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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines discourses around reading and reading 
instruction, with particular reference to children. The argument 
is that literate practices are crucially involved in the formation 
of that child. Psychology, when it establishes itself as the 
science which has the measure of the individual, becomes 
intertwined with literate practices and illuminates the relation 
between reading and the child in a new way. This thesis suggests 
that to understand the interrelations between reading, psychology 
and the child in our culture, one must pay attention to problems 
connected with the government of that culture, and, more 
specifically, to what Foucault has termed `governmentality'. 
Nowadays, literate practices are fundamental to the 
construction of citizens fit to take their place in society; this 
has not always been so. This thesis writes a genealogy of how a 
cognitive maximisation of literacy skills became a social 
imperative. It examines a series of crucial historical moments in 
this transformation. 
First, a set of reorganisations in the philological world in 
the middle of the eighteenth century enable the reader to become, 
for the first time, a problem. 
Second, the nineteenth-century reappraisal of the 
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transformative effects of education makes literacy for the lower 
orders desirable. Experiments in techniques of schooling allow 
for the formation of certain sorts of individuals. The thesis 
examines these processes of formation and analyses the 
contemporaneous reorganisation of the teacher-pupil 
relationship. 
Third, the beginning of our century sees psychology take an 
interest in literacy and the child. Psychology colonises such 
discursive processes and provides techniques for making new 
aspects of the literate child visible. The child is scientifically 
made subject to a set of practices which aim to calculate and 
administer. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Education may well be, as of right, the 
instrument whereby every individual, in 
a society like our own, can gain access 
to any kind of discourse. But we well 
know that in its distribution, in what it 
permits and what it prevents, it 
follows the well-trodden battle-lines 
of social conflict. Every educational 
system is a political means of 
maintaining or of modifying the 
appropriation of discourse, with the 
knowledge and the powers it carries 
with it."' 
"In Books lies the soul of the whole 
past time the articulate and audible 
voice of the past when the body and 
material substance of it has altogether 
vanished like a dream."2 
This thesis attempts to investigate the topic of children learning 
to read. In doing so, it situates itself in a critical way in 
relation to a whole series of theoretical and experimental 
projects in developmental psychology which have set out to 
discover the truth about this process: it takes these various 
studies as its backdrop and its point of departure. However, this 
thesis does not engage directly with these studies - it engages 
' Michel Foucault, The Order of Discourse', in R. Young (ed.), Untying the Text: 
A Post-Structuralist Reader, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.64. 
2 Thomas Carlyle. 
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rather with the historical conditions which have allowed these 
studies to occur, the conditions of possibility for such studies to 
constitute themselves as possible (that is to say, thinkable) 
projects The thesis attempts to develop an argument that 
dominant psychological explanations of the developmental reading 
process are produced within a field that can be termed the field 
of `governmentality'. That is to say, they relate to a series of 
historically specific strategies which have concerned themselves 
with the problems involved in governing the population or 
specific populations according to specific rationalities of 
government. `Governmentality' does not carry a simply negative 
meaning: a sense of the 'state' repressing individuals by forming 
apparatuses of oppression above them. Rather, it refers to all 
those processes which, since the eighteenth century, have aimed 
at the maximisation of the abilities, happiness, and health of the 
population - a process we might think of as the 'amplification of 
capacities'.3 
My argument is that the child is caught up in the web of 
governmentality; s/he is constantly incited to an amplification of 
his/her capacities, whether cognitive, emotional, or physical. 
Governmentality causes a series of interventions to be targeted 
3 I follow Michel Foucault's periodisation for the birth of governmentality here. 
See also Chapter Four, 'The New Pedagogy', which deals with the beginnings of these 
maximisation strategies in relation to literacy, starting also early in the eighteenth 
century. 
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at the subjective existence of the child; in fact, these 
interventions are crucial in the constitution of the child. The 
humble techniques of reading instruction, and the uses that 
literacy skills are put to, are some of the vectors of these new 
types of power. 
Many recent critiques of psychology have focused on 
psychology as an agent of oppression.' They have pointed to the 
theoretical and epistemological problems that make psychology 
unable to function as a liberatory mechanism in people's lives. It 
would have been possible for me to have taken a similar 
perspective in regard to the psychology of reading: in particular, 
because of the theoretical problem of dualism, I would have been 
able to sustain a critique of psychology as something which 
distorts our understanding of the 'real' processes going on.5 No 
doubt psychology is constrained ultimately to conceptualise 
reading as a mechanical, cognitive process. This conception of 
reading as a transaction between the child and the text, involving 
the former in some way processing the latter, in its pure form 
ignores the social context in which the 'process' takes place; and 
°In the field of psychology, the texts that assume this position are legion; some of 
the Marxist accounts of the functioning of psychological knowledge are clear 
examples. See, for example, Edward Sampson, 'Cognitive Psychology as Ideology', 
American Psychologist 36, 730-43, 1981; Ian Parker, Discourse Dynamics, 
London, Routledge, 1992. 
5 In the field of education, it is a fairly common strategy to engage in arguments of 
this sort. See, for example, Herbert R. Kohl, Reading - How To, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1974. 
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in its diluted form reduces the social context to a purely additive 
effect, 'surface noise' that, in the final analysis, is secondary to 
the cognitive transaction between the individual and the object 
(in this case, the child and the text). 
While there is much to be gained from such critiques of 
psychology, I am ultimately not interested in disputing the truth 
claims that psychology makes as regards its knowledge of the 
reading child: I do not wish to join battle with psychology on the 
terrain of epistemology. On the contrary, I am willing to go some 
way to accepting such psychological theorisation, because I 
believe that it is productive, rather than merely descriptive, of 
people and the social world they live in. What I aim to do is 
unsettle some of the claims this body of knowledge makes to be 
self-evident and humanitarian. 
To do this, I make use of theory that has originated outside 
psychology, partly because it is my contention that the way 
psychology is set up as a discipline makes it unable to 
conceptualise its history and its role in the formation of `the 
social' in any way other than as a history of progress: a privileged 
access to 'truth' which is a neutral, scientific understanding of 
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the individual.6 The theory I make use of can be broadly termed 
`critical theory', and has in the main developed in France over the 
last thirty years or so. Of primary importance among these 
alternative positions is the notion of `discourse'; discourse, at 
its most basic, refers to people's talk, but the meaning of 
discourse in French critical theory has become somewhat 
extended. A particular discourse refers to a coherent set of 
beliefs or practices: thus there may be particular discourses that 
are appropriate to medicine or schooling, for example; one can 
speak of the discourses of paediatrics, or of developmental 
psychology. These phenomena, by exhibiting a systematicity in 
the ways in which they can be spoken of as well as practised, 
attain the status of discourse. The notion of discourse has been 
extended to encompass not just words, but actions and practices 
as well. So, to think of this extension of meaning in the context 
of developmental psychology, we need to consider not only talk, 
but practices, beliefs, texts, and so on. To take an example: the 
corpus of Jean Piaget's work can be said to be part of 
developmental psychological discourse: the texts themselves are 
not literally 'talk', but are nonetheless part of what we might 
6 A quick glance at any of the standard accounts of the history of psychology, as 
written by psychologists, will confirm this view. See, for example, Thomas H. 
Leahey, A History of Psychology, 3rd Edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 
1992; James F. Brennan, History and Systems of Psychology, 3rd Edition, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1991; L. S. Hearnshaw, The Shaping of 
Modern Psychology, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987. 
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term the 'regime of meaning' that is modern developmental 
psychology, and feed back in to the continuing change and 
development of psychological discourse. Piaget's work is a part 
of modern psychological discourse, and can only be understood 
with reference to that discourse; conversely, it makes other 
aspects of psychological discourse themselves comprehensible - 
in fact, I would go further and say that it makes them sayable 
and/or visible. A discourse, then, can be characterised as a 
`regime of meaning' in that it sets up the intelligibility of any 
series of practices - developmental psychology is only 
understandable through a series of developmental psychological 
discourses, ways of talking about and practising developmental 
psychology. In addition, a discourse can be characterised as a 
`regime of truth', in that it forms the limit of intelligibility, and 
thus constrains what can be said (and so what can be accepted as 
true); we might also think of a discourse as a 'regime of truth' 
because the essential productivity of its nature means that it is 
the source of any innovation which it might in turn legitimate.' 
My approach to 'truth' within such a discursive framework is 
radically different from that typical of what we might term 
`scientific' psychology; in brief, I do not conceive of truth as a 
' One may note in passing that such a definition of discourse radically disturbs the 
foundations of 'truth', which can be thought of as discursively produced and thus 
potentially alterable. The phrase 'regime of truth' conveys something of this notion 
of truth as non-absolute, tied rather to a discursive and historical specificity. 
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priori, out there in the world waiting to be discovered by science; 
rather, discourse has a crucial role in the production of truth. 
Baldly, 'truth' itself is an effect of discourse: part of a 
discourse's 'positivity' (its nature as productive) is in its 
production of 'truth'. 
My aim in this thesis is to examine reading and the 
discourses that relate to reading, in particular in connection with 
the child beginning-reader. Because I start off by examining 
reading discursively, I am already moving towards an explanation 
of the child becoming a reader which is different in important 
respects from those usually entertained in psychology: I am now 
able to treat the child as a 'subject' of discourse, that is, as in an 
important sense produced through the workings of discourse; and 
I am able to consider the text as a 'discursive monument', that is, 
as something which is itself intrinsic to its discourse, 
explainable only with reference to the conditions of its 
production and having a further effectiveness within its own 
discourse (and possibly others). Neither the child nor the text in 
the reading process are treated as a priori, which in essence is 
what most psychological explanations do: instead, the discourse 
in which the act of reading takes place is always-already present. 
One can think of the child as always positioned within a 
discourse, and as being a subject in and of discourse; and one can 
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think of texts as part of the ebb and flow of discourse, not 
springing spontaneously to life, but evolving out of discourse, and 
altering its subsequent pattern - monuments in and of discourse. 
I began my investigations by working in the field: I followed 
two classes of children, first and second year infants, in two 
inner-city, working-class primary schools, for a period of just 
over a year. I made use of techniques of participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews, focusing on both the children and 
the teachers in a variety of classroom settings. I was also able 
to interview other teachers at the same schools, formally and 
informally. From this field work, I was able to develop a 
theorisation of the 'state of play' in the modern school: how the 
child, in learning to read, is constituted as a subject of 
governmental strategies, is maximised in terms of his/her 
subjective existence, has his/her capacities (particularly the 
cognitive capacities) amplified. In addition, one sees how the 
teacher is bound up in this process of producing a citizen through 
such devices as the transmission of literacy skills, and the 
strains and anxieties that flow from such a duty. One also sees 
something of the relationship between the school and the home, 
and how they form a complex, a grid from which the child is 
extorted. My account of this fieldwork is given in Chapter 10. 
I precede this chapter with the bulk of my research, in 
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which the basic question is: how did such modern discursive 
formations come about? My contention is that these modern 
knowledges and practices are historically produced and thus do 
not refer to a timeless and universal process through which the 
child learns to read. By drawing attention to their specificity, I 
can embark upon an analysis of how these knowledges gain the 
status of truth: how does the cognitive maximisation of literacy 
skills become a social imperative? How does psychology become 
the technique which can adjudicate on the success or failure of 
this maximisation? It is perhaps not giving too much away to say 
that these truths do not arise through the 'march of progress', but 
because they relate to wider projects to regulate and govern the 
population. This reworking of how one can think about truth and 
knowledge necessitates this second strand of my work, since it 
becomes impossible to understand the present without looking at 
the past that is constitutive of it. This strand of my work is 
directed primarily at a period from about 1830 to about 1870, a 
time of important technical change in methods of instruction 
related to reading, and a time which I maintain was the scene of 
the production of a set of stable discursive concerns, that is, 
concerns that are still relevant and still have an effectiveness 
with relation to modern practices and problems. The institution 
of compulsory education facilitated the consideration of children 
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as a distinct group with their own specific educational 
characteristics, while technical shifts in the teaching of reading 
and the reading materials considered suitable were also part of 
the conditions of possibility of having this new object of study, 
the child at school. My research also uncovers ways in which the 
teaching of reading was related to a series of wider concerns: for 
example, a concern to produce a workforce suitable for Britain's 
changing role in the world (and a workforce whose education was 
circumscribed to avoid the 'dangers' of over-education). The 
inculcation of good habits into this workforce (and here there 
was a concern with generation and hygiene, as well as morals) 
was seen as best achieved through the education of the 
workforce's children, who would take home the lessons learned 
through reading, which had by now been transformed into a 
widespread skill. 
I maintain that it is in the period immediately after this 
that psychology, arising in response to a need for an intensified 
programme of social regulation and administration, effectively 
`colonised' reading, which became in its turn an intensified 
vector of power, aiming at the body and the soul of the child. 
This colonisation transformed and 'reinvented' reading; 
psychology now became the discourse that most effectively 
claimed to speak the truth of the individual - reading became a 
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relay, enabling psychology to operate as an effective regulatory 
practice. From this time on, reading can be thought of as no 
longer just a discourse in its own right, but also as a `surface of 
emergence' for the new discourses of the human sciences, and 
psychology in particular.8 Having argued, then, that the period 
1830-1870 is a crucial one in the formation of modern literate 
practices and modern literate subjects, I attempt to produce a 
history, or genealogy, of some of the crucial innovations that set 
this period apart. 
The organisation of the thesis reflects this split in the 
research. The 'historical' chapters, which form the bulk of the 
thesis, detail what can be called a 'genealogy' of the modern child 
beginning-reader, tracing the 'conditions of possibility°  for what 
one might think of as a crucial discursive shift which happens 
around the middle-to-end of the nineteenth century. This shift is 
itself shown to be part of the conditions of possibility for 
'Foucault discusses the concept of 'surface of emergence' in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, London, Tavistock, 1972, p. 41. Literacy makes a strange bedfellow for 
some of the other surfaces Foucault instances, such as the family, religious groups, 
sexuality, criminality, etc, but I maintain that literacy is not the straightforward 
set of skills it might appear at first glance. 
The terms 'genealogy' and 'conditions of possibility', which I have already 
begun to use, will be outlined below in detail. The former is a Nietzschean term 
designed to mark a difference in terms of investigative procedure from 'history'. 
The latter was originally a Kantian term, and is used to signal a distrust of the 
totalisation of most versions of the cause-effect relation, or of such notions as 
'influence'. 
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modern practice. I am concerned to demonstrate how a project 
like the psychology of reading became 'thinkable', and to do that I 
have to trace some very old roots, or 'discursive resources', 
indeed. The history of different forms of discipline, of 
examination, of the silencing of reading, and of projects aiming 
to correct the moral life of the child, are among the topics I 
cover. I also deal, although much more schematically, with some 
of the shifts and adjustments that need to be made when the 
psychology of reading becomes established: problems which 
relate to the transference of certain ethical exigencies to a 
psychological register. In attempting to do this work, I have 
concentrated on material that relates to the situation in England; 
however, I also make use of material that relates to the situation 
in other parts of Western Europe and in North America. No doubt, 
to do justice to all the countries involved would require a much 
more microscopic analysis. However, I have been content with 
producing a much more schematic account, at the risk of over-
generalising: I have taken the generation of hypotheses to be the 
most important part of this research. As I discuss in more detail 
in Chapter 1, I am less concerned with the production of a 
`standard' historical work than with attempting to undermine 
certain cherished beliefs about the foundations of modern 
educational practices. 
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In Chapter 10, I introduce the field work I have conducted. I 
demonstrate how the production of certain forms of knowledge 
and of power are not merely of historical interest, but can be 
seen in the running of the modern classroom and in modern 
attempts to make the child literate. This account of modernity 
will also be seen to act as a test of how useful my historical 
work has been: how far the historical work makes aspects of the 
present more understandable is perhaps the best way of judging 
its success. 
The two parts form a coherent single project: the analysis 
of modernity is taken to be a key step to empower the possibility 
of change; and a genealogy of modern practice effectively 
demonstrates the latter's cultural and historical specificity. 
This is a necessary step, given my contention that modern 
practices cannot be understood outside the (newly-
problematised) categories of knowledge and truth. A 
(presumptuous) subtitle to the thesis might be "A History of 
Reading and Truth", since this is the crux of my investigations: 
the analysis of the modern configurations of truth as they relate 
to the child reader; and a history of those configurations. My 
intention is to demonstrate that things that appear to be givens 
are not so, and consequently that we can make a difference to the 
present. Uncovering and enabling such possibilities, or at least 
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making a contribution in that direction, is perhaps the most this 
or any thesis can hope for. 
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1: THE THEORETICAL 
"Theory does not express, translate, or 
serve to apply practice: it is practice... 
A theory is exactly like a box of tools."' 
To begin: why this investigation of reading and children, a well-
worn research topic in developmental psychology, on which a 
plethora of data has already been collected? - reading readiness, 
phonics, look-and-say, reading and cognition, phonological 
encoding, the importance of short-term memory, saccadic 
reading, reading disabilities, the relative contributions of 
environment and heredity, all these have already been examined 
and re-examined, and the results duly set down in those great 
scientific texts that promise us the truth of the individual from a 
roster of performance. My (minor) polemic is meant to signal a 
break, a stepping-back to reconsider the terms on which the 
whole (psychological) venture is based. There will be no new 
`facts' here, no definitive answers. This piece of work is a more 
modest venture, and takes its cue from Derrida's "profound 
suspicion" of all those taken-for-granted concepts that invest 
(and maybe infest) our lives.' I am simply interested in re- 
' Michel Foucault/Gilles Deleuze. 
'Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in Art and Architecture, Academy Forum/Tate 
Gallery Video, 1988. 
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examining those questions around reading, and around children, 
and around the relation between the two, while trying to 
problematise those explanations and facts which come all too 
easily, "suspiciously" easily one might say. For example, 
research into reading is often conducted with an implicit model 
as to the status of the phenomena that are under investigation, a 
model which provides the limit of theorisation: the child is a 
particular (autonomous) thing, the text is something else quite 
separate and likewise autonomous, and the 'transaction' between 
the two involves the ideas of the author (as embodied in the text) 
getting into the child's mind. All of this is 'reading', a 'neutral' 
activity, and fundamentally a 'cognitive' activity, both benign and 
self-evident. Of course, to be fair, this degree of naivety is not 
characteristic of all research in this area, but psychology has 
been slow to take up work in semiotics, psychoanalysis, post-
structu ralism3 and other approaches in the human sciences that 
have disputed these simplicities with some success; but then 
again, one must problematise a definition of psychology as an 
academic venture in search of the truth, making use of the best 
theoretical tools that it can lay its hands on. More of this later. 
This venture of "profound suspicion" leaves one wondering 
3 I follow Deleuze and Guattari in using these totalising expressions for 
convenience, "out of habit". One must, however, guard against the periodisations 
that such shorthands may evoke. 
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where to start; how to proceed when one must try and force 
oneself to suspect all those taken-for-granteds that underlie 
one's investigations - and when one must perhaps suspect 
`investigation' most of all. The whole history of 'investigation' 
under the aegis of Western metaphysics has been cast into doubt 
by the simple manoeuvre of suspicion; for the West orients itself 
around what Derrida has termed the logocentre' (or 
`phallogocentre'). In particular, the logocentricity of Western 
science privileges 'reason' and 'rationality', which in their turn 
pathologise 'unreason', an unreason which can attach itself to 
women, children, the lower orders, savages, or any group that 
seems in need of regulation. What I hope to demonstrate is that 
this 'reason' or 'rationality', which excludes and delimits, forms 
the bedrock of scientific psychological investigation and 
theorisation; nonetheless, it can be demonstrated that this is a 
project, in the sense that it is a political endeavour in which 
strategic investments are made.' Psychology orients itself 
around the twin poles of 'reason' and 'government', and reaches 
its goal in the production of the reasonable citizen who can 
regulate him- or herself even more effectively than an overt 
For the purposes of this thesis, I am most interested in the privileging of 
rationality in the service of government, a process Foucault has referred to by the 
neologism `governmentality'. It is also worth pointing out that Foucault has argued 
in Madness and Civilization that Western civilisation is founded on the insistence of a 
dichotomy between reason and unreason. 
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system of control can manage. Psychology colonises reading and 
extorts it to do its will: reading becomes a relay in the 
production of the obedient subject, reading works as part of a 
technology of government. Yet the way 'reasonable' projects like 
psychology operate is to exclude all counter-arguments as 
`irrational' and thus as 'wrong': and it becomes very hard to 
question that which presents itself as self-evident. The problem 
is: how does one deconstruct these claims to truth, how does one 
write about the 'hidden' history of social regulation that I 
maintain lies behind the seemingly-innocuous story of how and 
why children are taught to read, when one's tools are fashioned to 
work in the opposite direction? 
What seems clear is that any critical venture is forced to 
begin on the metaphysical terrain that it would maybe rather 
undercut, and thus runs the perpetual risk of restoring, of 
reasserting, the logocentre in the very act of deconstruction. 
Derrida has made this risk very clear in his critique of Foucault's 
attempt to write an archaeology of a silence, the silence around 
madness: 
"But first of all, is there a history of 
silence? Further, is not an archaeology, 
even of silence, a logic, that is, an 
organised language, a project, an order, 
a sentence, a syntax, a work? Would 
not the archaeology of silence be the 
most efficacious and subtle 
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restoration, the repetition, in the most 
irreducibly ambiguous meaning of the 
word, of the act perpetrated against 
madness - and be so at the very moment 
when this act is denounced?"5 
Foucault's own suggestions as to how one can write a history of 
silence are perhaps idealist: he privileges a space outside 
discourse from where a 'counter-memory' might arise! 
Whatever, it seems likely that this is an insoluble problem: how 
can one step outside one's own milieu and produce a history of 
silence? Nonetheless, there would certainly seem to be 
strategies one can adopt, the simplest (and simultaneously the 
most difficult) of which is to keep as critical an eye on one's own 
venture as on those 'truths' that one works to deconstruct. 
Certainly, it would seem theoretically impossible to avoid the 
reassertion of the logos, but in practice, as reason, according to 
Derrida, always refers to, and exists by virtue of its difference 
from, unreason, such proximity might well make possible some 
'Jacques Derrida, 'Cogito and the History of Madness', in Writing and 
Difference, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p.35, italics in original. 
The lecture of which this is a translation was a response to Michel Foucault's Folie 
et deraison: histoire de la folie a rage classique, Paris, Plon, 1961. 
6 See Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected 
Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977, 
p.113-196, and especially `Theatrum Philosophicum', a translation of an essay 
which appeared in Critique 282, 1970, 885-908. For many of the French texts I 
refer to in this section I have given references both to the original version and to the 
English translation; this is because some of the theoretical points have either been 
badly rendered or else have become rather opaque in translation, and thus may 
benefit from being considered in the original as well as in translation. 
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subversion of the logocentre - as would be suggested by the work 
of Nietzsche, Freud, Bataille, Artaud and Foucault among others. 
The existence of such 'otherness' in these authors' work suggests 
that the production of alternative positions is possible in 
practice even if it is very difficult to outline the conditions 
under which they might come into existence. 
However, I should not want wish this thesis to be read as in 
some sense defending a primitive and 'wild' form of literacy 
which can stand outside of and escape those governmental 
strategies which seek to pervade it. In this sense, I am not 
writing a history of the referent, of 'reading itself', but rather 
seeking to outline the deployment of reading in a constellation of 
projects which constitute 'society' "as an historically specific 
assemblage of positive knowledges of the soul and 'the social', of 
technologies for the policing of conduct, and of rules for the 
government of the self".7 In this sense, my account is less an 
account of 'silenced discourse', than an account of what discourse 
produces; and further, why certain statements are not made, why 
certain possibilities are excluded from the discourses around 
reading. 
' I borrow these words from Nikolas Rose, 'Of madness itself: Histoire de la folie 
and the object of psychiatric history', History of the Human Sciences 3, 3, 1990, 
373-380, p.374. Foucault himself suggests that there is a tension in his work 
between a description of the wild and untamed object of a genealogy, and a denial of 
the possibility that such an object can exist outside of a nexus of discourses. See 
The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp.16, 47. 
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My concern, then, is with the power-knowledge edifice that 
supports contemporary (developmental) psychology and 
particularly its incursions into the activity of reading. My 
approach will try to combine two apparently antithetical 
positions. On the one hand I shall evidence a complete refusal of 
psychological explanation: taken to its logical conclusion, my 
position is that a 'progressive' psychological theory of reading is 
impossible. Psychology cannot be 'saved', because its practice is 
not, as is commonly believed, a progress towards truth - that is 
to say, I will not partake of an 'act of faith' in science. Rather, I 
maintain that psychology is in essence a series of disciplinary 
and administrative practices, and the fact that its truths (or 
what I would term 'truth effects', that is, what has an effective 
status as true within psychological discourse) are so often seen 
as universal is only a mark of what I would term its 'effective 
ideologisation': how effectively it works as a discourse to 
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establish itself as `true'.8 My deconstruction of psychological 
theory, of a psychological claim to tell the truth, is mindful of 
Lyotard's warning that deconstruction can easily nurture the 
same terrorist pretensions to truth as 'construction'. He makes 
this clear in his critique of Baudrillard, locating the trap set by 
rationality at the moment of its apparent defeat:- 
"This perfectly simple trap consists in 
answering the demand of vanquished 
theory, and this demand is: 'put 
something in my place'. Now the 
important thing is the place, not the 
content of the theory. It is the place of 
theory which must be beaten. And that 
can only be done by displacement and 
flight."9 
Part of my method is to refuse the place where psychology seeks 
its answers, and I hope to reveal how it is not only possible but 
also necessary to reveal psychology as something other, and 
8 This term is deliberately used in contrast with the concept of 'ideology' as it is 
frequently used in the social sciences, and particularly in some forms of Marxism. 
'Ideology' implies that another, more real, truth exists behind the ideological level. 
My analysis suggests rather that there is no truth apart from what is produced 
through discourse - if discursively something is 'true' and has 'effects' ('truth 
effects'), then my interest is in analysing these truths rather than disputing them 
and claiming they are false because they are unpalatable, which is the thrust of most 
theories of ideology. Deleuze and Guattari sum it up with characteristic iconoclasm: 
"There is no ideology and there never has been" (A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, London, Athlone, 1988, p.4, a translation of Mille Plateaux: 
Capitalisme et Schizophrenie, Paris, Minuit, 1980). What I do dispute are the 
claims to universality that these truths often make: they are historical and cultural 
specificities. 
9 Jean-Francois Lyotard, Economie libidinale, Paris, Minuit, 1974, p.129, 
italics in original; the translation is taken from Geoff Bennington, Lyotard: Writing 
the Event, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988, p.35. 
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something more, than it presents itself as: psychology as self-
occulting. 
My second position is, however, to take psychology very 
seriously indeed as a productive discourse; my analysis will show 
how psychology is crucially implicated in the production of the 
particular truth that is the self-regulating citizen - 
accomplished, in part, through teaching the child to read. 
However, given the way in which 'truth' is conceptualised in the 
present thesis, it should be clear that it is possible both to 
dispute and deconstruct the eternal truths of psychological 
practice while examining just what these truths accomplish. 
In addition, it is important to avoid any extravagant claims 
about how revolutionary this thesis is, and Derrida again puts it 
nicely:- 
"The reproductive forces of authority 
can get along more comfortably with 
declarations or theses whose content 
presents itself as revolutionary, 
provided that they respect the rites of 
legitimation, the rhetoric and the 
institutional symbolism which defuses 
and neutralises whatever comes from 
outside the system."1° 
10 Derrida, 'The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations', in Alan Montefiore (ed.), 
Philosophy in France Today, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.44. 
Derrida continues by arguing that for him a 'thesis' is strictly speaking impossible 
since a `thetic' presentation implies a positional (or, no different, an oppositional) 
logic. To the extent that I agree with him perhaps the present work should be 
regarded as an 'athesis'. 
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The apparent paradox of linking such modesty with a 
deconstructive venture, which has aroused such antipathy in so 
many quarters, can be dissolved if one realises that such a 
venture is not a modern invention, but merely part of a 
hermeneutic practice that stretches back at least to the Greeks." 
The great achievement of modern psychological practice is that it 
has defined what are legitimate and illegitimate modes of 
inquiry; the knowledge that these are historically specific allows 
one to see one's deconstructive investigations as part of a long 
tradition which 'science' tries to exclude. Thus a refusal of these 
strictures can only be seen as revolutionary if one fails to retain 
a historical perspective which can show us just how extensively 
the terrain on which we argue has already been defined by the 
`other side'. 
Now it would seem that this process of breaking down 
psychology's claim to exclusivity in the field of knowledge about 
the individual is perhaps the most important step: once one puts 
into question the self-evident quality that much psychological 
investigation assumes for itself, one's own work can lose some 
" Derrida in Deconstruction in Art and Architecture contests the notion that 
deconstruction is a new venture or investigative paradigm, but is merely a practice 
that has gone on at least since the time of Plato. The obverse of this is his claim that 
he does not exclusively practice deconstruction. This recourse to the Greeks to 
dispute naive interpretations of his work has a parallel in Foucault's attempts to 
demonstrate the discursive roots of modern 'technologies of the self' in ancient 
Greece and Rome. For all their anti-metaphysical rhetoric, Derrida and Foucault 
frequently tread the well-worn paths of philosophy. 
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of that defensiveness which is engendered by psychology's 
appropriation of the 'truth', and the consequent hostility it has 
towards those who dispute this truth. Consequently, I shall not 
spend too much time justifying the legitimacy of my approach: its 
usefulness should be seen to lie in what anyone can derive from 
it, and whether it seems to provide a plausible account'2 of 
phenomena annexed to the domain of the psychological. In this 
venture, I am greatly helped by other recent work which has begun 
these inroads into the taken-for-granted, and has enabled the 
present work to be situated as part of a project whose need 
continually to justify itself is perhaps less than it once was. The 
most obvious debt here is to recent French theory, which has 
contested the notions of social determinism and individual 
coherence, and has suggested a range of possibilities for thinking 
about human action, political practice, and the importance of the 
socio-historical domain in the productivity of everyday life. This 
work is usually characterised as descendant from the 
problematics of les evenements of May 1968 and crises within 
the French Communist Party regarding the 'failure' of Marxism, 
but it seems clear that, well before this time, a renewal of 
12 In seeking to give nothing more than a 'plausible account', I am deliberately 
echoing the playfulness of Foucault, who often remarked that his books were 'novels'. 
However, a serious point lies behind this playfulness, since it demonstrates an 
unwillingness to set up an absolutist text with those 'terrorist' truth-games to 
which Lyotard has alerted us. 
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interest in Nietzsche and Heidegger was fuelling a concern with 
the irrational and the possibilities of undermining the logic of 
the dominant Western modes of thought. Derrida and Foucault are 
key names here, as is Jacques Lacan, who more than anyone 
disputed the coherence of the individual and opened up a renewed 
consideration of subjectivity; Louis Althusser, too, was 
concerned with this problem, and although his notion of the 
interpellation of the subject, an attempt to fuse Marxism and a 
modified Freudo-Lacanianism, is generally regarded as 
problematic, his work inspired much of what was to come later 
(particularly POcheux), and demonstrated that Marxism's 
conception of the individual needed to be problematised; while 
Roland Barthes's textual analyses brought into question the 
categories of author and text, and challenged the empiricism and 
humanism that had dominated literary criticism, with 
repercussions way beyond his chosen field. Some of this work 
concentrated specifically on psychology and its related 
disciplines, particularly the research done by Foucault and his 
Page 32 
circle,13 although most of the 'new' approach to psychology 
developed in Britain. I am thinking here in particular of the 
journal Ideology and Consciousness (later /&C, which played an 
important part in introducing much of this theory to those 
interested in radical psychology) and books that were written 
subsequently by members of that journal's editorial collective 
and others.14 A renewed interest in psychoanalysis also chipped 
away at the psychological edifice: the impetus for this 
" Foucault's training was initially in psychology, although in the latter part of 
his career he rarely dealt with psychology per se. He gained his Licencede 
psychologie in 1949 and his Diplome de psycho-pathologie from the Institut de 
Psychologie in Paris in 1952. Just after this he published the text that deals more 
explicitly with psychology than anything else in the corpus of his work, Maladie 
mentale et personalite, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1954, which was 
revised and republished in 1962 as Maladie mentale et psychologie. This is available 
in translation as Mental Illness and Psychology, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1987. His later book, Folie et deraison: histoire de la folie a rage classique 
concentrated on psychiatry. This is available in an abridged translation, Madness 
and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, New York, Random House, 
1965. Of Foucault's circle, Jacques Donzelot is perhaps most concerned with 
psychology. See his La police des families, Paris, Minuit, 1977, translated as The 
Policing of Families, New York, Pantheon, 1979, as well as his L'Invention du 
social: essai sur le declin de passions politiques, Paris, Fayard, 1984. 
"This journal made available, often for the first time in English, pieces by 
Foucault, Donzelot, Deleuze and Guattari, and others, and dealt with work in the 
psychoanalytic tradition (Lacan, Irigaray, and others). It also provided an 
opportunity for British psychologists to develop work using these theoretical 
positions. Notable in this regard are Diana Adlam et al., 'Psychology, Ideology and 
the Human Subject', IdeologyandConsciousness 1, 1977, 5-56; Couze Venn and 
Valerie Walkerdine, 'The Acquisition and Production of Knowledge: Piaget's Theory 
Reconsidered', IdeologyandConsciousness 3, 1978, 67-94; Denise Riley, 
'Developmental Psychology, Biology and Marxism', IdeologyandConsciousness 4, 
1978, 73-92; Nikolas Rose, 'The Psychological Complex: Mental Measurement and 
Social Administration', IdeologyandConsciousness 5, 1979, 5-70; and Karen Jones 
and Kevin Williamson, 'The Birth of the Schoolroom', /&C 6, 1979, 59-110. 
Perhaps the most important books in this tradition are Julian Henriques et al., 
Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity, London, 
Methuen, 1984, and Nikolas Rose, The Psychological Complex: Psychology, Politics 
and Society in England 1869-1939, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985. 
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`rediscovery' of Freud came from the work of Lacan, and it was 
taken up, again, particularly in the I&C circle, some of whose 
members developed a theoretical position which attempted to 
reconcile post-structural notions of discourse with 
psychoanalytic conceptions of subjectivity. 
It is possible, then, to situate the present thesis within an 
already existing tradition which, roughly speaking, problematises 
the notion of the subject and stresses the importance of the 
discursive. I shall gradually unveil my own theoretical 
predilections and refusals, but at this point it will suffice to 
stress the basis for my selection of theory. It is not simply a 
case of eclecticism to combine, for example, Latourian notions of 
enrolment with Foucaultian theories of the power-knowledge 
couple; and even though it seems to me entirely proper to do what 
one likes with theory,15 my own regroupings of French theoretical 
work are justifiable because of the common themes (or better, 
paranthemes, anthems) that much of this writing inspires. This 
is not to suggest an identity among the work that inspires my 
own, but is rather a recognition of the similar problematics with 
'Foucault comes to my defence, so to speak, while discussing his use of 
Nietzsche: "The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely to use 
it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I am 
being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest." 
`Entretien sur la prison', Magazine Litteraire 101, June 1975, 27-33. Translated 
as 'Prison Talk: an Interview with Michel Foucault', Radical Philosophy 16, Spring 
1977, 10-15. 
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which all these endeavours engage. Thus I maintain that it is 
possible to utilise various aspects of differing theoretical 
orientations with a reasonable chance of non-contradiction: 
besides which, an obsession with non-contradiction, with 
theoretical purity, while attempting to describe the functioning 
of the most tortuously complicated discursive formations is 
perhaps not the most helpful approach. To feel oneself hamstrung 
by logic is to risk restating the logocentre; none of which points 
to a rejection of rigour or of care, but the emphasis is rather on 
the exploration of possibilities. Is it possible to think 
differently? 
It should by now be a little clearer what sort of approach to 
the question of children and reading I have decided to take. First 
of all, the principles of suspicion and care are evoked. One needs 
to select tools for this task carefully and critically, and alter 
them as the task demands. This section is designed to lay out 
those resources that seem most apposite for the task in hand, 
given the inescapability of the metaphysical (but don't forget the 
refusals above, the exergue to this thesis: this is a modest 
venture, content to try and use those fissures in the clOture of 
Page 35 
the metaphysical domain to suggest new departures, new 
questionings, in an area that seems to labour under the hegemony 
of the common-sense). What I would like to suggest is a dual 
strategy to begin these questionings, a duality formed from a 
couple that I hope to show are mutually informative, and, indeed, 
indissoluble. The first strategy: try to examine those modern 
practices around the child and reading, and situate them 
critically in their relation to the other discourses of social life: 
that is, one must ask such questions as 'why is this as it is?', 
`who stands to gain from it?', 'is there a wider context in which 
these practices are comprehensible?' The second strategy: try to 
construct a history of these practices - 'where do they come 
from?', 'with what other discourses are they coarticulated?', 
`could things have been otherwise (and could they still be)?' 
These two strategies form part of one overarching method of 
inquiry, since the examination of modern practices can only be 
done by an attention to their (historical and other) specificities, 
which can be drawn out by situating them in relation to their 
history, the context of their emergence, and the conditions of 
'I take these terms from Derrida's Positions, Paris, Minuit, 1972, translated 
as Positions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981. Derrida's point here is 
that, overall, a strategy of escape from the Western phallogocentre is impossible, 
and it would be idealist to suppose otherwise. However, there exist points from 
which this 'closure' can be identified and critiqued, the kind of place (or non-place) 
from which Derrida's work itself comes. It sums up neatly the raison d'être of this 
(a)thesis: find fissures and make use of those positions. 
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their possibility. However, it is not just the attention to 
specificity which constrains one to look at the past: it is 
precisely because knowledge and truth are to be problematised, 
that one needs to look to the past to analyse the emergence of 
those particular forms of knowledge and truth that are relevant 
to children and reading. Not only is the examination of modernity 
in this way made inextricable from its historical underpinnings, 
but the reverse is also postulated: a meaningful history of 
practice must concern itself with present problematics and 
conjunctural thematics - it must be a 'history of the present', 
taking its cue from there and aiming at the deconstruction of 
those present practices, aligning itself with the politics of 
radical change. At which point the reader (my ideal reader, a 
fictive reader) will have noticed a subtle shift in orientation - 
the introduction of the political. 
This work starts from particular premises about the role of 
intellectual labour and its instrumental value in terms of 
bringing about social change. I start off with certain 
assumptions about the nature of social life, and a certain 
investment in the possibilities of changing that nature. The value 
of this work lies in whether it contributes to opening up new 
spaces for manoeuvre, finding its usefulness in whether it helps 
lay bare what Foucault has termed the 'mechanisms of power'. I 
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intend, by taking up such a position, to disavow the Marxist-
Leninist stance in which intellectuals form a separate class, in 
some senses in advance of the proletariat; rather, it seems to me 
that the task is to expose the truth effects of power, and to avoid 
being the instrument of those effects. It is perhaps worth 
eavesdropping on a conversation between Foucault and Deleuze: 
Foucault: "The intellectual's role is no 
longer to place himself 'somewhat 
ahead and to the side' in order to 
express the stifled truth of the 
collectivity; rather, it is to struggle 
against the forms of power that 
transform him into its object and 
instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge', 
`truth', 'consciousness', and 'discourse'. 
"In this sense theory does not 
express, translate, or serve to apply 
practice: it is practice. But it is local 
and regional, as you said, and not 
totalising. This is a struggle against 
power, a struggle aimed at revealing 
and undermining power where it is most 
invisible and insidious. It is not to 
`awaken consciousness' that we 
struggle... but to sap power, to take 
power; it is an activity conducted 
alongside those who struggle for power, 
and not their illumination from a safe 
distance. A 'theory' is the regional 
system of this struggle." 
Deleuze: "Precisely. A theory is exactly 
like a box of tools."' 
'Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, les intellectuels et le pouvoir', L'Arc 49, 
1972, 3-10. Translated as 'The Intellectuals and Power', Telos 16, 1973, 103-
109. 
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What should become clear from this is that an emphasis is 
not being placed on the Kantian ideal of the universal intellectual, 
but rather on the specific intellectual, who can engage in local, 
transversal struggles.18 Here's Foucault again on the 
intellectual's role: 
"The essential political problem for the 
intellectual is not to criticise the 
ideological contents supposedly linked 
to science, or to ensure that his own 
scientific practice is accompanied by a 
correct ideology, but that of 
ascertaining the possibility of 
constituting a new politics of truth. 
The problem is not changing people's 
consciousnesses - or what's in their 
heads - but the political, economic, 
institutional regime of the production 
of truth. 
"It's not a matter of emancipating 
truth from every system of power 
(which would be a chimera, for truth is 
already power) but of detaching the 
power of truth from the forms of 
hegemony, social, economic and 
cultural, within which it operates at 
the present time. 
"The political question, to sum up, is 
not error, illusion, alienated 
consciousness or ideology; it is truth 
itself. Hence the importance of 
'This is a recurrent motif in the work of Felix Guattari. See his Molecular 
Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984, a translation 
of material from Psychanalyse et transversalite, Paris, Maspero, 1972, La 
Revolution moleculaire, Fontenay-sous-Bois, Editions Recherches, 1977, and Les 
Annees d'hiver 1980-1985, Paris, Barrault, 1986. 
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Nietzsche."19 
Thus the intellectual's role is political, but limited, and the 
limitations are produced because reality is a discursive entity 
for Foucault; in the end, discourse is a matter of words, and 
words are the concern of intellectuals. This is the point of the 
reference to Nietzsche - when politics comes down to discourse, 
intellectuals become the politicians of our era.' All of which is 
to make a subtle change of emphasis in the intellectual's task: it 
is still very much a political one, although the notion of 'politics' 
has become subtly altered; however, the task now also concerns 
the effect intellectual labour has on the self. Foucault is clear 
that the struggle is to avoid becoming an instrument of power, 
but at the same time to change oneself, to move to the possibility 
of penser autrement: 
"one writes to become someone other 
than who one is",21 "to learn how (and 
how far) the effort to think one's own 
history can free thought from what it 
silently thinks, and so enable it to think 
'Foucault, 'Truth and Power', in Colin Gordon (ed.), Michel Foucault: 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Brighton, 
Harvester, 1980, p.133, a translation of 'Intervista a Michel Foucault', in 
Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino (eds), Michel Foucault: Microfisica del 
Potere: Interventi Politici, Turin, Einaudi, 1977. 
20 This point is made by Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985, 
p.239-40. 
21 Foucault, 'An Interview with Michel Foucault', postscript to Foucault's Death 
and the Labyrinth: the World of Raymond Roussel, London, Athlone, 1987, p. 182, a 
translation of Archeologie d'une passion', Magazine Litteraire 221, July-August 
1985, 100-5, p.104. 
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other things... what is philosophy today 
- what philosophers should actually be 
doing, I mean - if it is not the critical 
work that thought brings to bear on 
itself? What is it all about, other than 
the attempt to know how (and how far) 
it might be possible to think 
differently, instead of legitimating 
what is already known?"' 
Lyotard takes this 'downgrading' of the intellectual still further, 
and would seem to deny the possibility of political intervention 
politics for Lyotard is merely another genre, yet some of his 
aphorisms are strikingly reminiscent of the later Foucault:- 
"One writes before knowing what there 
is to say and how to say it, to find out 
if possible."23 
"Obviously the only interesting thing 
for the philosopher is to think what he 
can't manage to think: without that... I 
wonder what the hell he'd be doing... 
When you're trying to think about 
something in philosophy, you couldn't 
care less about the addressee, you don't 
give a damn. Someone comes along and 
says, 'I don't understand a word of what 
you say, of what you write': and I reply, 
`I don't give a damn. That's not the 
problem. I don't feel responsible 
" Foucault, Histoire de la sexualite II: L'usage des plaisirs, Paris, Gallimard, 
1984, p.14-5, my translation. This passage can be found in the standard English 
translation, The History of Sexuality Volume II: The Use of Pleasure, New York, 
Pantheon, 1985, p.8-9. The reference to "critical work" is an allusion to the 
production of an archaeology; the sense here has a flavour of 'thought archaeologising 
itself'. 
23 Lyotard, Le Postmoderne explique aux enfants: correspondance 1982-1985, 
Paris, Galilee, 1985, p.160. Translation from Bennington, Lyotard, p.103. 
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towards you. You're not my judge in 
this matter...' There's no contempt, it's 
not at all a problem of contempt."24 
Clearly, the role of the intellectual and of intellectual labour has 
been given great consideration by recent French theorists. But 
while, for example, Derrida25 and Lyotard (to oversimplify) 
eschew the necessary involvement of political issues in 
intellectual labour, Foucault always stressed the relevance of his 
inquiries to a project of changing the present and laying bare 
those mechanisms of power which characterise modern 
disciplinary society, and to a project of working to produce new 
forms of subjectivity. From the outset, I would ally myself with 
these aims and these hopes for the usefulness of intellectual 
work. This is why I have sought to write a Foucaultian account of 
the discursive production of the reading subject, that is, to 
provide a history of this present with an investment in forging 
new forms of subjectivity - a first step towards revolutionary 
24 Lyotard, Unpublished conversations with René Guiffrey, typescript, p.63-4, 
quoted in Bennington, Lyotard, p.104-5. 
25 Derrida's exegesis of his 'positions' as regards his work can perhaps best be 
grasped from his Positions. One of his interrogators, Houdebine, desperately tries to 
make Derrida pledge allegiance to a project of progressive Marxism (all of this being 
of particular concern because of a series of wrangles internal to the Tel Que/group). 
Derrida, of course, refuses, preferring the option of a multiplicity of positions 
(hence the title of these interviews). 
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change." 
If, as we have seen above, theory is a box of tools, it may 
well be justifiable to use an exotic French set; but first, we must 
be clear about the tools to hand that must be discarded: what 
exactly is wrong with the obvious tools for the job, those 
commonly used in psychology? My contention is that psychology 
is unable to provide adequate or complete explanations to 
problems of the functioning of individuals in social life. My use 
of the word 'adequate' signals certain problems of theoretical 
orientation that are a bar to a convincing characterisation, such 
as the (usually unacknowledged) problem of dualism, or the 
radical separation of both mind from body and the individual from 
society. Indeed, psychology's continuing faith in the coherence 
" 'Revolution' should not be understood here in its Marxist sense, referring to 
class-based revolution: this assumption is at the root of many misapprehensions of 
Foucault and derogations of his work, because he does not provide an obvious 
blueprint for the overthrow of capitalist modes of production. But since this is not 
the point of his work, the criticism is misdirected. 'Revolution' for Foucault is a 
much more modest endeavour, "the simultaneous agitation of consciousness and 
institutions", 'Revolutionary Action: "Until Now— in Bouchard, Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice, p.228, a translation of 'Par dela le bien et le mal', 
Actuel 14, Nov 1971, 42-7, p.46. This task of 'laying bare the mechanisms of 
power' is conceived of as the first stage in a process of social change, at which point 
the intellectual's thought gives way to the decisions of those who actually choose to 
revolt; and the 'revolt' is history's breath of life:- 
"it is through revolt that subjectivity (not that of 
great men but of whomever) introduces itself into 
history and gives it the breath of life... A people 
refuses the regime which oppresses it". 'Is It 
Useless to Revolt?', Philosophy and Social 
Criticism VIII, 1, Spring 1981, 1-9, p.7, a 
translation of 'Inutile de se soulever?', LeMonde 
10, May 11, 1979, 661. 
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and inalienability of the individual shows a remarkable lack of 
knowledge and interest in debates external to the domain it has 
defined for itself. However, in another sense, psychological 
explanations of individual functioning are entirely 'adequate' to 
the task in hand if one is suspicious of psychology as an 
autonomous, neutral quest for truth, striving to be 'good' science. 
An epistemological critique of psychology's claims to truth and 
accuracy is certainly an important undertaking, but one which can 
be taken as read: there is a growing body of work which 
demonstrates the internal contradictions of psychological theory 
and the unexamined and unconvincing a prioris that keep the 
whole venture in place.27 However, I am less interested in 
establishing whether psychology is 'true' or not than what are its 
`truth effects': that is, how does psychology come to its position 
of ascendancy, what are the 'conditions of possibility' of its 
emergence, how does it maintain its 'effectivity', how did it 
achieve its `positivity'?28 What does it produce as true, and how 
do these productions lay claim to legitimacy? If psychology is 
`adequate' to tasks of discipline and administration (which is my 
27 Especially thorough, again, was work done under the aegis of ldeologyand 
Consciousness. See particularly Adlam et al. 'Psychology, Ideology and the Human 
Subject' and Venn and Walkerdine, 'The Acquisition and Production of Knowledge'. 
" A discourse has an 'effectivity' when it is able to produce truth effects. A 
discourse becomes 'positive' when it enters into the fray of the true and the false, 
and can be used to make adjudications as to the truth value of pertinent statements. 
See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p . 1 25ff . 
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claim), how is this adequacy guaranteed? 
The clue to this problem lies in the characterisation of 
psychology as a productive discourse; that is, one must abandon 
empiricist and essentialist claims that psychology acts on 
objects which exist independently of it and precede it 
ontologically. My contention is: objects of psychological inquiry 
are created and modified by the discursive activities of 
psychology itself. Now, the Foucaultian corpus has demonstrated 
specific domains of production: medical discourses about 'folly' 
and 'unreason' produce the mentally ill person, penology produces 
the criminal, discourses on sex produce sexuality.29 If we take 
such a perspective, does this mean that before the existence of 
these discourses, we did not have mental illness, criminality, 
sexuality? No, indeed not. To take the last example: we only have 
the beginnings of sexuality from the eighteenth century, when a 
variety of strategies of power and knowledge applied themselves 
to the field of sex. Before sexuality, we had other things 
entirely: a series of deployments of alliance based on kinship 
ties, deployments of the flesh based on Christianity, deployments 
29 Madness and Civilisation; Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1975, translated as Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, New 
York, Pantheon, 1977; Histoire de la sexualite I: La volonte de savoir, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1976, translated as The History of Sexuality Volume I: an Introduction, 
New York, Pantheon, 1978; The History of Sexuality II; Histoire de la sexualite III: 
Le souci de soi, Paris, Gallimard, 1984, translated as The History of Sexuality III: 
The Care of the Self, New York, Pantheon, 1986. 
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of the uses of pleasure based on self-mastery. Sex may be 
subject to certain physiological limitations, but its practice is 
always discursive. As far as children and the practice of reading 
go, I would follow a Foucaultian line of reasoning: the modern 
child is produced by psychological discourse, in coarticulation 
with other discourses concerned with reading. There are, of 
course, other discourses which target and produce the child as an 
object of their gaze (sexuality is an obvious example), but I 
intend to limit my study to those strategic deployments around 
reading and psychology in this production, while also considering 
the mutual effectivity of the reading/psychology couple on each 
other. 
At this point I shall begin a discussion of the theoretical 
tools I have selected for this task. Their difference from some of 
some of the conventional tools of psychological investigation 
will be drawn out, and this difference will be a crucial principle 
of selection. It seems to me politically important to refuse those 
old tools, as they have been fashioned as part of a project of 
social regulation. The mute and blind strategies of psychology 
can do no other, its purpose and usefulness lying in its ability to 
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deploy a normal/pathological distinction to regulate social life.30 
It is clear that not all psychology will have this effectivity, of 
course, since the hazardous play of discourse precludes any 
simple correspondence between ambition and realisation, desire 
and fulfilment: the cycle of cause and effect remains ineffable, 
producing bizarre and unexpected monstra. However, it seems 
sensible to avoid the psychological tool-box given that the aim of 
this work is the undermining of that project of social regulation 
which psychology serves; thus I reject traditional tools of 
psychological investigation on political grounds. Perhaps the 
most important theoretical tool which (developmental) 
psychology implicitly employs is the tool of dualistic thinking, 
which I critique below. It should be clear from the preceding 
discussion that I am not concerned to resist dualism on straight 
philosophical grounds, although one often is forced to commence a 
critique on such a terrain; by suggesting that dualism is not an 
unalterable fact of nature, I seek to problematise not only 
dualistic modes of thought, but also the products of dualistic 
discourse (including the modern child), arguing that they are not 
30 I need not specifically rehearse here the arguments that demonstrate 
psychology's implication in techniques of normalisation. This ongoing project can 
only demonstrate this role by exemplification, since, as I have tried to show, it is not 
merely a matter of the proof of theoretical insufficiency but also the exposure of the 
workings of power in the diagrams of social regulation, which can only be done issue 
by issue. I hope my section providing an archaeo-genealogy of reading practices will 
contribute to this project of exemplification. 
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`natural' or 'necessary'. 
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DUALISM 
By 'dualism', I mean here specifically individual-social dualism, 
or the separation of the individual from the social world that 
surrounds her/him. My critique of the problem of dualism in 
psychology is first and foremost done on theoretical grounds; 
however, because my attempts to get over this problem (or at 
least confront it more effectively) make use of theory conceived 
of as part of political practice, my critique is necessarily also 
political, claiming that the way psychology deals with the 
problem of dualism conceals the political problem at psychology's 
heart. In addition, I would maintain that dualism is in some 
senses a condition of possibility for the functioning of 
psychology.' The inscription devices32 that psychology uses to 
make the individual calculable rely on an easy dichotomy between 
31 It would be easy here to accuse me of over-generalisation. Is all psychology 
dualistic? Perhaps one can think of variations in psychological discourse which try 
to resist such categorisation (although rarely explicitly) - for example, it could be 
argued that behaviourism or gestalt psychology or sociobiology are attempts to 
bypass some of the problems I describe in this section. Nonetheless, I would argue 
that these radical solutions to the problem of the relation between individual and 
society only 'work' because they deny a problem exists at all. 
" This notion is taken from the work of Bruno Latour. See, for example, 
'Visualization and cognition: thinking with hands and eyes', in H. Kushlick (ed.) 
Knowledge and Society. Vol 6. Greenwich CT, JAI Press, 1986. By 'inscription 
devices', I refer to the means by which psychologists typically 'codify' the 
individual, and attempt to turn him/her into something quantifiable. Typical 
inscription devices are the measurement of reaction times, responses to 
questionnaires, and the various categorisations of children's behaviour, as well as 
all the statistical paraphernalia which usually accompany these procedures. 
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the individual and the social, such that the measurement of the 
individual can be conducted without any interference from 'noise' 
in the social world. Dualism as a kind of epistemological project 
and the psychological technologies of making subjects calculable 
and manageable are, in this sense, a self-supporting couple. 
Within psychology, then, dualism has usually been 
necessarily 'dealt with' in ways that prioritise the individual at 
the expense of any theory of society, which is then in turn 
conceived of as in some way impinging on the individual.33 
Particularly in social and developmental psychology, a series of 
critiques that appeared in the early- to mid-1970s were aimed at 
redressing what was seen as a lack of concern with the social 
world; particularly important in this context were Harre and 
Secord's work, and collections by Armistead and Richards.' 
However, as Henriques et al. point out, the commitment of these 
writers to understanding the terms of this couple as interacting, 
in however sophisticated a formulation, inevitably means that the 
" Dualism is not, however, a problem exclusive to psychology. Interestingly 
enough, sociology tends to repeat the problem but with a prioritisation of society. 
This is what Henry terms 'the field of complementarity', that is, whatever is 
considered non-psychological is thought to belong to the social order, and vice-versa. 
This is why psychology and sociology bypass each other, even though they often evoke 
each other to explain away what falls outside their particular domains of 
responsibility and interest. See P. Henry, Le mauvais outil, Paris, Klincksieck, 
1977. 
" Nigel Armistead (ed.), Reconstructing Social Psychology, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1974; Rom Harre and Paul Secord, The Explanation of Social Behaviour, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell,1972; Martin Richards (ed.), The Integration of a Child 
into a Social World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974. 
6 k 
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core of these terms remains untouched, and the separability of 
the couple is reaffirmed; in such accounts the individual can 
rapidly reduce to a biological base once 'society' has been invoked 
to explain everything else.' It is ironic that this should happen 
given the desires of many such theorists to escape the 
determinism of behaviourist theories of action in the social 
world, a motive that was particularly evident in, for example, 
John Shotter's accounts of the infant's entry into the social 
world.36 However, Shotter's account of the transmission of 
humanity to the infant from a maternal provision of a 'structure 
of motives', with its implication of a somehow 'pre-social' 
infant, rapidly reduces to an account of the social world 
impinging on a biologically-given individual. It is interesting 
that Colwyn Trevarthen produces a similar picture, although his 
structure of motives is innate, that is, internal to the child.37 
While Shotter's account appears to invoke a form of social 
determinism, presumably the infant must in some sense recognise 
" See Henriques et al, Changing the Subject, p.13-25. These positions which 
stress the 'interaction' between the individual and the social world are still current, 
as can be seen from the sterile debates in the British Journal of Social Psychology 
Special Issue 25, 3, 1986: The Individual-Society Interface. 
36 John Shotter, 'What is it to be Human?', in Armistead (ed.); 'The Development 
of Personal Powers' in Richards (ed.); 'The Cultural Context of Communication 
Studies: Theoretical and Methodological Issues', in Andy Lock (ed.), Action, Gesture 
and Symbol: the Emergence of Language, London, Academic Press, 1978. 
" Colwyn Trevarthen, 'The Primary Motives for Cooperative Understanding', in 
George Butterworth and Paul Light (eds.), Social Cognition: Studies of the 
Development of Understanding, Brighton, Harvester, 1982. 
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and engage with the structures the mother provides; for 
Trevarthen, the infant 'directs' his or her engagement with the 
social world (reduced to the concept of 'intersubjectivity'). Yet 
both these positions, despite appearances, require some sort of 
`core' to the individual, a directive source we can think of as an 
`homunculus', and in this way restate the biologically-based 
individual that moves through the social world. Theories of this 
type tend to rely on processes of internalisation to explain how 
the social world has any effect on the individual (Shotter, for 
example, introduces Meadian/Vygotskian mechanisms of 
internalisation), and thus fall prey to the problem of the relation 
between the knower and the known; as with Kant's express 
duality of the knower and the known, these accounts need to rely 
on the pregiven individual, and thus again reduce to the 
`homunculus'.38 
The problem of dualism, then, has a constraining effect on 
how psychology can conceive of the relation between the 
biological individual and the society that surrounds her/him. In 
developmental psychology in general, and in developmental 
pictures of learning to read, this dualism is restated time and 
again. The (biologically-given) child is separate from the social 
world (in the form of the textual world); the child may learn to 
" The same theoretical problem occurs in, for example, socialisation theory and 
role theory. See Henriques et al., p.18-25. 
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read by internalising reading skills.39 A separability of child and 
context is affirmed, and the problem of the relation between the 
knower and the known is 'resolved' through internalisation. Such 
are the dualistic positions which I maintain are virtually the only 
conceptual possibilities in psychology as it is presently 
constituted. Psychology is positioned on the individualistic side 
of dualism, and as such falls prey to the traps of biological 
reductionism, social reductionism (as for example in the 
reduction of the social to the mother-child dyad), and the 
cognitivism that springs from a conception of the individual as 
rational, autonomous, and directed by an tomunculoid' core." 
I have gestured towards a critique of the predication of 
psychology on a dualist conception of the individual and the 
social. However, I should perhaps again make it clear that my 
purpose is less to engage in an interminable round of debate 
around the truthfulness of such notions. I am content on the one 
hand to unsettle the comfortable self-evidency of dualism; and on 
the other to establish my contention that dualism is a necessary 
" These 'common-sense' views of the child's learning are ubiquitous, but in the 
field of reading are perhaps most forcefully expressed in the tradition of 
psycholinguistics, particularly as evidenced in the work of Frank Smith. This 
tradition will be analysed later. 
40 `Cognitivism' refers to the theoretical problem of prioritising structure over 
content and the consequent elision of process and content. Cognitivism is 
psychology's answer to the Kantian problem of understanding the relationship 
between the knower and the known; but as can be seen in socialisation theory's 
recourse to cognition, the emphasis on interaction and the priority of the individual 
can only reduce to a watered-down biological determinism. 
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theoretical base for a science which aims at rendering 
individuality calculable. Put simply, it would be too hard for 
psychology to provide a grid of specification for the individual if 
it was also necessary to consider the social in any convincing 
way. Historically, psychology has never really needed a more 
convincing approach because its vocation has typically lain in its 
abilities to administer, rather than in its abilities to solve 
academic problems. Interestingly, as we have seen, this is even 
true of social psychology, a domain where one might expect 
theorisation in terms other than the dualistic ones adopted. This 
is not to say, however, that psychology is uninterested in the 
functioning of the individual in his/her social world. Far from it; 
in fact, I would argue that psychological knowledge is, 
frequently, all about fitting out the individual for optimal 
effectiveness in a variety of social domains. The task psychology 
is set is to produce the optimised citizen; psychology's method of 
achieving this is first to make the citizen knowable and 
calculable. This it can only do with the aid of dualist 
epistemologies. 
By stepping outside mainstream psychology for my tool-kit, 
I hope to make use of work which confronts the problem of 
dualism in a slightly different way from some of the critiques I 
have outlined. First of all, I would emphasise the mutuality of 
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relations between 'the subject' and 'the social', as I wish to 
reconceptualise the deconstructed categories of individual and 
society. I maintain that the best way to approach the problem of 
dualism is to forget about the individual and society as pregiven 
categories, and to develop instead a theory of the positioning of 
subjects in discourse. This is not simply a matter of changing 
the terms of the debate, but involves a radical 
reconceptualisation of just how we can think in this debate at all. 
In addition, as I have already suggested, this is not just a matter 
of challenging the epistemology of psychological knowledge and 
contesting its 'truth': the point is to go beyond epistemology and 
into the realm of political critique by examining what is actually 
produced within the dualistic articulations of psychology. 
Some terms need explanation before we move on, terms 
which I have already begun to use, and whose importance for my 
project will become more apparent: the notions of discourse, of 
the axis of power/knowledge/subject, and of archaeo-genealogy. 
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DISCOURSE 
The term 'discourse' has gained a certain contemporary currency, 
and has perhaps become all things to all people: it seems sensible 
to rehearse my own definition of discourse, even at the risk of 
appearing abstruse. First of all, I use the term roughly as it is 
used by Deleuze or Derrida or Foucault: that is, it is not used in a 
purely linguistic way (as in most incarnations of 'discourse 
analysis"' ), although, finally, discourse is about words. 
Henriques et al. give an excellent résumé of a post-structural 
conception of discourse: 
"... it is regulated and systematic. An 
important proposition is related to this 
recognition: the rules are not confined 
to those internal to the discourse, but 
include rules of combination with other 
discourses, rules that establish 
differences from other categories of 
discourse (for example scientific as 
opposed to literary, etc.), the rules of 
production of the possible statements. 
The rules delimit the sayable. But 
(except for axiomatic systems such as 
chess) they do not imply a closure. The 
systematic character of a discourse 
includes its systematic articulation 
with other discourses. In practice, 
discourses delimit what can be said, 
while providing the spaces - the 
'The clearest example of the project of discourse analysis in psychology is 
Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond 
attitudes and behaviour, London, Sage, 1987. 
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concepts, metaphors, models, analogies, 
for making new statements within any 
specific discourse... The analysis which 
we propose regards every discourse as 
the result of a practice of production 
which is at once material, discursive 
and complex, always inscribed in 
relation to other practices of 
production of discourse. Every 
discourse is part of a discursive 
complex; it is locked in an intricate web 
of practices, bearing in mind that every 
practice is by definition both discursive 
and material."" 
To develop this a little: the term 'discourse' is used for a corpus 
of 'statements' whose organisation we can describe as regular 
and systematic. If a corpus of statements forms a discourse, we 
should be able to identify a series of rules relating to the 
discourse: rules of formation, rules of succession and rules of 
derivation, for example. These rules will enable us to specify the 
conditions any other statement or group of statements will need 
to satisfy if they are to be thought of as part of that discourse. 
In addition, because discourse provides the limitation of the 
sayable, that is, of the domain of the statement, discourse must 
'Henriques et al., p.105-6. One point perhaps needs clarification: in theory, 
discourses are not closed systems, and the possibility of innovation in discourse is 
inscribed within the discourse itself and within tangential or succeeding discourses. 
However, discursive formations, or systems of dispersions of statements, may well 
evidence closure. For example, Derrida suggests that the domain of the metaphysical 
maintains its status as closed; this closure is produced through the strategic micro-
operations of power in the service of the logocentre. In other words, closures such 
as these blindfold us through their evidencing closure. However, because the closure 
is not perfect but is fissured, the possibility of change remains with us. 
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also provide the limit of 'truth': discourses are 'regimes of truth'. 
This, indeed, is a particular characteristic of scientific 
discourses, that they aim at systematicity, and systematic 
truthfulness. Thus a discursive formation' like psychology 
produces 'truth' and has its specific 'truth effects', i.e. an 
effectivity given by its privileged position as `true'.44 These 
effects are produced by those discursive relations which mediate 
between the discursive and the non-discursive domains. 
The Discursive and the Non-Discursive 
`Strata' are the starting point for my distinction between the 
discursive and the non-discursive: we may consider strata to be 
historical formations (`positivities' in the Foucaultian sense, 
`empiricities' in the Deleuzian sense). Strata are composed of 
words and things, speaking and seeing, the sayable and the 
43 A 'discursive formation', as we have seen above, is a system of dispersion of 
discourses. In this instance I use the term because I am thinking of the historical 
dispersion of statements in the discourses around psychology whose 'truth 
effectivity' I wish to lay bare. The term comes from Foucault, LArcheologie du 
savoir, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p.44-54, translated as The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, London, Tavistock, 1972, p.31-9. 
" Different discourses may have competing claims to truth, so some discourses 
may be discredited or come to be regarded as false; for example, behaviourist 
psychological discourses are in some sense 'falsified' by modern cognitive 
psychological discourses. In general, discourses can only be established through a 
claim to truth: the production of truth is a function of discourse. 
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visible, fields of readability and bands of visibility. The first of 
each pair has the form and substance of expression, the second 
the form and substance of content; 45 the attribution of form and 
substance mean that a content/expression distinction can go 
beyond a purely linguistic signified/signifier couple. Many 
examples of this distinction can be gleaned from the corpus of 
Foucault's work: prison as a form of content defines a place of 
visibility, while penal law as a form of expression defines a field 
of sayability;46 the asylum is a place of visibility for madness, 
while medicine is the field of sayability about `folly';47 similarly, 
the clinic and pathological anatomy make distinctions and 
distributions between the visible and the articulable 
respectively:" while an analysis of the work of Raymond Roussel 
reveals how a contradistinction between extraordinary machines 
and an unusual 'method' outlines a distributive field between 
visibilities and statements." All of which suggests that in 
Foucault's work, while the field of saying relates to discursive 
" I follow Deleuze in taking the terms 'content' and 'expression' from Hjelmslev. 
See Deleuze's Foucault, Paris, Minuit, 1986, p.55ff., translated as Foucault, 
London, Athlone, 1988, p.47ff. 
46 Discipline and Punish. 
" Madness and Civilisation. 
48 Naissance de la clinique: une archeologie du regard medical, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1963, translated as The Birth of the Clinic: An 
Archaeology of Medical Perception, New York, Pantheon, 1973. The translation is of 
a revised edition published in 1972, with some discrepancies. 
" RaymondRoussel, Paris, Gallimard, 1963, translated as Death and the 
Labyrinth. 
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practices, the field of seeing relates to forms of self-evidence. 
As is clear from The Archaeology of Knowledge, the articulable is 
equivalent to the discursive, while the visible is equivalent to 
the non-discursive. What is important is that Foucault grants the 
statement a radical primacy; thus the mediation between the two 
is from the realm of discourse: discursive relations are what 
exist between the discursive statement and the non-discursive 
domain. The importance of this move is in understanding the way 
in which materiality is subsumed under a theory of discourse 
such as Foucault's. The existence of the real is not denied, but it 
is clear that it is only comprehensible, articulable even, from 
within the web of discourses which always-already exist, always 
precede. This is why a radical primacy is granted to the 
statement. For example, 'bodies' are not discourse - they are 
non-discursive - but never stand in a non-discursive vacuum; the 
word itself is a discursive production, while the entity, the body, 
is under the sovereignty of discourse:5° for example, 'torture' is a 
discursive practice (that is, a practice always-already inscribed 
in a series of statements) which changes the material, the body. 
Thus the body's form is not independent of discourse, and 
articulations of the body (in a wide sense) are always discursive, 
' The body is actually a 'grid of specification' of discourse, if one takes the 
example of, for example, psychopathology, as Foucault discusses in Birth of the 
Clinic. 
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although the body itself is non-discursive. The objection may be 
raised that there are other non-discursive entities which lie 
outside the influence of any discourse, such as those of nature.51  
Yet even the 'facts' of natural phenomena only enter into 
discourse as produced 'truths'. Rain may be the urine of the gods 
or a precipitation derived from clouds, but its changing 
discursive existence, in the modern age guaranteed through 
scientific theory, only suggests that science is a discourse like 
any other, and raises the problem of how one examines scientific 
theory - and thus what is the relation between science and the 
materiality that science takes as its object. We might say that 
the object, rain, is made visible by Greek myths or by 
meteorological science, or the body is made visible by torture or 
by incarceration, depending on the historical specificity under 
consideration. Yet these visibilities are not forms of objects, but 
rather forms of luminosity, that allow a thing to exist only as a 
flash, sparkle or shimmer' "each historical medical formation 
modulated a first light and constituted a space of visibility for 
illness, making symptoms gleam" comments Deleuze, discussing 
5 ' Bruno Latour, Science in Action, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1987, 
argues convincingly that 'Nature' can never be the final arbiter about a dispute in 
science: other forms of justification are constantly needed because of arguments 
about "the composition, content, expression and meaning of that [sc. Nature's] 
voice." Nature is only ever a post hoc justification of an established fact. See 
especially p.94-100. 
52 Foucault developed this theme of visibility as early as Death and the 
Labyrinth. 
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The Birth of the Clinic.53 This first light refers to discourse, 
which enables objects to attain a form of visibility. Psychology, 
as a first light, makes the child gleam, colonises reading and 
makes it gleam also. The task of an investigation of these 
phenomena (the task of an archaeology) is to break open words, 
phrases and propositions, and extract statements54 from them, 
and perform a similar operation on visibilities. Now, the 
discursive and the non-discursive are the two poles of knowledge, 
that is, knowledge is a mechanism of statements and visibilities; 
thus to break them open and extract statements from them is to 
conduct an archaeology of knowledge.' The knowledges or strata 
I must archaeologise are those concerning children and reading. 
So what sort of task would this be? How does one reach the 
extractive conditions of these (hidden?) statements? What is the 
key to producing this archaeology (of a silence?)? The search 
" Deleuze, p.58 in the English translation, p.65 in the French edition. 
54 Foucault deals at great length in The Archaeology of Knowledge with the 
statement, which is, for him, a more fundamental unit for analysis than the word, or 
the speech act, or the sentence, or any other candidate for 'atomic' archive unit. See 
especially p.79ff. 
" It is interesting to note that in The History of Sexuality Vol. II, Foucault 
concerns himself with the relation between truth and knowledge. For Foucault, truth 
only offers itself to knowledge through what are termed 'problematisations', which 
are themselves created only on the basis of 'practices'. By spelling out that 
practices are both of seeing and of speaking, and restating the disjunction between 
these two, the important point is being made that the statement may have its own 
object which correlates to it, but it never merely designates an object (as would be 
the case for a version of 'discourse determinism'): the visible object is not merely a 
mute meaning. This disjunction between seeing and speaking, must, incidentally, 
raise problems for archaeology, since the archive, as 'audiovisual' (as Deleuze puts 
it), must also be disjunctive. 
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must always relate to the conditions of possibility of statements 
and visibilities, and must strive to read the inscription of the 
statement and its conditions. The statement is always present, 
although it may be hidden: its extraction is simply a matter of 




The relation that exists between the discursive and the non-
discursive is, as we have seen, a discursive relation. Thus the 
field of knowledge can be seen as dominated by the primacy of the 
statement. However, we can be more specific about these 
discursive relations: they are relations of power. These power 
relations coadapt the visible and the articulable, the two poles of 
knowledge, yet exist outside these poles. Power is a strategy, 
rather than a stratum, a strategy which maintains a relation 
between the articulable and the visible and prevents the escape 
of the latter. The latter is always in danger of escape because it 
is completely determined by articulation: the problem is one of 
how visibilities, being completely receptive in contrast to the 
spontaneity of the articulable, are inexhaustible.' For Foucault, 
the solution lies in regarding the two elements of the stratum as 
always in struggle, and he describes their inter-relation by 
martial metaphors. The articulable and the visible are divided 
" This is a recurrent problem in philosophy: for example, for Kant 
understanding was a determining element over intuition, and thus the problem arose 
of how intuition was not exhausted. Kant's solution was the 'mysterious 
imagination'. 
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from each other, yet insinuate themselves inside the relation 
between the other and its conditions.57 Consequently in the 
conduct of an archaeology, one reveals something of the visible in 
opening up statements, and something of the statement in opening 
up visibilities. For example, in his archaeology of the prison, 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault shows how the prison as a form of 
visibility produces statements which reintroduce criminality, 
while statements around the prison produce forms of visibility 
which reinforce prison. There is, then, a necessary double 
relation between the two anisomorphic forms which is productive 
(and the production of this relation is truth).58 The notion of the 
struggle within this double relation is not sufficient, however, 
because the primacy of the articulable would seem to suggest 
only one victor: hence the need to introduce a fully-fledged theory 
of power. 
" An anisomorphism or heterogeneity obtains between the articulable and the 
visible, but the former 'conditions' the latter. The articulable offers the visible in a 
'space of dissemination', while offering itself up as a 'form of exteriority'. See the 
discussion in Deleuze, op. cit., p.66 [p.73]. 
" This theorisation owes a lot to the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem, whose 
work on epistemology and the transformation of concepts respectively alerted 
Foucault to the tasks a general history, as opposed to a total history, must set itself. 
See the discussion in The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 4-5. This thesis aims at the 
production of a general history in the sense that seeks to provide an account of the 
relations between discontinuous and discrete discourses, in this instance discourses 
around literacy-children-psychology. The name one could give to this series of 
series, or table, is governmentality. 
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What is Power? 
"Power is a relation between forces, or 
rather every relation between forces is 
a power relation... Force is never 
singular but essentially exists in 
relation with other forces, such that 
any force is already a relation, that is 
to say power: force has no other subject 
or object than force... It is 'an action 
upon an action, on existing actions, or 
on those which may arise in the present 
or in the future'; it is 'a set of actions 
upon other actions'. We can therefore 
conceive of a necessarily open list of 
variables expressing a relation between 
forces or power relation, constituting 
actions upon actions: to incite, to 
induce, to seduce, to make easy or 
difficult, to enlarge or limit, to make 
more or less probable, and so on."59 
Power, then, is not essentially repressive; it is not possessed, 
but is practised;6° power is not the prerogative of 'masters', but 
passes through every force. We should not think of power as an 
attribute (and ask 'what is it?'), but as an exercise (and ask 'how 
does it work?'). Moreover, forces have a capacity for resistance, 
" Deleuze, p.70 [p.77]. The quotations are taken from Foucault, 'The Subject and 
Power', an afterword to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
60 Deleuze's claim is that it is possible to talk of power in this way as a 
possession, in a determinable form of class and in a determined form of State, but I 
would suggest that these forms are attributions of discursive formations that include 
relations of power, rather than attributions of power itself. See Deleuze, p.71 
[p.78]. 
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such that power is only exercised in relation to a resistance,61  
each force having the power to affect and be affected by other 
forces. Thus far we have established power as a series of 
relations between forces, and knowledge as a series of relations 
between forms; what, then, are the relations between these 
relations? The two are completely heterogeneous, but engage in a 
similar process of struggle as the forms of knowledge. However, 
power passes through forces not forms; it is diagrammatic62 - it 
mobilises non-stratified matter and functions, it is local and 
unstable, and is flexible. Knowledge is stratified, archivised, and 
rigidly segmented. Power is strategic, but it is anonymous: the 
strategies of power are mute and blind, precisely because they 
avoid the forms of knowledge, the articulable and the visible. 
Foucault characterises the workings of power as `microphysicar, 
but this should not be taken as referring to a miniaturisation, but 
rather to the status of power as mobile and non-localisable.63 
Power and knowledge are mutually dependent and exist in a 
'Foucault, La volonte de savoir, p.126-7; The History of Sexuality Vol. I, 
p.95-6. 
62 Foucault discusses the Panopticon as diagram in Surveiller et punir (see 
particularly p.207); Discipline and Punish, p.205. The diagram is:- 
(i) the presentation of the relations between forces unique to a particular 
formation; 
(ii) the distribution of the power to affect and be affected; 
(iii) the mixing of non-formalised pure functions and unformed pure matter; 
(iv) a transmission or distribution of particular features. 
63 The term 'microphysics' is intended by Foucault to distinguish himself from 
Kant. Kant's practical determination is irreducible to a connaissance, whereas 
Foucault is concerned that the practice of power be irreducible to a savoir. 
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relation of interiority to each other, although Foucault accords 
power a kind of primacy: power would exist (although only in a 
virtual form) without knowledge, whereas knowledge would have 
nothing to integrate without differential power relations. 
Subjectivity 
I now need to introduce the concept of subjectivity. The term 
`subjectivity' (a somewhat simplified translation of the multiple 
meanings of the French `asujetissement') is chosen to mark a 
difference from the psychological 'individual'. As should by now 
be clear, for psychology the individual is a rational being, the 
origin of human action, forming a unitary and non-contradictory 
object occupying the same physical space as the body. This 
`individual' is, as we have seen, one of the twin foundation stones 
of dualistic conceptions of the world; however, it is an 
`individual' whose existence is an historically contingent 
phenomenon, an invention that begins to be produced in the 
seventeenth century, but is rigorously defined in the nineteenth 
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century." I shall go on to explain how this emerging 
psychological invention comes to be seen as the 'site' (or 'grid of 
specification', to use the terminology of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge) where reading take place, and becomes an object of 
those 'technologies of the self' founded by the reading/psychology 
couple." 
Just as I maintain that a dualistic conception of human 
action constrains the ways psychology can think about practices, 
so I maintain that the 'individual' of psychological theory is 
crucial to the ways we can understand the working of that 
psychology. By contrast, a theory of the 'subject' problematises 
the coherence and rationality of the individual (etymologically, 
that which cannot be divided) with a theory of multiple 
positionings in discourse. But just as power is implicated in 
discourse, so it is in the field of subjectivity. For power, as we 
have seen, acts upon actions: but these are the actions of 
subjects. Subjects' actions take place in discourse, and subjects 
64 On the birth of the psychological individual, see Couze Venn, 'The Subject of 
Psychology' in Henriques et al., Changing the Subject, and Nikolas Rose, The 
Psychological Complex. 
" A 'technology of the self' is a term developed in the later Foucault to describe 
the processes of construction of selfhood through the workings of (for example, 
psychological) knowledges. These knowledges are 'technological' in the sense that 
they are systematic mini- or inter-discourses implicated in self-construction. The 
etymology of 'technology' ('technique' in the French), from the Greek 'techne', 
implies an art or skill, particularly a constructive skill (such as weaving). 
'Technology' in its Foucaultian sense is precisely such a 'weaving' or production. 
Compare the Latin 'texo', I weave, from which is derived our word for 'text': both 
the self and the text are weavings or productions inscribed in discourse. 
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themselves are produced through discourse. Subjects are the 
punctuation of discourse, and provide the bodies on and through 
which discourse may act: thus we may say that subjects form 
some of the conditions for knowledge. For Foucault, the subject 
is produced out of the doubling of force upon itself, the attention 
to self, le souci de soi. This production of subjectivity always 
occurs as a doubling of self upon self in every realm, in the realm 
of the body, of force, and of knowledge. Human action within 
discourse is always positional, that is, it always occurs through 
a subject position which inhabits a fissure between the two poles 
of knowledge, the discursive and the non-discursive. 
Such a theory of the subject, then, has important 
repercussions for the psychological 'individual'. Theoretically, 
we need no longer depend (should we so choose) on that individual 
as originatory and rational. The various subject positions that 
are taken up in discourse can be and are contradictory and 
irrational: furthermore, the subject within discourse is both 
produced and productive. For a Foucaultian theory of the subject, 
attention must be drawn to the ways in which power relations 
differentially position subjects in discourse, even when (perhaps 
especially when) this produces 'contradictory subjectivity'. It 
has been contended that such a theory of the subject raises the 
twin problems of discourse determinism and the essentialisation 
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of power: the subject seems at times to be moved mechanically 
through discourse by the workings of power relations which 
themselves only seem to be exercised through what we might 
term a 'will to power'. However, it seems to me that the complex 
intertwining of power, knowledge and the subject precludes the 
questions of origin and of determination: this triad is so 
systematic that it begins to make little sense to consider them 
separately - they all condition, and form the conditions for, each 
other. Thus it would seem inaccurate to suggest that discourse 
determines the subject, or that power in the last instance is 
responsible for the production of subjectivity: the circularity of 
interdependence precludes questions of primacy, since none of the 
terms in the triad would exist (except in a virtual form) without 
the others. 
In this move to unsettle psychology's truth claims in regard 
to individuality, we have arrived at a being which takes up a 
variety of 'subject positions' in different discourses, positions 
which may be (and indeed almost certainly are) contradictory and 
non-rational. At first sight this seems to give us a new degree of 
explanatory power: we can begin to understand the 'individual' 
who might simultaneously be a Conservative voter, transvestite, 
Catholic, wife-beater, and voluntary worker. The example may be 
contrived, but the simple point is that such contradictions are the 
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stuff of social life; and theories of subjectivity allow us to 
examine such contradictions in ways that an individualistic 
analysis, with its emphasis on rationality and coherence, would 
never permit. There are two obvious objections to the take-up of 
this new theoretical orientation: the first is, does not such a 
theory of the subject, counterposed as it is to the individual, rely 
on some notion of 'truth' to sustain itself. Why believe in the 
subject rather than in the individual? The second question is, if 
we accept this theory of subjectivity, what is it that holds the 
subject positions of a particular human being together? That is, 
given that we very often do act in ways that are rational and 
consistent, do we need to fall back on the homunculus to 
understand the internal consistencies among our different 
subject positions in different discourses? 
In response to the first question: it seems clear that, given 
my problematisation of the category of truth, it is difficult to 
propose competing theories of what it is to be human. How can 
we judge between competing theories, given that the ground of 
absolute truth has been cut away from under us? In the first 
place, I would draw attention to the fact that I am interested in 
examining 'truth effects' rather than 'truths' - that is to say, I 
am less interested in adjudicating between competing theories on 
epistemological grounds than examining what they construct as 
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true. This much has already been made clear. However, the 
implication of psychological individualism in a series of 
regulative practices suggests that we need to work towards other 
forms of subjectivity which may give us the potential for change 
and 'revolution' in its Foucaultian sense. The ground from which I 
am able to distinguish between 'individualism' and 'subjectivity', 
and assess the one as regulative, the other as potentially 
`progressive', is the ground of ethics. While this is not the place 
to lay out my ethical positions, I would like to point out that it is 
surely the 'ethical substance' that drives critical work such as 
this.66 As a strategic move, I wish to bracket this ethical domain: 
suffice it to say that I work with a theory of subjectivity rather 
than individualism because of the progressive possibilities it 
would seem to open up. The obverse of this is that we can only 
make post hoc judgements about how effective such interventions 
may be - what new explanatory power do they offer us, and what 
possibilities for change do they empower? 
" Part of the problem, I think, lies in the assumption that work such as 
Foucault's must be set in opposition to, for example, Marxism, and supply answers 
to a whole series of questions in every domain. My approach is rather that, when 
considering certain issues, Foucault can be very useful. My ethical commitments, 
however, belong to a series of spheres I can hardly begin to analyse. Foucault's later 
work began to deal with this problem of the ethical self-construction of the subject. 
Very interesting on the thorny problem of political commitment in the context of 
Foucaultian investigation are Jeffrey Minson's Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Donzelot and the Eccentricity of Ethics, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1985, and 
Ian Hunter's Culture and Government: The Emergence of Literary Education, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1989. 
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To the second question: what is it that holds together all 
these subject positions and enables us to conceive of an 
`identity', a coherence (however contrived) across discourses? 
Any answer to this question, must, I think, refer to the domain of 
the psychic, and stress the social construction of that psyche as 
a 'factor of coherence' in subjectivity. I shall not rehearse these 
positions here, because it is not essential for the work I wish to 
carry out. As I have already pointed out, some radical theorists 
have drawn particularly on the work of Lacan to begin to answer 
these questions; while the 'libidinal theorists', Lyotard and 
Deleuze and Guattari, also present useful possibilities. For my 
purposes, it is only necessary to signal that my theorisation of 
the discursive formations that form or are contiguous on the 
reading/psychology couple is dependent on the inextricable triad: 
power, knowledge, and the subject. My task from Chapter 2 
onwards is to analyse this complex historically: this is the task 
of an archaeo-genealogy. 
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ARCHAEO-GENEALOGY 
Already I have begun to indicate which features of an 
archaeological investigation are suggested by the theoretical 
positions to which I adhere. However, the notion of `archaeo-
genealogy', critically derived from the work of Foucault, is the 
tool which I contend is the most important part of my approach, 
especially because it provides for the possibility of a radical 
break with previous (deeply problematic) forms of socio-
historical investigative procedures.67 An archaeo-genealogical 
analysis of, for example, children's imbrication in the practice of 
reading does not examine the web of discourse in terms of rules 
of formation that are purely internal to it, but in terms of the 
specific practices which are dispersed throughout the discursive 
domain and which have children and reading as their target. 
Archaeo-genealogy represents an attempt to combine the 
investigative procedures of both archaeology and genealogy. 
First, I must outline the constituent parts of this procedure. 
67 On this 'crisis' see, for example, the special issue of Social History, Social 
History Today... and Tomorrow?, 10, 2, 1976; Hayden White, Tropics of 
Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978; Allan Megill, 'Foucault, Structuralism, and the Ends of History', 
Journal of Modern History 51, 451-503, 1979; Derek Attridge, Geoffrey 
Bennington and Robert Young, Post-Structuralism and The Question of History, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
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What is Archaeology? 68 
It should be clear by now that a primary concern of this thesis is 
with discourse. Now Foucault wished to investigate discourse 
(specifically the discourses of the emergence of 'man') not in 
terms of 'truth', but in terms of history. His recourse, then, given 
that his goal is the investigation of the history of the statement, 
is to the archive, and we can say that archaeology is this process 
of investigating the archives of discourse. In addition we can 
formulate two principles of archaeological research: first of all, 
in merely seeking to provide a description of regularities, it is 
non-interpretive; secondly, in eschewing the search for authors, 
and concentrating instead on the statement (and the visibility), it 
sets itself up as non-anthropological.69 
An archaeological analysis proceeds in four directions. 
First of all, it attempts to elucidate how statements are related 
to a field of objects: that is, to understand the relation between 
the articulable and the visible - Foucault's Archaeology of 
Knowledge attempts to describe the links between the two poles 
" This section is derived primarily from Foucault's The Archaeology of 
Knowledge. 
"In being anti-interpretation and against simple stories of causality (replacing 
the mono-cause with the polyhedron of intelligibility), Foucault is very much in a 
tradition of positivism, especially as it is characterised by Ian Hacking in his 
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural 
Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 41ff. 
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of knowledge. Second, it attempts to analyse the relation 
between one statement and other statements in that discourse. 
Third, and following on closely from the second point, it attempts 
to formulate rules for the repeatability and strategic potential" 
of statements within discourse. Fourth, it attempts to analyse 
the positions which are established between subjects in 
discourse. 
There are, in addition, three more elements that are 
characteristic of a properly archaeological investigation of the 
production of 'discursive objects'. First there are 'surfaces of 
emergence', practices (or places) within which objects are 
`individuated' (in the sense of being made objects in discourse), 
designated or acted upon; for example, I shall contend that 
`reading' forms a surface of emergence through which psychology 
can 'act' on children. Second, there are 'institutions', which 
acquire authority and provide limits within which discursive 
objects may act; for example, the school (and, from the 
nineteenth century on, the family) forms an authoritative 
institution which delimits the range of activities of the 
discursive object, in this case the child beginning-reader 
(institutions are usually 'places of visibility' and as such have 
70 Strategies are selections which are unified at the level of objectives. We might 
think of a strategy as a formation which orients itself to produce a particular 
outcome. See Foucault, Conference inedite a la Societe Francaise de Philosophie, 
BibliothAque le Saulchoir, Paris, May 1978. 
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already been described as belonging to the non-discursive pole of 
knowledge). Third, there are 'forms of specification', which refer 
to the ways in which discursive objects are targeted; the most 
common forms of specification of the human sciences are the 
body (the task of an anatomo-politics) and the species or 
population (the task of a bio-politics),' but may also focus on the 
soul (the task of a truly disciplinary politics). Reading, as a 
vector of power, both psychological and pre-psychological, 
targets itself on the body and soul of the child, and attempts a 
disciplining of the entire population through these micro-physical 
operations. 
Thus we might say that an analysis of discourse that is 
properly archaeological must specify the rules of formation of 
objects in terms of the surfaces on which they appear, the ways 
in which limits are provided for them, and how they are specified. 
What is Genealogy? 
For Foucault, archaeology was a response to a whole series of 
theoretical problems that were very much of the 1950s 
" These terms will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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and1960s" . It was a 'methodology' (if one can call it that) that 
owed much to Heidegger, as well as the work of Bachelard and 
Canguilhem, and in some senses sat apart from Marxism 
(Foucault's theoretical starting point is anti-humanist, and thus 
he takes off from much the same place as Althusser, but in a 
different direction). Genealogy' was developed by Foucault in the 
1970s to address problems that seemed to him paramount (in 
particular, the problem of how to theorise power in the context of 
his own political involvements); as such, it was often pushed by 
Foucault as a kind of successor to archaeology, whose complex 
theoretical edifice, ironically, was consigned to the archives. 
Genealogy, which gained its name through an allusion to 
Nietzsche's work, maintained many of the essentials of 
archaeology (for example, the examination of bodies of 
statements in the archive), but added to it a new concern with 
political analysis, which manifested itself in the twin directions 
of a new emphasis on power, and the provision of a 'history of the 
72 Foucault's archaeological work was at the time considered to be part of the 
wider structuralist tradition; whether this is accurate or not, it is fair to say that 
Foucault, like the structuralists, was seeking to respond to, and to break free from, 
the traditions of phenomenology and existentialism; ultimately, to escape from Hegel. 
" Foucault became more and more preoccupied with this method in his later 
studies and in interviews and lectures. It is dealt with passim in The History of 
Sexuality Vol. I; also important statements of intent are:- 'Nietzsche, le genealogie, 
l'histoire' in Hommage a Jean Hyppolite, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 
1971, translated as 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in Bouchard (ed.); Discipline 
and Punish; and 'Corso del 7 gennaio 1976', in Fontana and Pasquino (eds), 
translated as 'Two Lectures', in Gordon (ed.). 
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present' which is: 
"structured by conclusions and 
considerations already established 
concerning present practices and 
institutions... [Genealogy] finds its 
point of departure in problems relevant 
to current issues and... its point of 
arrival and its usefulness in what it can 
bring to the analysis of the present."' 
The practice of genealogy, then, would seem a highly significant 
endeavour in the light of my own research project, particularly 
because of genealogy's commitment to changing the present and 
its status as a political mode of inquiry. Genealogy concerns 
itself with "disreputable origins and unpalatable functions",75 
and thus is at a remove from the more 'academic' archaeology: 
genealogy involves making calculations as regards possible 
interventions and orienting one's research towards such 
interventions. In this thesis, certain assumptions are made about 
the implication of psychology and reading in the production of the 
disciplined subject and self-regulating citizen. In addition, 
genealogy establishes its difference from archaeology in that the 
former pays attention to the processual aspects of the web of 
discourse, while the latter provides us with a snapshot, a slice 
7° Henriques et al, Changing the Subject, pp.101, 104. 
75 I take the phrase from Nikolas Rose, The Formation of the Psychology of the 
Individual in England 1870-1939, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 
1984, introduction. 
Page 80 
through the discursive nexus.76 It is perhaps obvious why I think 
the two could usefully be put together: the detailed analysis of 
the slice fits perfectly with the politically directed 'history of 
the present'. 
What is Archaeo-Genealogy? 
There has been much dispute over the relation between 
archaeology and genealogy in Foucault's work, but I maintain that, 
despite his occasional efforts to distance himself from the 
terminology of The Archaeology of Knowledge, he himself 
regarded these two methods as separate but complementary, 
distinguished by their differing emphases on 'historical slice' 
(however extended that slice might be) or 'historical process'.77 
Now this cornplementarity of the two is something whose 
usefulness I should like to reaffirm, in contrast to most avowedly 
76 This point is also made in Angele Kremer-Marietti's study of the archaeology-
genealogy relationship, Michel Foucault: Archeologie et genealogie, Paris, Libraire 
Generale Francaise, 1985, p.194-7. See also Foucault, L'Ordre du discours, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1971, p.62-5, translated as The Order of Discourse in 
Robert Young (ed.), Untying the Text: a Post-Structuralist Reader, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, p.70-1. 
'See The Order of Discourse, ibid. Also in the Conference inedite Foucault 
maintains that archaeology and genealogy, along with a dimension of strategic choice, 
form a single methodology: "En parlant d'archeologie, de strategie et de genealogie... 
[il s'agit] pl0tot de caracteriser trois dimensions necessairement sinnultanees de la 
merne analyse." (p.16). 
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Foucaultian investigations which tend to dismiss one or other of 
the couple.' Rather I should like to suggest that what is called 
for is neither genealogy nor archaeology alone, but a contiguous 
approach, a space for manoeuvre that might open up potential for 
change in a way that has been claimed for a 'history of the 
present': such an approach I have termed archaeo-genealogy.79 My 
use of this term is designed to signal a series of positions which 
draw on existing post-structuralist work, positions which 
address a concern to avoid problems of essentialism and 
academicism.8° First of all, the refusal of the separability of 
archaeology and genealogy is designed to keep a rein on any 
`history of the present': the genealogical concentrates attention 
on the processual aspects, as well as orienting the ongoing work 
in the direction of effective intervention; the archaeological 
concentrates attention on the specificities of analysis that are 
required to describe the play of discourse. Now, given that a 
`total' archaeo-genealogy is an impossible venture, what sort of 
short-cuts do we need to take to make such an investigation 
" See, for example, Jones and Williamson, Birth of the Schoolroom and 
Rose, The Formation of the Psychology of the Individual, who prefer to archaeologise; 
and Donzelot, La Police des families and Henriques et al., Changing the Subject, who 
work as genealogists. 
" This section, and the theoretical formulation of archaeo-genealogy, owe much to 
Phil Bevis and Michele Cohen. 
" I have tried to draw out elsewhere such problems in Foucault's work. See Phil 
Bevis, Michele Cohen and Gavin Kendall, Archaeologizing Genealogy: Michel Foucault 
and the Economy of Austerity, Economy and Society 18, 3, 1989, 323-345. 
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feasible? 
I would suggest that the terrain of possibilities is bounded 
on the one side by what we might call a 'genealogy of erudition', 
and on the other by a `laminary archaeo-genealogy'. In a 
`genealogy of erudition' the onus is on the researcher to maintain 
on an ad hoc basis the particular collection of bits and pieces of 
archaeologies that bear on the specificities of the project. This 
is a massive, burdensome task, requiring great scholarship and 
patience. It becomes feasible only when the specific research 
problem permits a programme of work of manageable options, and 
will be an unlikely option for most projects and most 
researchers. A laminary archaeo-genealogy' consists of a series 
of selected slices which allow the genealogy to proceed by 
interpolation: archaeologies, selected for their strategic 
importance, need to be situated on their genealogical frame if 
they are to be anything other than academic; on the other hand, 
the frame is vacuous unless preoccupied with these laminae. 
What is important is the tension inherent in the relation, the co-
extension of the laminae and the frame: for a 'history of the 
present' to be 'knitted' into a comprehensible pattern that will 
also protect the wearer against conjunctural inclemencies, the 
tension needs to be finely adjusted. This option has the 
advantage of the safety and convenience deriving from the 
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systematicity of operating with whole slices; at the same time it 
may be wasteful of scarce research resources and run risks from 
its reliance on interpolation. Such research is necessarily 
thoroughly one-off and characteristically 'bespoke', and it is this 
feature which makes the setting down of the general prescriptive 
methodological principles of an archaeo-genealogy so elusive and 
indeed so futile a venture. At the same time, the bespoke 
character of the research holds up the hope that the resources for 
the research will be deployed optimally, with the choice of each 
area of archaeologisation, its extensiveness, and the amount of 
effort invested in that locus decided on its merits and tailored to 
the requirements of the project. 
Wherever an archaeo-genealogy might be situated in this 
terrain, certain general problems will recur. It is obviously a 
matter of some importance how archaeologies and genealogies 
are selected and conducted, and it is here that an insistence on 
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the necessity of deconstruction comes into play.'" My 
characterisation of archaeo-genealogy and its relation to 
deconstruction is through a notion of radical interiority:82 a way 
in which this can be reconciled with the practical limitations of 
research is through a recursive process moving between 
archaeological work and genealogical analysis. Deconstruction 
too is a recursive process, and as such, it can proceed 
indefinitely, but since it is an analytical tool rather than an end 
in itself we must choose carefully when it is politic to stop. 
What should become determinant in such decision making derives 
from the present conjuncture and its problematics, for by 
imbricating the deconstructive processes in our present 
problematisations we are able, so to speak, to harness the former 
while refusing the essentialisations of the latter. 
8' It would indeed be difficult to rehearse a definition of Deconstruction. The term 
is most closely associated with the name of Jacques Derrida, and refers to a close and 
critical analysis of concepts, texts, etc., in an attempt to lay bare their hidden 
allegiances and affiliations. Deconstruction is perhaps most fruitfully practised on 
the 'obvious' truths that are productive of our existence. Henriques et al. suggest 
that Deconstruction in the context of genealogy involves retracing the system of 
'dependencies' of a discourse - that is, describing statements in terms of the bodies 
of other statements on which they stand (cf. Changing the Subject, p.104). 
Traditionally, deconstruction has concentrated on the binary structures of meaning 
and value which condition the discursive structure of Western metaphysics. Given 
that this thesis is concerned with the individual-social divide as well as the 
distinction between form and content so characteristic of psychology, deconstruction 
is a particularly apposite approach, suggesting as it does that the undervalued term 
in the binary structure must be a condition of possibility for the entire edifice; thus 
to an extent the edifice is collapsed from within. 
82 This term is derived from Derrida's Positions, and is meant to signal a relation 
between the two which denies the possibility of one ever being exterior to the other: 
their unitary character is guaranteed by each only existing through the other. 
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Deconstruction has a vital integratory role, therefore, while 
simultaneously being put to use within the confines of archaeo-
genealogy. An insistence on deconstruction ensures that the 
entire ensemble of recursive processes converges to focus 
mutually on present problematics rather than diverging into an 
oblivion of academicism, because the deployment of the 
deconstructive principle within the project is itself tailored to 
the overall aim of convergency. To sum up, I can represent my 
overall position as follows:- 
First, the separability of archaeology and genealogy must be 
refused. 
Second, their relation can be characterised as one of radical 
interiority. 
Third, a recursive principle must be used to maintain the 
interrelation of these two aspects of the research process. 
Fourth, deconstruction must be included in this formula, 
both because it allows us to disperse the monoliths about which 
we should be suspicious, and because it plays a key integrative 
role. 
Fifth, a principle of mutuality is intended to ensure that 
both types of recursive processes work together. 
Sixth, there is a principle of convergence which aims to 
retain a sharp focus in relation to the problematics of the 
Page 86 
present. 
It should perhaps be pointed out that such a theoretical 
edifice echoes other post-structural work. The notion of 
archaeo-genealogy is, of course, very close to the `nomadology' of 
Deleuze and Guattari (although they, somewhat perversely, claim 
it is anti-genealogical, I suspect they are not taking up a position 
against Foucaultian genealogy). The emphasis on heterogeneity 
and multiplicity (guarding against a unitary history) in both 
Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari recalls both Derrida's recourse 
to what he terms 'strategies without finality' and Lyotard's 
emphasis on the `dissensus' that obtains throughout the 
heterogeneity of regimes. All these concerns are stated very 
much in the shadow of Kant, and particularly the Third Critique's 
analysis of 'purposiveness without purpose'.83 To this extent, all 
these important post-structuralist theorists are neo-Kantian; and 
my own investigations are even more neo-Kantian in their 
determination to search for 'conditions of possibility'. However, 
as opposed to Kant, I am interested in the conditions of 'real 
experience' (such as the conditions of the limited corpus of 
statements); and my investigations are on the side of the 'object' 
in its historical specificity, rather than the Kantian universal 
subject. To this extent, my investigations are thoroughly 
93 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, introduction, §2. 
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Foucaultian. What I am not doing is seeking to provide a history 
of mentalities or behaviours." 
I began this chapter promising the exposition of theory, only 
to conclude that the archaeo-genealogical positions necessary for 
my investigations can only be described in the most general 
terms, while the bespoke character of the theory means that 
exposition can only proceed by exemplification. The chapter is 
called 'The Theoretical' to signify its difference from 'Theory': to 
this extent I propose a break with theory, since 'The Theoretical' 
will not work in the abstract, but can only inhere in the chapters 
that follow it. My chosen route is what I have termed the 
laminary option. Remember, this is an exploratory venture, 
content to open up spaces, inhabit the fissures that the continual 
play of power and knowledge has created, then like a scout to 
report back on what is seen and what is said, on the articulable 
and the visible: words and things. 
84 My project begins to look even more positivist, especially if one follows 
Hacking's characterisation of positivism. 
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TO DIGRESS: INSCRIPTION, ENROLMENT, 
TRANSLATION, HABITUS 
I should perhaps say a few words about some other theoretical 
tools that are evident in the conduct of my research. It should be 
obvious that my investigative framework is heavily Foucaultian 
in its emphasis, but some other useful methodological principles 
have been thrown into the pot. Foucault has analysed at great 
length, primarily in The Archaeology of Knowledge, the ways in 
which what we might think of as a grid of perception-enunciation 
comes to be formed: this relates, of course, to the discussion 
earlier of fields of visibility and sayability. The work of Bruno 
Latour in this area is, it seems to me, very compatible with 
Foucault's. Latour draws attention to means of visualisation and 
techniques of inscription, which seem to be very helpful ways of 
thinking about what I term, following Foucault, 'individuation', 
that is to say, the entry of an object or a subject into discourse. 
For Latour, sciences (or knowledges) act as means of 
visualisation of phenomena: they are the means for making 
objects visible. However, there is also a need for making these 
objects amenable to analysis by a science, and herein lies the 
importance of inscription devices. These devices are techniques 
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for rendering visible objects calculable in some form: for 
example, the psychologist can make use of tests and statistical 
techniques for producing a calculation about the individual; and 
the production of dossiers, case histories, and so on, are still 
further ways of inscribing. This perspective is useful in that it 
directs our attention towards what might otherwise be 
considered minutiae in the lofty ambitions and achievements of a 
science like psychology. What is important about psychology is 
the new ways it has given us for understanding and intervening in 
subjective life, based on a variety of apparently uninteresting 
bureaucratic-type innovations; which sounds a lot less noble than 
the accounts of the many standard histories of psychology. 
In addition, the Latourian notion of enrolment provides us 
with an interesting way of thinking about subjective involvement 
in discourse. Latour attempts to theorise how it is that 
particular discursive innovations can come to be taken seriously, 
while others do not.85 It is always important for us to remember 
that people will only become literate for specific purposes, given 
the huge investment required in the acquisition of so complex a 
skill. Thus we need to consider exactly how it was that certain 
" Latour, Science in Action, p.108ff. For Latour, the task is one of 'breaking 
open' taken-for-granted notions like 'interest', or the 'black boxes' (historical and 
scientific 'facts') that support them. The way to do this is to examine interests and 
black boxes in the making, rather than using them tautologously as explanatory 
categories. I discuss the black-boxing of normality below: see especially p.142. 
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interest groups were able to win over others in their literacy 
strategies, and, indeed, how they were able to convince 'ordinary' 
people that literacy was something worth acquiring. In the late-
nineteenth century moves to institute compulsory education, a 
complex reshuffling of discourses and of actors (human and non-
human) enabled new alliances of interests to take place. These 
new alliances were the conditions of possibility for what had 
once been unthinkable: the education of the lower orders. What 
had happened was a series of translation tactics' - a 
reorganisation of the goals of different groups, and a 
remarshalling of knowledges. 
Finally, the notion of tabitus', as developed by Marcel 
Mauss, and later by Pierre Bourdieu, is also a useful concept for 
the sort of story I wish to te11.87 For Mauss and Bourdieu, the 
concept of habitus relates to certain habits of mind and of body. 
These 'habits' are formed in a variety of domains; what is 
important is that such habits are always culturally and 
historically specific. The ensemble of habits and of the places 
where these habits 'make sense' is the tabitus'. We might think 
of the early nineteenth century experiment in monitorial 
schooling as forming a habitus: the sorts of school that were set 
" Latour, Science in Action, p.103ff. 
87 Marcel Mauss, 'Techniques of the Body', Economyand Society 2, 1, 1973, 70-
87. Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Economics of Linguistic Exchange', Social Science 
Information 6, 1977, 645-68. 
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up, with their distinctive architecture and organisation, formed a 
habitus within which existed certain 'habits' of body and mind, 
such as the posture and deployment of the body, the mental habits 
formed through rote learning, and so on. I think of these 
particular schools as forming a `literate habitus', a habitus where 
different sorts of habits and 'personalities' are formed primarily 
through the relation of the school and its pupils to particular 
literate techniques. The organisation of the institution and of the 
individual are both comprehensible as part of the habitus. Mauss 
and Bourdieu are both deliberately eschewing complex 
philosophical or psychological explanations of tabits'; Bourdieu, 
in particular, regularly asserts that to explain behaviours in such 
a way is to subscribe to the 'intellectualist fallacy', a belief in 
the necessity of metaphysics. Once again, there is a nice 
correspondence with the Foucault of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge who is content to describe rather than to interpret. 
In this attempt to organise a theoretical tool-kit, I am 
bearing in mind Marx's critique of the 'Illusion of Politics' in The 
Holy Family." Marx suggested that there is a problem in the 
conviction that all change flows from the conscious action of 
people, and that human destiny is therefore in the hands of 
educators and legislators. While such figures play an important 
" Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical 
Criticism, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1956, see especially ppl4ff. 
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role in my account, I should not wish this thesis to be interpreted 
as suggesting that there is a self-evident link between schooling 
and literacy, for example; and by stressing the importance of 
discourse, the statement, and strategic interests, I hope not to 
fall victim to this illusion. It is not just a matter of telling a 
story of the programmes of such bureaucrats, but also of 
interpreting the role of contingency in puncturing and scarring 
discourse: an anonymous discourse whose constant murmur 
echoes through the ages. 
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POSTSCRIPT: METHODS OF ASSESSMENT 
Before we proceed, it is perhaps necessary to establish what 
claims can be made for any archaeo-genealogical description, 
given that any account cannot correspond to 'truth'. There are 
perhaps four points to bear in mind when assessing the success or 
otherwise of an archaeo-genealogy (or, for that matter, of an 
archaeology or of a genealogy). First, we can examine the account 
in terms of how closely it sticks to its own analytical 
framework, and, conversely, whether it manages to avoid the 
theoretical problems that it itself identifies in other approaches. 
Second, it is necessary to ask whether it goes beyond other 
techniques of interpretation: does it justify its copious and 
obscure theoretical base? Third, do the documents and 
monuments used in the construction of an archaeo-genealogy 
seem to work in such a framework, or would they rather tell a 
different story? Finally, does this account facilitate the 
possibility of us thinking differently: does it allow us to bring 
new sets of relationships into focus, does it throw up new sorts 
of problems, and perhaps most importantly, does it allow us to 
understand our own situation any better and from there to move 
towards change? 
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2: READING UNTAMED 
"We can learn from the wisdom of Jesus 
Sirach how much perversion, corruption, 
and vice there is in children, and how 
easily and quickly they are spoiled, if 
we do not, by means of good discipline, 
retrieve them from their wickedness."' 
As I have indicated in the preceding sections, the following 
chapters of the (a)thesis is constructed as a laminary archaeo-
genealogy: this is not to suggest that this is the only, or indeed, 
necessarily the most fruitful method of investigation into the 
problem of children and the instruction of reading; but it did seem 
at the outset the research method which enabled me to cope best 
with limited resources and to fulfil certain predilections for 
investigative procedure. This section is less a history than a 
detective novel, seeking not to reconstruct the past (what 
Donzelot calls 'Lin bel objet fetichiste') but to uncover some of 
its monuments, to see what lies just below the surface of the 
present, and thus to write a history of that present - rather than 
a history of the past. At first sight, the kind of account that this 
approach produces might seem anarchic, cavalier, irresponsible 
even; yet my defence against such charges would be that this 
' Huberinus. 
Page 95 
reading is (at least partially) an effect of a contrast with the 
more usual and 'legitimate' methods of historical investigation, 
such as political or social history. I am questioning not the 
necessity to produce a rigorous account, but rather the necessity 
to produce an account which respects certain rites of 
legitimation: these rites are an obstruction to a description of 
the widespread deployment of the discursive domain, and as such 
I feel no compulsion to take part in them. How, then, does one 
begin to do such an archaeo-genealogy? 
A crucial starting point for understanding this contrasting 
approach can be found in the Foucaultian notions of bio- and 
anatomo-politics; in Europe from the seventeenth century 
onwards, a series of policies started to appear which took the 
body (as physical surface of investment, the body as machine; or 
as population, the species body) as their target:- 
"In concrete terms, starting in the 
seventeenth century, this power over 
life evolved in two basic forms; these 
forms were not antithetical, however; 
they constituted rather two poles of 
development linked together by a whole 
intermediary cluster of relations. One 
of these poles - the first to be formed, 
it seems - centred on the body as a 
machine; its disciplining, the 
optimization of its capabilities, the 
extortion of its forces, the parallel 
increase of its usefulness and its 
docility, its integration into systems of 
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efficient and economic controls, all 
this was ensured by the procedures of 
power that characterized the 
disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the 
human body. The second, formed 
somewhat later, focused on the species 
body, the body imbued with the 
mechanics of life and serving as the 
basis of the biological processes; 
propagation, births and mortality, the 
level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity, with all the conditions that 
can cause these to vary. Their 
supervision was effected through an 
entire series of interventions and 
regulatory controls: a bio-politics of 
the population. The disciplines of the 
body and the regulations of the 
population constituted the two poles 
around which the organization of power 
over life was deployed. The setting up, 
in the course of the classical age, of 
this great bipolar technology - 
anatomic and biological, individualizing 
and specifying, directed towards the 
performances of the body, with 
attention to the processes of life -
characterized a power whose highest 
function was perhaps no longer to kill, 
but to invest life through and through."2 
My analysis of the teaching of reading will demonstrate that this 
discourse too was the target of anatomo- and bio-political 
strategies, strategies which, one might say, aimed at the body 
'Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. I, p.139; La volonte de savoir, p.183. 
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and the soul of the individual. In the West, at any rate, these 
strategies form part of a series of techniques of regulation which 
can be seen as a unified political project, unified at the level of a 
more efficient management of the population. My emphasis will 
be on explaining change by reference to these strategies, which 
embody the very transformation I am seeking to analyse. Clearly, 
then, the emphasis on anatomo- and bio-politics does not rule out 
reference to political or economic relations or facts; however, 
my approach tends to give weight to concerns and problems which 
are usually regarded as technical or contingent, and which are 
typically thought of as somehow peripheral to the 'real' political 
issues. Questions such as 'how can an examination be run 
efficiently?', or 'how can a dictionary be organised?' can be 
shown to be of crucial important in the production of new forms 
of social life. I shall attempt to situate reading instruction 
within the orbit of such 'peripheral' concerns and explicate its 
role as a technique of normalisation and its position within 
strategies of surveillance and social regulation. I posit, then, a 
double principle of investigation which will guide the archaeo-
genealogy. First, I begin from the Foucaultian contention that 
there develops what he terms a reversal of the political axis of 
individualisation, and that this development gathers still more 
momentum in the mid- to late-nineteenth century: that is to say, 
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there is a new focus on the individual, who previously was not 
considered worthy of such concentrated attention. This attention 
is political, and is part of a more widespread strategy of 
population management and what is termed `disciplinarity': 
For a long time ordinary individuality -
the everyday individuality of everybody 
- remained below the threshold of 
description. To be looked at, observed, 
described in detail, followed from day 
to day... was a privilege... The 
disciplinary methods reversed this 
relation, lowered the threshold of 
describable individuality and made of 
this description a means of control and 
a method of domination... This turning 
of real lives into writing... functions as 
a procedure of objectification and 
subjection."' 
This new attention to the individual can be seen as the 
microscopic incarnation of an increasing concern with what 
Foucault has termed `governmentality';4 there is a relation of 
dependence between those discourses or technologies of the 
self which target the individual as an object of disciplinary 
practice (and reading and psychology are ultimately such 
discourses or technologies), and those more global projects of 
national government (which constantly reform in relation to 
3 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.191-2. 
'See especially Foucault, 'On Governmentality', /&C6, 5-21, 1979; `La 
gouvernmentalita', Aut Aut 167-8, 1978; The History of Sexuality Vol. I, p.135ff.; 
`Orinnes et singulatim: towards a criticism of political reason', in S. McMurrin (ed.), 
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. II, Utah, University of Utah Press, 1981. 
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perceived crises in the role of the State)5, and which cluster 
around a threefold problematic: security, population and 
government. There is no arbitrary distinction, however, 
between the micro- and the macro-levels, and it is perhaps 
helpful to think of the microscopic as mobile and local rather 
than miniaturised, as I have already argued in Chapter 1. It is 
clear that strategies at the level of governmentality, or of 
bio-politics, have effects at the local level, and vice-versa: 
the subject who is caught up in discourses around reading is 
affected by both anatomo-political and bio-political 
strategies. All of which points to the second principle of 
investigation, which is a denial of the usefulness of 
internal/external dichotomies in a history of reading. Reading 
is only comprehensible in a framework which emphasises its 
deployment in a variegated discursive nexus. To understand 
reading, one must understand this political reversal of the axis 
of individualisation which has an effectivity at both micro-
and macro-levels, working at the level of the individual and of 
the population. 
This section, then, attempts to impose a mutual relation 
5 Foucault, On Governmentality. He goes on to analyse how this new technique of 
governmentality is born out of a triple set of discourses: those around the Christian 
pastoral, those around a diplomatico-military technique, and those around police. 
The latter is perhaps the most important for this thesis, and I shall expand upon it 
below. 
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of comprehensibility in relation to reading. On the one hand, it 
attempts to sketch out some points in relation to this surface 
of emergence, but to make those points within a framework 
already established by Foucault, encompassing discipline, 
government, and political strategy. On the other hand, it 
attempts to open up reading and make it a window onto this 
Foucaultian framework in the hope that the framework might 
be better understood. Reading and discipline should each 
afford insights into the other. 
Before I continue with this section, it should be pointed out 
that this research does not involve a critique of reading 
instruction, or of psychology's role in the particular deployments 
of reading; it does not align itself in favour of one type of 
deployment or against another, nor does it attempt to prove the 
truth or falsity of any practice. Rather, it seeks to analyse how 
particular practices became possible; how these practices relate 
to other, apparently external, events; what effects these 
practices had; and what possibilities they in turn permitted - all 
the time focusing on what lies below the surface of the present. 
This refusal to 'judge' should not be seen as a dereliction of the 
investigator's duty; my hope is, on the contrary, that a field for 
further examination and consideration may be opened up by this 
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research:6 
"The intellectual no longer has to play 
the role of an advisor. The projects, 
tactics and goals to be adopted are a 
matter for those who do the fighting. 
What the intellectual can do is to 
provide instruments of analysis, and at 
present this is the historian's essential 
role. What's effectively needed is a 
ramified, penetrative perception of the 
present, one that makes it possible to 
locate lines of weakness, strong points, 
positions where the instances of power 
have secured and implanted themselves 
by a system of organisation dating back 
over 150 years. In other words, a 
topological and geological survey of the 
battlefield - that is the intellectual's 
role. But as for saying 'Here is what 
you must do!', certainly not."7 
Nonetheless, it is clear that I have made a strategic decision to 
investigate certain forms of regulative practice with some 
commitment to the possibility of change. Such considerations, as 
I have already intimated, form part of an 'ethical space'. It is 
perhaps sufficient to say that I do not wish to characterise the 
discourses around reading as monolithically oppressive - they are 
6 These remarks are meant to echo Foucault's in his introduction to The Birth of 
the Clinic. Nikolas Rose sees himself as part of this tradition also; see his The 
Psychological Complex, p.10. 
' Foucault, 'Pouvoir et corps', Quel Corps? 2, September/October 1975. 
Translated as 'Body/Power', in Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge, p.62. It should be 
clear from my discussions of intellectuals that to include the present work as 
`intellectual' does not represent a grandiose claim of the author's value, but rather a 
realignment of what we mean by 'intellectual': a technician of a specific field of 
knowledge. 
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frequently the opposite - but to lay open the processes of 
formation of discourse as a first step towards being able to judge 
(which latter activity forms part of the 'ethical space' referred 
to above), and then (perhaps) to change. 
In broad terms, the discussion below will centre on 
technical shifts in the rationale behind reading practice and 
instruction, and seek to outline the conditions of possibility for 
these shifts. Sometimes the shifts are only noticed because of 
changes in what is said; sometimes changes in what is said only 
present themselves to archaeological analysis because technical 
shifts enable us to extract them from their strata. As far as an 
attribution of primacy, or causality, in these matters is 
concerned, I would prefer not to risk an answer. What can begin 
to be delineated, however, is the general coarticulation of a 
series of discourses which seem to be part of a common strategy, 
a strategy which concerns itself with the most efficient methods 
of social regulation. Discourses of reading come to be part of a 
new political technology of the body; reading begins to provide a 
technique to get at the soul by regulating the body. In the 
sixteenth century, the target of reading is the spiritual and 
pedagogical transformation of individuals: the Bible is the very 
notion of the book. By the mid-eighteenth century, while the 
centrality of the Bible is not yet questioned, reading becomes 
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part of a penitentiary technique, part of the production of the 
obedient subject. The body becomes a target of power, and the 
teaching of reading becomes more and more a series of techniques 
of the precise wielding of power over the body. A sign of this 
new concern, this new operation of power, is the examination. 
The examination, in turn made possible by literacy, enables a 
precise register of the individual's attainment to be made, the 
very self condensed into a mark. This technique par excellence of 
microscopic power8 makes its appearance in schools at the end of 
the eighteenth century: schools now become first and foremost 
examining institutions. The concern with moralisation is still 
present, a descendant, no doubt, of Christian techniques of self-
analysis and inquisition (and Inquisition); but the birth of the 
human sciences, in a period beginning around 1840, sees the 
`psychologisation' of reading and a change in the orientation of 
the concern with producing an obedient subject. From the mid-
nineteenth century onwards, there is a shift from a concern with 
the moral regulation of bodies and populations, to a concern with 
the pedagogical transformation of the individual, although still 
conceived in terms of a revitalised 'moral training'; this 
pedagogical transformation, however, is unlike that of the 
sixteenth century, as it is concerned less with spiritual well- 
8 That is to say, power operating at a local and mobilisable level; examination, of 
course, is also a technique of macroscopic power. 
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being (although such concerns are not completely absent from 
discourses of this time) than with a more intensified control over 
the body and the population - a control so intense because it 
comes from the individual itself. The individual's place in the 
home, the nation and the empire is made clear as he or she is 
transformed into a self-regulating phenomenon, mindful of his or 
her place but also sufficiently well-read to perform the duties of 
his or her station. All of this is accomplished through a 
coarticulation of already-existing discourses or practices and the 
new discourses of the human sciences. I am proposing, then, that 
there are two major shifts in reading instruction and practice, 
and these form part of a larger series of discursive 
discontinuities which transform subjectivities and materialities. 
These shifts occur in the middle of the eighteenth century and in 
the middle to end of the nineteenth century. The latter shift, 
which is only accomplished with the help of the burgeoning 
discipline of psychology, seems to have been to a field of 
practices and concerns which is relatively stable; that is, it is 
formative of problematics we might term 'modern'. Thus I intend 
to look in greater detail at this period and the complex of 
discourses that form a 'modernity' of reading practice and 
instruction. All of this will form no more than an archaeo-
genealogical sketch, with certain laminae plucked from obscurity 
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to hold centre stage. Taking my cue from Foucault,9 at this point I 
start a section that must serve as a historical background to 
various studies of the power of normalisation and the formation 
of knowledge in modern society, with particular reference to 
reading and its instruction. 
Before 1750: A Golden Age? 
My hypothesis is that after the middle of the eighteenth century, 
the world is 'written' in a new way, as there arise discourses and 
strategies concerned with the disciplining of individuals in a far 
more exact and measurable way, techniques of bio-politics which 
form a complement to earlier techniques of anatomo-politics, 
which themselves appear to become intensified. We see the 
widespread introduction in schools, for example, of practices 
such as examination, of a concern with 'silence' (the triumph of 
silent reading), and of a concern with the 'moralisation' of 
children in a far more efficient way. These power-knowledge 
shifts signal something of a discursive discontinuity, although 
silencing, examination and moralisation all make appearances 
before 1750. It may be more accurate to state that a 'fissure' 
See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.308. 
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opens up in the archaeological field, and new discourses, 
previously hidden underground, come to light, taking on new 
significance and empowering new possibilities. We can begin to 
understand how this fissure appears by an analysis of its 
significant discursive predecessors, or 'discursive resources'. 
While it is clear that many of the techniques of discipline were 
already to hand, it seems that they were not employed with 
anything like the systematicity that we begin to see after about 
1750. 
The reading child has been a target of textual advice since 
time immemorial; for example, in antiquity, Plato claims;- 
"The child is of all wild animals the 
most difficult to curb... it is wilful, 
fractious and utterly insolent, and 
therefore it needs to be tied down, as 
with bridles."1° 
while Quintilian's advice is:- 
"Let instruction be an amusement to the boy"." 
While these two have different views as to the nature of the 
child, Plato the 'disciplinarian', Quintilian the 'humanist', they 
nonetheless recommend the same course of action to promote 
learning: rote methods. This view of the child as animal-like, but 
a willing learner (given habitual drill), persists through into the 
10 Plato, Laws 808D-E. 
11 Quintilian, lnstitutio Oratoria 1, I, 20. 
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seventeenth century. These traditional views, although in some 
senses contradictory, are often held simultaneously, and are both 
thought to entail one essential method of instruction, giving 
primacy to memorisation. In the field of reading, the only 
instructional technique is the alphabetic method, which effects a 
total separation of signifier from signified and in so doing, 
disallows the possibility of there being any meaningfulness in the 
learning process: first of all, the alphabet is learned, then strings 
of syllables, called bridles, which are gradually extended viz: 
B—A, B-E etc., then B-A-B, B-A-C, etc. The child becomes 
equipped to deal with any combination of letters he or she 
(usually he) might come across, and thus is enabled to decode 
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their meaning.12 This use of rote learning reaches something of a 
pinnacle in the sixteenth century, as there is an intensification of 
discipline in respect of the child and a concern with building a 
god-fearing society through well-trained individuals. The power-
knowledge techniques of this time are those that will later be 
refined and deployed with such finesse that they take on the aura 
of natural, basic, common-sense, obvious procedures: schooling, 
examination, discipline, surveillance. In the eighteenth century, 
this concern with discipline is discursively transformed; the 
individual (child or adult) to be disciplined (or taught) will be 
known in a far more intensive sense. Before this shift, the 
individual is still regarded as "psychologically simple",13 a 
'The alphabetic method is discussed in detail in W. J. Frank Davies, Teaching 
Reading in Early England, London, Pitman, 1973. The reader may notice that the 
current work does not make use of many of the excellent accounts of the history of 
reading practice that exist, most notably M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written 
Record: England 1066-1307, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1979; 
Mitford Mathews, Teaching to Read: Historically Considered, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1966; R. O'Day, Education and Society 1500-1800, London, 
Longmans, 1982; and Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the 
Word, London, Methuen, 1982, except as guides to source material. This is because 
the present work conceptualises its role differently and does not seek to provide a 
history, in its usual sense. It is perhaps an axiom of archaeo-genealogical inquiry 
that secondary materials must be treated with circumspection if used at all because 
of the tendency to view the past as 'trace' rather than as 'monument' (see the 
introduction to Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge). Davies, as well as Keith 
Hoskin, Cobwebs to Catch Flies: Writing (and) the Child, Unpublished MS, 
University of Warwick, 1983, point out that the alphabetic method still survived in 
some Kent schools in the 1960s according to one survey (although in company with 
other methods). This is a demonstration of the point that discursive shifts are never 
complete or total, but proceed with many exceptions and reversals. The 
archaeological strata are pitted with instances of 'anachronism', pockets of 
resistance to the transformation of knowledges; we can still speak generally of these 
strata, but no claims to totalisation will be made. 
13 I borrow this phrase from Hoskin, op. cit. 
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universal, unproblematic reader. This reader exists in coadaption 
with the 'universal text', the characteristic of seventeenth 
century writing. The universal reader and the universal text are 
each a condition of possibility for the other, and just as the 
universal text reaches its apogee in the late seventeenth century, 
so the universal reader accompanies it as its textual object." 
" To develop footnote 12: I could be accused of giving an historical account which 
is too broad, enforcing an unlikely heterogeneity on massive periods of time, perhaps 
suggesting that a Zeitgeist forces all thought and all behaviour to follow a single 
pattern. Of course, it might be objected, not everybody in the seventeenth century 
thought in one way, or believed the reader was such as has been described here. 
Perhaps this is so, but this is not the issue for my research. Such objections could 
be made if I were constructing a total history of literacy practices. However, I am 
seeking to do something else: to indicate what things became sayable and thinkable and 
at roughly what point, and how, this happens; in addition, I am only interested in 
discovering this information about what is pertinent to the modern age. My evidence 
for my contentions is the archive, the collection of statements that are available to us 
for analysis. In fact, in this time period, the archive is comparatively limited and 
very few statements seem to be made: I contend that those that are made can be read 
with reference to the general characterisation of the period that I make. To 
reiterate: this is not a history of mentalities or behaviours, but an analysis of the 
sayable and the thinkable, made with the purpose of understanding, in addition, 
visibilities. 
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The Project of the Universal Book in the Seventeenth 
Century 
"I delight in envisaging the innumerable 
multitude of Worlds as so many books 
which, when collected together, 
compose the immense Library of the 
Universe or the true Universal 
Encyclopaedia. I conceive that the 
marvellous gradation that exists 
between these different worlds 
facilitates in superior intelligences, to 
whom it has been given to traverse or 
rather to read them, the acquisition of 
truths of every kind, which it 
encompasses, and instils in their 
understanding that order and that 
concatenation which are its principal 
beauty. But these celestial 
Encyclopaedists do not all possess the 
Encyclopaedia of the Universe to the 
same degree; some possess only a few 
branches of it, others possess a greater 
number, others even more still; but all 
have eternity in which to increase and 
perfect their learning and develop all 
their faculties."15 
Thus did Charles Bonnet express the ultimate dream of the 
seventeenth century, that a book might encapsulate all that is in 
the world, and conversely that the world, thus gathered in, might 
'Charles Bonnet, Oeuvres IV (Contemplation de la nature), 1781, p.136, as 
quoted in Foucault, Les mots et les choses, p.100, The Order of Things, p.85-6. 
Much earlier Grude de la Croix du Maine, La Bibliotheque, Premier Volume, Abel 
L'Angelier, Paris, 1584, had anticipated an encyclopaedic solution to problems of 
the incompleteness of knowledge and proliferation of books (see "Epistre au Roy"). 
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become a total book, an encyclopaedia. We see the start of the 
search for an absolute mastery over language, which Foucault 
characterises as crucially dependent on the possibilities 
engendered by the invention of the 'double sign', the place where 
signifier and signified meet in perfect correspondence: "it 
presupposes that the sign is a duplicated representation doubled 
over upon itself."' This technical shift is away from an 
undifferentiated conception of how meaning is conveyed through 
words; now, each signification corresponds exactly to a given 
sign - signs become pure presences with no overspill of 
signification into the spaces between them. This link between 
signifier and signified was conceived of as a literal and physical 
one, and is perhaps best exemplified in John Webster's 
Academiarum Examen." Webster proposes relating 
"Hieroglyphical, Emblematical, Symbolical and Cryptographical 
learning" to grammar. He derives his evidence that means exist 
to repair "the ruines of Babel!, and... Cure... the confusion of 
tongues" from dactology ("the ability of the deaf and dumb to 
communicate by signs"), Chinese characters, and Boehme's 
`Natural Language'.18 For Webster, the reorganisation of language, 
despite its appalling state of confusion, is a possibility because 
'Foucault, The Order of Things, p.65. 
John Webster, Academiarum Examen, London, 1653. 
18 Webster, op. cit., p.24-5. 
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of this belief in the equivalence of signifier and signified; 
Webster's task is the production of the one, true sign-system. 
Providing the place where the double sign can show itself is 
another seventeenth century innovation, the monolingual 
dictionary, with its implicit commitment to the possibility of 
the precise definition of the sign: every word and every definition 
can be found, in its place, in the same book. The 'true' 
monolingual dictionary for the age is the complete and exhaustive  
word-book. Now, while the dictionary is the first book explicitly 
to write double signs, it is revealing that the practice of making 
dictionaries, lexicography, forms part of a much wider linguistic 
world. Our seventeenth-century lexicographers turn out also to 
be the writers of grammar and reading books; in this period they 
are producing universal language schemes, shorthand systems, 
and suchlike. These new wordsmiths crop up in some profusion, 
but so many of them, including, as Murray Cohen remarks, "the 
ones who have the greatest impact", are schoolmasters.19 
Reading, writing, teaching, the production of didactic and 
pedagogical texts, these practices exist in mutual relation. 
Books like the dictionary and the 'reader' (the textbook aimed 
specifically at the individual learning to read) are never produced 
as a result of purely epistemological breakthroughs; being the 
19 Murray Cohen, Sensible Words; Linguistic Practice in England 1640-1785, 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p.6. 
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work of pedagogues, they are pedagogic as well as 
epistemological, vehicles of power as well as knowledge. This is 
why they prove so important in the construction of the child - 
they constantly prescribe as well as describe. This practice of 
prescription later became defined in terms of a practice of 
proscription, when reading became 'psychologised', 'colonised' by 
psychology from the late nineteenth century onwards. 
This seventeenth century concern with prescription and 
description is part of the project of universal language schemes; 
a project aiming at uncovering or creating the single universal 
structure of language, to heal the fractioning of Babel. For 
example, George Dalgarno believed a "Natural and Universal 
Grammar" existed awaiting discovery;20 he had also produced a 
form of shorthand "that drove me before I was aware upon a Real 
Character; that again, after a little consideration, resolved itself 
into an Effable language".' These different writings exemplified 
by Dalgarno are essentially a set of doublings of the sign system. 
The testing of the possibilities of the double sign to its 
20 George Dalgarno, Didascalocophus; or, the Deaf and Dumb Man's Tutor, Oxford, 
1680. He had previously outlined his version of this grammar in his Ars Signorum 
of 1661. These concerns are eerily reminiscent of modern attempts to theorise a 
universal grammar, such as those of the Chomskians; although, as Hoskin, op. cit., 
points out, modern day adherents of this type of universalism prudently locate their 
universal structures at deeper and deeper levels, and thus avoid the 'rout' their 
predecessors were to suffer. 
21 Dalgarno, Works, Edinburgh, 1834, p.164. "Real Character" is 'Universal 
Writing'. 
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limits is characteristic of this period; universal languages, 
shorthands, sign-languages for the disabled, are all ways of 
producing an eternally valid spatial representation of language, a 
perfect and exhaustive grid of double signs, where signifieds (as 
ultimate, fixed meanings) are 'captured' in signifiers (as 
ultimate, fixed word-forms). And as Foucault shows in The 
Order of Things, this can be done not only for words but for things 
and values as well, providing the conditions of possibility for the 
discourses of natural history and the analysis of wealth; in each 
case, the world of things and values permits a Total Book, 
eternally and exhaustively valid.22 
This venture to produce the Total Book works; that is, the 
discursive formations around this venture have truth effects and 
are 'veridical'. Yet these attempts to reduce language to pure 
spatial representation do so at the cost of ignoring temporality, 
trying to overcome temporal changes in, and differences between, 
languages. The reader (both the child beginning-reader, the 
object of this study, and the adult 'sophisticated' reader) is 
coadaptive with this universal language, and like it is seen as 
eternal and ideal. Those texts of the seventeenth century which 
deal with reading instruction do not treat it as problematic; to 
22 Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les choses, Paris, Gallimard, 1966; translated 
as The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences, London, Tavistock, 
1970. 
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get the reader to read, all that is needed is the presentation of a 
system where self-evidently correct signifiers cannot fail to be 
recognised. John Buno, for example, uses pictures to illustrate 
letters' shapes as well as their sounds - 'b' is represented by a 
berry, whose stalk and body form the shape of that letter.' 
Richard Lloyd has a similar system, although he opts to deal with 
sound and shape separately (for example, 'h' is written like the 
back of a chair; and in sound, "b' is the creature that doth make 
honey").24 Charles Hoole lists various techniques for learning the 
letters - letters written on dice, on packs of cards, or on a wheel 
which reveals only one letter at a time, for example.' All the 
semiotic relations of these texts and the many others like them 
refer back to the pure and eternal relationship of signifier to 
signified, while the texts themselves strive to remove all 
possibility of error and ambiguity from the system. An example 
of this aim is provided by Christopher Cooper, with his charts of 
ambiguous words, whether those with the same sound but 
different meanings, or those with the same spelling but different 
sounds, or those with the same sound but different spellings.26 
23 John Buno, Newly Set-Out ABC and Reading Book, 1650 . 
24 Richard Lloyd, The Schoolmaster's Auxiliaries, 1653. 
25 Charles Hoole, A New Discovery of the Old Art of Teaching School, 1660. 
" Christopher Cooper, The English Teacher, London, 1687. Cooper's is an 
example of the working principles of seventeenth century pedagogy: to try to make 
the method of teaching, the sequence of learning, and the structure of language 
compatible with the order of things. 
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The ideal is the production of the one true sign-system, in which 
each double sign would consist of totally unambiguous signifiers 
signifying the eternal signifieds of ultimate, absolute Truth. 
Seventeenth century reading books attempt to produce 
themselves as texts on this model, lifting the veil between text 
and reader and making the process of reading transparent. 
Reading may be made fun or easy, as Quintilian had pointed out in 
antiquity, but the reader per se is not a problem - reading error is 
a temporary aberration which will be eradicated with the 
production of the pure sign-system.27 While one can see an 
increasing complexity in reading instruction books at this time, 
this complexity is in complete contrast to the perceived 
simplicity of the learning process, which proceeds through 
memorisation and habituation. However, the reader does not 
escape attention entirely. 
The 'Simple' Reader: Anatomo-Politics 
We have seen, then, how the reader is regarded as an 
"An early example of the attempt to make reading `fun' was the publication in 
1694 by "J.G." of "A Play-book for children to allure them to read as soon as 
possible. Composed of small pages on purpose not to tire children and printed with a 
fair and pleasant letter. The matter and method plain and easier than any yet 
extant". In the Preface the author states he wants "to decoy Children in to reading". 
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unproblematic individual, and the child as beginning-reader needs 
no particular consideration as far as instruction is concerned; the 
text is the crucial element in the relationship. Nonetheless, this 
child reader was not permitted to engage in the learning process 
without outside intervention. The body was incessantly a target 
of discipline, a surface on which power-knowledge relations 
might play. Foucault suggests that anatomo-political techniques 
of disciplinary power begin to make their appearance in France in 
the seventeenth century; similarly, in England, there is an 
explosion of books dealing with the bodily disciplining of the 
reader and writer; posture, the dressage of the body, is the 
crucial consideration, as can be seen from Edward Cocker's thirty 
or more writing books from the 1650s onwards which supplied 
detailed instructions such as "How to Hold the Pen" and "How to 
Manage and Use the Pen". A precise utilisation of power over the 
body, an anatomo-political power, is characteristic of this 
period, and its conditions of possibility lay in those techniques of 
surveillance developed by Reformation pedagogues. 
The Reformation is the scene of the creation of the good 
society out of well-trained individuals, which in turn made use of 
techniques refined by the Inquisition to guarantee the efficacy of 
that training: control, surveillance, examination, schooling, 
discipline. The child was the particular target of Reformation 
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disciplinary practice, since theologians of that time attached 
their hopes to future generations, but these techniques are 
comparatively simple; the child is seen as animal like, a 
paradoxical combination of the sinful and the innocent, best 
trained by the indoctrination typified by rote learning.28 This 
comes across time and again in Reformation authors like Luther, 
Melanchthon and Erasmus, and particularly in the educational 
theories of Peter Ramus; these texts stress ensuring the bodily 
disciplining of the child as a necessity of good educational 
practice. Corporal punishment is ubiquitous, but the evidence 
suggests it was not indiscriminate. Educational laws of both the 
Protestant and Catholic Reformations show an abhorrence of 
inhumane punishment, and an attempt to temper punishment with 
gentleness came to be seen as the best means of 'civilising' the 
child.29 A reduction in punishment is seen as needed to increase 
its effectiveness; and accompanying this intensified targeting of 
the body as a surface for intervention, intensified because more 
effective, is an intensification of the desire to teach reading. 
" See Gerald Strauss, Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the Young in 
the German Reformation, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. 
Strauss concentrates on the German Reformations, but nonetheless many of his 
arguments hold good for England at this time. An account of the contemporary 
situation in England is given by John Morgan, Godly Learning; Puritan Attitudes 
towards Reason, Learning, and Education, 1560-1640, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986. Morgan also provides an exhaustive bibliography of 
primary and secondary sources for the period. 
29 Strauss, p.179-82. 
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The school became a de facto institute for the instilling of 
literacy, often limiting its ambitions only this far. And while 
reading is primarily a means to salvation by giving access to the 
Bible, there is also an acknowledgement of the importance of 
literacy for other occupations, especially those connected with 
commerce.3° However, it seems clear that the concern to produce 
pious individuals is foremost in the minds of Reformation 
pedagogues - something which could only be achieved through 
`discipline' (what the Lutherans called `Zucht'), which Gerald 
Strauss characterises as:- 
"a systematic, habit-shaping regime, 
part upbringing, instruction, and 
character formation, part surveillance, 
control and punishment, a procedure 
expected to mold and tone the 
personality until obedience to 
established rules became automatic. 
Initiated in youngest infancy and kept 
up through adolescence and early 
adulthood, Zucht counteracted the 
youth's natural proclivities, eventually 
replacing them (or so it was hoped) 
with the traits of an evangelical 
personality. 'We can learn from the 
wisdom of Jesus Sirach,' writes 
Huberinus, 'how much perversion, 
corruption, and vice there is in 
children, and how easily and quickly 
they are spoiled, if we do not, by means 
of good discipline, retrieve them from 
their wickedness.' Left to their own 
30 Strauss, p.193-8. 
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devices, untamed and undisciplined, 
they bring ruin on themselves and 
everything around them."31  
Thus the period of the Reformation sees the institution of a 
pervasive disciplining, focusing on the body, and making use of 
techniques of control that are medieval in origin.32 These can be 
seen as the discursive resources for what I have characterised as 
anatomo-political techniques, although as yet they are rather 
crude: the object of discipline or Zucht is the spiritual 
transformation of the individual, and particularly the child. 
These early forms of discipline furnished the tools for the 
seventeenth century anatomo-political attempts to discipline the 
body for the sake of discipline, a truly modern phenomenon.33 The 
disciplinary practices of the Reformation and of the seventeenth 
century take an object (in particular the child) that is still 
relatively untheorised, but by the middle of the eighteenth 
century this was no longer the case. Other puritan techniques are 
also important for our story, and these will be examined below. 
On the surface, the disciplinary practices of the sixteenth 
31 Strauss, p.238. Cf. Caspar Huberinus, Spiegel der Hauszucht... Nuremberg, 
1565. 
32 See Hoskin, passim, and p.1 on the medieval institution of 'control' through 
the 'counter-roll'. 
" One is reminded of Nietzsche's much-quoted observation: Nietzsche reverses 
Christian dogma when he suggests that the soul is the prison-house of the body. One 
can view the history of the West as the history of the construction of the government 
of the soul, as a way of constraining more and more what bodies may do. 
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and seventeenth centuries do not seem so different: both stress 
the importance of education, and especially reading, as the means 
to salvation, and both concern themselves with the child as the 
privileged object of these educational discourses, and 
particularly of reading instruction, which in this period is almost 
synonymous with education.34 Both concern themselves with the 
body as a target of disciplinary action. Yet the differences 
between these centuries are crucial. 
As Cohen points out, in the period 1630-1660, Samuel 
Hartlib and John Wilkins were at the centre of those learned 
groups who were at the forefront of the universal language 
schemes described above.35 These are the same men who make up 
the Royal Society, founded in 1660 by Charles II for research into 
science. The institution of this organisation is not without 
significance, since it is indicative of an important discursive 
shift, the irruption of scientific discourses into the study of the 
world. We can characterise scientific discourses as having two 
34 On the birth of the child as object par excellence of educational practice, see 
Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1962, passim. 
Although there was no longer a lack of interest in education, Roger Ascham, The 
Schoolmaster, 1570, could still complain that horsetrainers got more attention and 
better wages than schoolmasters. Even at the beginning of the nineteenth century, in 
some quarters teaching was thought of as a stand-by job, or a last resort: "He is 
impotent and cannot stand upright: the only suitable employment for him is 
teaching" - see Francois Furet and Jacques Ozouf, Reading and Writing: Literacy in 
France from Calvin to Jules Ferry, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, 
p.111. 
35 Cohen, p.2. 
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essential features: first, that they are predisposed towards 
theory; and second, that they are systematic and truthful, or, 
rather, veridical.36 It is this systematicity that is important for 
our purposes, since it is exactly this which is characteristic of 
the closer mapping of the body as an object of anatomo-political 
practice. The seventeenth century is the scene of increasing 
attention to detail, discipline existing as a political anatomy of 
detail. The venture to produce universal language schemes is the 
beginnings of this new obsession with detail, a veritable 
`microphysics' of the operations of power, and forms, no doubt, 
an important condition of possibility for the scientific 
`onslaught' of the later part of the century. However, it seems 
clear that this microphysical attention to the detail of the body 
could only go so far - its object, the child, was still relatively 
untheorised, and one of the most important discourses through 
which these microphysical techniques could operate, the practice 
of reading and its instruction, was still relatively unentangled 
36 'Veridical' in the sense that they have truth effects. This emphasis on the 
irruption of scientific discourse is not meant to suggest the beginnings of a 'march of 
progress', in the manner of, for example, Richard F. Jones, Ancients and Modems: A 
Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth-Century England, 
Second Edition, Gloucester, Mass., Smith, 1961. I am concerned rather with the way 
in which a systematic targeting of the body could be part of a scientific endeavour to 
`know' the individual. I am not intending to privilege science as a space of pure 
knowledge, or to commit the opposite error, to stress the social conditions that 
formed the background to this innovation. My intention rather is to provide a 
description of this period which respects the multi-dimensionality of the dispersion 
of discourse. On this aim of Foucaultian investigation, see Nikolas Rose, The 
Formation of the Psychology of the Individual in England 1870-1939, introduction. 
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with a whole other corpus of discourses, techniques and 
knowledges that were to transform it. Reading was slowly 
becoming subject to a series of calculations, first evidenced in 
the rationalisation of dictionaries and wordbooks, which were to 
enable reading to become a vector of power, a technology to get 
at the body and the soul.37 We can see the discursive resources 
for this investment in the pre-Classical Age: but it is at the end 
of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth 
that we really see the start of an intensification of the 
operations of micro-power on the child. This is not a move from 
a golden age to a time of oppression, but is rather a move from a 
period characterised by an unsophisticated wielding of power to 
a period in which cunning surveillance and the strategic 
operation of power techniques were not only to become the norm, 
but were to create it as well. 
It should now be clear that the title of this chapter is 
ironic: reading in the period before anatomo-political and bio-
political strategies was not simply a pure space of knowledge, 
uncorrupted by such 'external' factors as techniques of 
government. On the contrary, it would be possible to write 
" The aim to produce universal language schemes had the side-effect of producing 
a whole series of (almost) exhaustive texts and word-lists, such as the monolingual 
dictionary, as discussed above. This rationalisation, however, is fairly simple, and 
does not encompass, for example, the calculated development of different footnotes 
and typefaces characteristic of the first half of the eighteenth century, as discussed 
below. 
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histories of reading in the pre-modern age which demonstrate 
how reading is always connected up with, entangled even, in a 
whole series of other discourses. Reading and the instruction of 
reading always have a purpose, are always techniques formed in a 
cultural and historical specificity. To understand reading, we 
must try to understand those specificities, whether they relate 
to the devotional practices of pre-Classical Christianity, or the 
rhetorical and philosophical techniques of antiquity.38 'Reading' 
before 1750 does look quite strange to us, but it was tied up in a 
different web. We must move on to consider how the web of the 
present was woven. 
38 For example, one could talk about how ancient Greek techniques of self-
knowledge, self-mastery and self-care were related to their literate abilities, or 
even forged by them; or how the Romans, inventing the technique of examining the 
self through autobiography, perhaps first seen in the figure of Marcus Aurelius, 
were able to constitute new notions of the self in and through literacy. 
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3: THE INVENTION OF THE NORMAL 
"For this is above all others the wisdom 
the eloquent man wants, namely - to be 
the regulator of times and persons."' 
The End of Universalism: The Intensification of 
Anatomo-Politics and the Beginnings of Bio-Politics 
My argument has been that the seventeenth century schemes and 
grammars were locked in a nexus of coarticulation with 
discourses around the double sign and the 'simple' reader, each 
aspect of this equation depending on the others for its continued 
existence and comprehensibility. So long as this discursive 
formation was undisturbed, it was able to have a whole host of 
`truth effects', most notable among them being the creation of 
rigid codes of discipline, which themselves could refer back to a 
desire to produce a pious population. Cornerstones of this whole 
complex of discourses were the child, and the possibility of 
teaching the child to read to guarantee this piety; cornerstones 
indeed, yet cornerstones paradoxically produced by the very 
' Cicero, The Orator. 
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edifice which rested upon them. However, at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, the attempt to produce universal wordbooks 
slowly dies out, and refocuses in an aim to write "universal or 
General" grammars and language schemes. While the seventeenth 
century project had ignored temporality in the concern with what 
is true for all time, the eighteenth century books incorporate 
temporality in the concern with what generally happens in a 
particular language at a given time.2 This shift is exemplified in 
changes in the contents of, and approaches to the construction of, 
the dictionary. 
In the seventeenth century, when the monolingual dictionary 
first appears, it is modelled on a sixteenth century invention, the 
bilingual dictionary, and features a list of Latinate 'hard words' 
and an equivalent list of vernacular 'common words'. The 
seventeenth-century dictionary is an an attempt to produce (or, 
rather, an act of faith in the possibility of producing) a complete  
wordbook which contains every word in the language. It is not 
until the eighteenth century that the modern monolingual 
dictionary, with one alphabetical list of words, is produced, but 
when it is, it is immediately concerned with temporality or 
specificity, as I shall explain. 
2 This transformation occurs in each discursive domain; for example, natural 
history becomes biology, and analysis of wealth re-forms as political economy, but 
it seems to happen first in the domain of language. These parallel transformations 
are dealt with in detail in Foucault, The Order of Things. 
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The first lexicographer to produce a modern English 
dictionary is John Kersey; his New English Dictionary of 1702 
claims to be a "Compleat Collection of the Most Proper and 
Significant Words, Commonly Used in the Language". This 
concern with the 'common and the proper' is expressed here for 
the first time, suggesting that something is stirring in the 
discursive field; while his Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum of 
1708 goes still further, being the first abridged  dictionary.3 It 
abandons the dream of the universal word list and aims at a 
general list of commonly-used words. This shift is not limited 
to dictionaries, but is more generally characteristic of 
contemporary theories of language, "a temporal aspect 
subsum[ing] the spatial", as Murray Cohen puts it;4 the figure of 
the Total Reader suddenly becomes derogated, as, for example, by 
Jonathan Swift: "Throughout Swift's works... the enemy is 
someone who completely and literally knows all".5 This new 
incorporation of temporality into the text produces a different 
reader; again, with reference to Swift, "the reader's alternative 
to being implied and totally mirrored by the satire is to read 
differently, to recognise the mental habits that lead, miserably, 
3 John Kersey, A New English Dictionary, London, Henry Bonwicke... and Robert 
Knaplock, 1702. John Kersey, Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum; or, A General 
English Dictionary, London, Printed by J. Wilde for J. Phillips et al., 1708. 
° Cohen, p.74. 
'Cohen, p.75. 
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to literalization".6 The search for a "Real Character", a universal 
language scheme, is abandoned - for example, grammars become 
general grammars of specific languages rather than a universal  
grammar of Language. My contention is that the shift towards 
the inclusion of the temporal is perhaps the most important 
condition of possibility for the intensification of a control over 
the body; the fictions created by these new language schemes, 
dictionaries, grammars, histories, novels, become 'fleshed out' - 
"its [sc. writing's] fictions become more life-like and more of us 
become like them the more (and the better) we learn to read and 
write."' We can understand this process as one of normalisation, 
the production of individuals according to a rigorous code of 
norms: this production of normality, which is perhaps the essence 
of modern disciplinary society, can be seen to arise first, I would 
argue, in the world of lexicography. 
`The normal' is the product of these new eighteenth century 
wordbooks; indeed the term 'normal' is not used in its modern 
sense until now, and we even have acknowledgement of the 
`normal reader', perhaps first in Kersey's 1702 dictionary. 
Kersey derogates the older style of dictionary, in particular 
Coles's, for including various foreign and rare words "never us'd 
or understood anywhere else. So that a plain Country-man, in 
6 ibid. 
' Hoskin, op. cit., p.17. 
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looking for a common English Word... must needs lose sight of it".8 
Previous dictionaries had designated a particular readership, but 
this had always before been 'unlearned'.8 Produced with 
reference to this abnormal reader, our 'normal reader' now 
appears regularly in prefaces to dictionaries, but perhaps most 
explicitly in Walker (1791), who discusses which usage should 
form the directing principle of his work: 
"Is it the usage of the greater part of 
Speakers... Is it the majority of the 
studious in schools and colleges... or of 
those who, from their elevated birth or 
station, gives laws to the refinements 
and elegancies of a court?" 
Walker's range of possibilities, then, encompasses the general 
mass of speakers, the university staff, and nobles, but his verdict 
is in an impossible, fictive combination of them all: 
"The usage, which ought to direct us, is 
neither of these we have been 
enumerating, taken singly, but a sort of 
8 Kersey, A New English Dictionary, preface. Cf., Elisha Coles, An English 
Dictionary, London, Samuel Crouch, 1676. This excerpt is quoted in Tetsuro 
Hayashi, The Theory of English Lexicography 1530-1791, Amsterdam, John 
Benjamins B.V., 1978, p.81. 
9 For example, Robert Cawdrey, A Table Alphabeticall, London, Printed by I. 
Roberts for Edmund Weauer, 1604, claims on the title-page that his dictionary is 
"for the benefit & helpe of Ladies, Gentlewomen, or any other vnskilfull persons", 
while Henry Cockeram, The English Dictionarie, London, Nathaniel Butter,1623, 
also on the title-page, aims at "Enabling as well Ladies and Gentlewomen, young 
Schollers, Clarkes, Merchants, as also Strangers of any Nation to the understanding 
of the more difficult Authors". Quoted in Hayashi, p.40. Incidentally, Cawdrey's is 
the first and Cockeram's only the third English dictionary produced. 
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compound ratio of all three.' 
This normalised fiction, however, is essentially productive: and 
what it produces more than anything is the child as a normalised 
language user. The Reformation injunctions to intervene first and 
foremost on the child still have their effects, but the fiction of 
the normal reader changes the ways in which such interventions 
work. While the Reformation ambition of producing more pious 
citizens, citizens more interested in religion and more able to 
take part in it more actively and in a more informed way, can only 
be judged a failure, the discursive shifts at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century secure a closer control and mapping of that 
citizen, and especially the child. These shifts, occurring first in 
the field of language, signal the beginnings of the production of 
the modern child. The temporalised, fleshed-out figure of the 
normal language user was able to produce the reader in its own 
image. At this point, the problem of how to teach reading 
undergoes a transformation, and acquires a new problematic 
object: the text now shares its problematisation with the reader. 
There is, then, a double action of temporalisation from the 
beginning of the eighteenth century: both the text and the reader 
`attain' a temporal existence. As they are temporalised, so they 
10 John Walker, A Critical Pronouncing Dictionary and Expositor of the English 
Language, London, G. G. J. and J. Robinson, and T. CadeII, 1791, preface, quoted in 
Hayashi, p.123. 
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lose their status as universal and unitary:" as they become more 
complex, they become more detailed; and the presence of the 
`detail' gives a domain to discipline. We notice the slow 
encroachment of discipline into pedagogy, but in general, 
following Foucault, one may distinguish three characteristics of 
discipline that begin to emerge at this time: the requirement of 
enclosure, the principle of partitioning, and the classification by 
hierarchy. In addition, there is the imposition of the timetable in 
the field of pedagogy: this is the imposition of disciplinary time. 
Enclosure 
"Discipline sometimes requires 
enclosure, the specification of a place 
heterogeneous to all others and closed 
in upon itself. It is the protected place 
of disciplinary monotony. There were 
the great 'confinements' of vagabonds 
and paupers; there were other more 
discreet, but insidious and effective 
ones. There were the colleges, or 
secondary schools: the monastic model 
was gradually imposed; boarding 
appeared as the most perfect, if not the 
most frequent, educational regime; it 
" This fractioning of the text and the reader can be most clearly seen in the 
contemporaneous invention of the footnote, which splits the text, but also 
distinguishes different users: the learned are distinguished from the unlearned, the 
master from the child. See Cohen, p.55, and the discussion of the new pedagogy 
below. 
Page 132 
became obligatory at Louis-le-Grand 
when, after the departure of the 
Jesuits, it was turned into a model 
school."' 
The principle of enclosure was one which worked its way from 
the secondary to the primary school: the latter had gradually 
disassociated itself from the community by its exclusive 
attention to children, and by long-standing attempts to 
`professionalise' teachers. The elementary school was, by this 
period, a space with its own logic of organisation, separate from 
`life', and a domain for the 'expert' education of children.13 There 
is evidence for a growing distinction between the various 'ages' 
of childhood, such as adolescence, middle-childhood and infancy," 
and the realisation that education (in this period virtually 
synonymous with being taught to read) needed to be more closely 
tailored to the different needs of its recipients. 
Partitioning 
"But the principle of 'enclosure' is 
neither constant, nor indispensable, nor 
sufficient in disciplinary machinery. 
12 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.141. 
"Morgan, op. cit., p.203-5 discusses the efforts to `professionalise' teaching, 
starting in the 16th century, particularly through 'licensing'. 
"See, for example, Aries, Centuries of Childhood, p.275 and passim. 
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This machinery works space in a much 
more flexible and detailed way. It does 
this first of all on the principle of 
elementary location or partitioning. 
Each individual has his own place; and 
each place its individual. Avoid 
distributions in groups; break up 
collective dispositions; analyse 
confused, massive or transient 
pluralities. Disciplinary space tends to 
be divided into as many sections as 
there are elements or bodies to be 
distributed. One must eliminate the 
effects of imprecise distributions, the 
uncontrolled appearance of individuals, 
their diffuse circulation, their unusable 
and dangerous coagulation; it was a 
traffic of anti-desertion, anti- 
vagabondage, anti-concentration. Its 
aim was to establish presences and 
absences, to know where and how to 
locate individuals, to set up useful 
communications, to interrupt others, to 
be able at each moment to supervise the 
conduct of each individual, to assess it, 
to judge it, to calculate its qualities or 
merits. It was a procedure, therefore, 
aimed at knowing, mastering and using. 
Discipline organises an analytical 
space."15 
This use of partitioning, or disciplinary space, is still 
comparatively crude, as we shall see when discussing the far 
more sophisticated monitorial system of education. Nonetheless, 
reading began to be extorted from a grid of localised power 
'Foucault, op. cit., p.143. 
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relations, which is crucially dependent on the development of a 
new disciplinary architecture. Foucault quotes the chilling 
passage from Delamare: 
"Sleep is the image of death, the 
dormitory is the image of the 
sepulchre... although the dormitories 
are shared, the beds are nevertheless 
arranged in such a way and closed so 
exactly by means of curtains that the 
girls may rise and retire without being 
seen."16 
No longer is it possible to educate an undifferentiated mass of 
people; the focus has moved to the child (now distinguished from 
the adult in educational practice), and to the specific child 
occupying a position in disciplinary space. By such strategies is 
it possible to raise the threshold of individuality. This move to 
`individuate' the individual brings its own problems, of course, 
which are in their turn answered by discipline. How else to 
comprehend the appearance of an entirely new sort of book, the 
Onania?17  What is interesting about the Onania is that its main 
16 N. Delamare, Traite de police, 1705, p.507: 'Reglement pour la communaute 
des filles du Bon Pasteur', quoted in Foucault, ibid. 
17 Anonymous, Onania; or, the Heinous Sin of Self-Pollution, London, 1710. It is 
interesting that this new crop of books seem to be directed at the lower orders: see, 
for example, Samuel Auguste André David Tissot, L'Onanisme: Dissertation sur les 
Maladies Produites par la Masturbation, Lausanne, Grasset, 1764. These lower 
orders are, of course, a principal target of disciplinary practice, since there is 
frequently concern expressed about their 'idleness'. Tissot revealingly writes Avis 
a peuple ten years later (peuple = 'the common people'). His simultaneous concern 
with healthiness, and thus with the extortion of the capacities of the body rather than 
its simple 'negation' can be seen in his De la Sante des gens de lettres, Lausanne, 
Grasset, 1768. 
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proscription is against the wasting of seed rather than the actual 
`sin' of masturbation: it is thus indicative of a move away from 
the action of discipline as negative, towards an attempt to 
promote absolutely every aspect of the body. This is the very 
essence of modern disciplinary power - it does not forbid, but 
rather incites and produces. The most perfect control over 
individuals comes to reside not in saying 'no', but in sanctioning, 
producing and dictating what is allowable. 
In addition, I have already alluded to the partitioning of the 
child that is taking place in the textual world, and I shall develop 
this theme below; it seems possible to develop Foucault's 
notions about the reorganisation of the child's life beyond its 
physical conditions. The very concept of the child was in the 
process of being enclosed, partitioned and hierarchised. 
Hierarchy 
"Discipline is an art of rank, a 
technique for the transformation of 
arrangements. It individualizes bodies 
by a location that does not give them a 
fixed position, but distributes them and 
circulates them in a network of 
relations.' 
'Foucault, op. cit., p.146. 
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The principle of hierarchical arrangement is perhaps the most 
important for the education of disciplined individuals. The 
eighteenth century sees the introduction of rows and ranks of 
pupils in classrooms and yards, and the ordering of pupils 
according to performance. Rochemonteix gives an account of the 
military organisation of the Jesuit colleges,19 while Jean-
Baptiste de La Salle dreamt of the classroom in which the spatial 
arrangement of pupils would be a co-articulation of a whole 
series of assessments of the pupil's progress, worth, character, 
industry, cleanliness and wealth: 
"In every class there will be places 
assigned for all the pupils of all the 
lessons, so that all those attending the 
same lesson will always occupy the 
same place. Pupils attending the 
highest lessons will be placed in the 
benches closest to the wall, followed 
by the others according to the order of 
the lessons moving towards the middle 
of the classroom... Each of the pupils 
will have his place assigned to him and 
none of them will leave it or change it 
except on the order or with the consent 
of the school inspector... Those whose 
parents are neglectful and verminous 
must be separated from those who are 
careful and clean... an unruly and 
frivolous pupil should be placed 
between two who are well behaved and 
serious, a libertine either alone or 
19 C. de Rochemonteix, Un college au XVIle siècle, 1889, III, p.51ff. 
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between two pious pupils."' 
Foucault stresses how this drive to tabulate people, 
performances and things was a mark of the eighteenth century, 
and marked the perception of a problem that was simultaneously 
scientific, political and economic.21 The question was: 
"how one was to arrange botanical and 
zoological gardens, and construct at the 
same time rational classifications of 
living beings; how one was to observe, 
supervise, regularize the circulation of 
commodities and money and thus build 
up an economic table that might serve 
as the principle of the increase of 
wealth; how one was to inspect men... 
and constitute a... register of the armed 
forces; how one was to distribute 
patients... and make a systematic 
classification of diseases: these were 
all twin operations in which the two 
elements - distribution and analysis, 
supervision and intelligibility - are 
inextricably bound up. In the eighteenth 
century, the table was both a technique 
of power and a procedure of 
knowledge."22 
This tabular hierarchy that was imposed on pedagogic practice 
also manifested itself in the arrangement of time. The time- 
20 Jean-Baptiste de La Salle, Conduite des ecoles chretiennes, 1720, p.248-9. 
The manuscript, which in all probability was not written by La Salle himself, but 
definitely refers to Jesuit colleges, is usually attributed to the year 1706. Many of 
these practices remain in Jesuit schools to this day, as I know to my cost. Much the 
same divisions had been suggested earlier by Batencour; cf. Foucault, op. cit., p.147 
and p.314, n.3. 
21  Foucault, op. cit., p.148; cf. The Order of Things. 
"Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.148. 
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table had had a long history, but now the division of time became 
more and more minute: again the anatomy is one of detail: 
"At the last stroke of the hour, a pupil 
will ring the bell, and at the first sound 
of the bell all the pupils will kneel, 
with their arms crossed and their arms 
lowered. When the prayer has been said, 
the teacher will strike the signal once 
to indicate that the pupils should get 
up, a second time as a sign that they 
should salute Christ, and a third that 
they should sit down."23 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century this discipline of the 
time-table had become still more precise; Tronchot outlines how 
the following time-table was suggested for the Ecoles 
mutuelles: 8.45 entrance of the monitor, 8.52 the monitor's 
summons, 8.56 entrance of the children and prayer, 9.00 the 
children go to their benches, 9.04 first slate, 9.08 end of 
dictation, 9.12 second slate, etc.24 We can also see in La Salle's 
description of the correct posture for handwriting how much 
more precise were the eighteenth century disciplinary procedures 
than their seventeenth century predecessors (cf. Cocker's 
instructional books of the mid-seventeenth century, discussed 
above). The pupils must always:- 
"hold their bodies erect, somewhat 
" La Salle, op. cit., p.27-8; cf. Foucault, op. cit., p.150. 
2° R. R. Tronchot, L'Enseignement mutuel en France de 1815 a 1833, les luttes 
politiques et religieuses autour de la question scolaire, These de doctorat d'Etat, 
Paris, 1972, i, p.221. Cited in Foucault, op. cit., p.150. 
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turned and free on the left side, slightly 
inclined, so that, with the elbow placed 
on the table, the chin can be rested upon 
the hand, unless this were to interfere 
with the view; the left leg must be 
somewhat more forward under the table 
than the right. A distance of two 
fingers must be left between the body 
and the table; for not only does one 
write with more alertness, but nothing 
is more harmful to the health than to 
acquire the habit of pressing one's 
stomach against the table; the part of 
the left arm from the elbow to the hand 
must be placed on the table. The right 
arm must be at a distance from the body 
of about three fingers and be about five 
fingers from the table, on which it must 
rest lightly. The teacher will place the 
pupils in the posture that they should 
maintain when writing, and will correct 
it either by sign or otherwise, when 
they change this position."' 
In this way, disciplinary time and space gradually imposed 
themselves on educational practice. The school years were now 
rigidly separated from adult life, and regarded as a time of 
`training'; the hours at school were becoming more regulated; 
different stages of progress were beginning to be theorised, the 
passage between which would be secured by the passing of 
examinations. A precise analytics of educational progress was 
slowly replacing the traditional, more undifferentiated 
25 La Salle, op. cit., p.63-4. 
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supervision of the schoolmaster. In the field of reading, the 
French educationalist Charles Demia was perhaps the first to 
produce a precise 'anatomy' of instructional technique:- 
"Demia [sic] suggested a division of the 
process of learning to read into seven 
levels: the first for those who are 
beginning to learn the letters, the 
second for those who are learning to 
spell, the third for those who are 
joining syllables together to make 
words, the fourth for those who are 
reading Latin in sentences or from 
punctuation to punctuation, the fifth for 
those who are beginning to read French, 
the sixth for the best readers, the 
seventh for those who can read 
manuscripts. But, where there are a 
great many pupils, further subdivisions 
would have to be introduced; the first 
class would compose four streams: one 
for those who are learning the 'simple 
letters'; a second for those who are 
learning the 'mixed' letters; a third for 
those who are learning the abbreviated 
letters (a, L..); a fourth for those who 
are learning the double letters (ff, ss, 
tt, st). The second class would be 
divided into three streams: for those 
who 'count each letter aloud before 
spelling the syllable, D. 0., DO'; for 
those 'who spell the most difficult 
syllables, such as bant, brand, spinx', 
etc."26 
Time and space thus become vectors of power: power is grafted 
" Quoted in Foucault, op. cit., p.159-60. Charles Dernia, Reglement pour les 
ecoles de la ville de Lyon, 1716, p.19-20. 
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directly onto them. But it should be clear that this is not a 
sudden shift in the wielding of power, but draws on a series of 
dispersed discourses and practices which one can begin to make 
out as a general form. For example, the temporal invasion of 
readers and texts is a sine qua non of the detailed disciplining of 
the individual, the heterogeneity of the reader existing as a spur 
to exhaustive knowledge, a knowledge of the detail of the 
subject; the indissolubility of power and knowledge ensures that 
knowledge about the reader, especially the child, does not exist in 
a pure space of its own, but becomes part of the productive 
discourses of education where the relations of power can play 
further. 
Furet and Ozouf suggest that the principles of these sorts 
of schools usher in the reign of the Norm; but a Norm, moreover, 
that can have a universal power, a validity throughout the order 
of things. They quote from a school handbook, L'Escole 
paroissiale, written by a Paris priest in 1654: 
"uniformity must be the rule for all, 
without departing in any way from 
received practice; thus, the same signs 
are to be used in lessons, the same 
method for reading, writing and 
arithmetic; the same manner of 
coaching for the Catechism, of saying 
prayers and hearing them, of assembling 
and dismissing children; the Conduct of 
schools should be an unvarying rule for 
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all. A Master shall find in his efforts to 
conform to it his hopes of success."' 
From this point on, classes in schools run by the Brothers were 
held in silence. 
We have seen in this chapter how the invention of the 
normal, a crucial innovation which allows for a whole new set of 
ways of understanding objects, is accomplished first in the some 
rather humble, literacy-related spheres. It would seem to be 
occasioned not by the machinations of the State, wishing to 
control and oppress the population as much as possible, but 
thanks to a series of technical lexicographical problems. The 
individual who comes under the this normalising gaze is already 
being changed, being made docile: 
"In accordance with a programme of 
normalization... when an object becomes 
observable, measurable and 
quantifiable, it has already become 
civilized : the disciplinary organization 
of civilization extends its subjection to 
the object in the very way it makes it 
knowable. The docile object provides 
the material template that variously 
supports or frustrate the operations 
performed upon it."28 
The concept of the normal is well on its way to becoming 'black- 
" Furet and Ozouf, Reading and Writing, p.79. 
28 Foucault, op. cit., p.162-3. 
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boxed':29 to becoming an unquestioned, reliable tool in the service 
of a series of other projects; and by its very nature, it brings 
with it civilisation and docility. What could be more civilised or 
docile than the silent schoolboy reading his text? 
" Latour developed the notion of the black box in relation to those fixed beliefs 
that enter into the calculations of technoscience, but without ever having to be 
problematised (because they been 'proven'). Latour borrows the term from 
cybernetics: a black box is something that is too complex to be represented fully, and 
all that is needed is for the inputs and outputs to and from the black box to be 
understood. I am extending the notion here to a non-scientific setting; the discursive 
elaboration of disciplinarity similarly has a series of 'black boxes' that it does not 
need to worry about - 'the normal' is perhaps the the most crucial. 
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4: THE DETAILING OF THE CHILD: THE NEW 
PEDAGOGY 
"Maybe it was a sign of the times that 
the last great saint of the Century of 
Saints [Jean-Baptiste de la Salle] 
should have been a man identified with 
elementary schooling."' 
In 1711, Charles Gildon's Grammar of the English Tongue is the 
first text to make use of the footnote (as opposed to the 
differentiation within the text common in earlier pedagogical 
works such as Comenius's), a split not only of text, between the 
`practical' and the 'rational' grammar, but also of reader, between 
"Children, women, and the Ignorant of both Sexes", who get the 
large print, and "the reasonable Teacher", who gets the "Reasons 
of Things" in small type.2 In the period up until 1740, this 
I Furet and Ozouf, p.78. 
2 [Charles Gildon], A Grammar of the English Tongue, With Notes, Giving the 
Grounds and Reason of Grammar in General, London, 1711. Much of this work is 
little more than a translation of Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot's, Grammaire 
generale et raisonee, Paris, 1660. Murray Cohen, inter alios, ascribes great 
importance to this and other works of the Port-Royal linguists in breaking down the 
universal language schemes of the seventeenth century, although he suggests that 
Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole's, La logique ou l'art de penser, Paris, 1662, was 
a more crucial work as it was available in English translation as early as 1685, and 
in seven editions in either English or Latin before the turn of the century. The 
Grammaire generale did not appear in English translation until 1753. See Cohen, 
op. cit., p.37 and p.154 n.100, and on the Messieurs du Port-Royal more generally, 
p.34-8. Foucault's The Order of Things deals with Port-Royal with customary 
brilliance; see especially p.94ff. 
Page 145 
tendency to drop the philosophy of language from the main text 
grows apace, first of all through the device of the footnote, then 
with a still more radical separation as the philosophy comes to 
occupy separate texts in its own right. Robert Lowth's Grammar 
of 1762 makes an explicit statement about the desirability of 
such a separation and suggests that anyone interested in the 
niceties of language should consult a specialist work such as 
Harris's `Hermes'.3 The project of teaching reading, once 
inextricably linked to the progression of Protestantism, moves 
further and further away from simple theological promotion. The 
teaching of reading now concerns itself more and more with the 
precise detailing and ordering of the reader. Texts are 
reorganised not only to exclude the more arcane elements of the 
language, but also to present a rational order in which learning 
might best take place. Johnson maintains that "Order in Teaching 
[contributes] mainly to Order in Understanding, so far as anything 
is out of Order, so far 'Us out of the way of being understood." 
This order, the correlate of the order just beginning to be 
extorted from the individual, still proceeds from alphabet up, in 
the manner of the alphabetic method, but ignores such things as 
'Robert Lowth, Short Introduction to English Grammar With Critical Notes, 
London, 1762. Cf. James Harris, Hermes; or, a Philosophical Inquiry concerning 
Language and Universal Grammar, London, 1751. 
'Richard Johnson, Grammatical Categories: Being an Apparatus to a New 
National Grammar: By way of Animadversion Upon the Falsities, Obscurities, 
Redundancies, and Defects of Lilly's System, London, 1706, p.16. 
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pronunciation to get straight to etymology and syntax, which are 
prioritised as the places where meaning is made possible; tables 
are fitted into this new organisation by becoming more general 
guides to the workings of language rather than merely being 
vehicles for the presentation of massive chunks of specific 
information (I would argue that tabulation is employed to 
organise both the text and the reader). The meaningfulness of 
words as they function in discourse is the crux of these 
instructional texts, and authors no longer strive to give some 
imaginary meaning to letters and bridles (see the discussion 
above of Buno and his contemporaries, p.114ff.). The best 
students would go on to learn the reasons behind the words, but 
this was no longer necessary in the teaching of reading and 
writing nor did it follow automatically from the learning of 
language, as was thought in the seventeenth century. This 
technical shift had consequences for the links between reading 
and religion, since no longer was learning to read a (guaranteed) 
step on the road to Christian brotherhood; while the differences 
in the level to which reading could be taught placed more 
emphasis on social status, since it seemed pointless to educate 
the poor beyond what they would need for everyday life.' In this 
way, the links between religion and reading were slowly being 
5 These points are dealt with in greater depth in Cohen, p. 63-8. 
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broken, while the higher orders were gaining a stronger and 
stronger hold on the techniques of knowledge acquisition. 
"Pedagogy has shed its philosophical responsibilities" in 
the period we have been examining, but it began to take its new 
responsibilities even more seriously. Its new responsibilities 
centre around fitting the specific beginning-reader with the 
appropriate form of education. Reading begins to be taught in the 
1730s in a variety of specific ways rather than as a kind of 
universal skill. Thus, for example, William Loughton's Grammar 
is aimed specifically at youth who will need it "for Trade and 
Business", and he specifically claims that had he bothered to 
include rational explanations about language, it would have made 
his book less useful.' In moving away from philosophy and into 
the specifics of providing targeted reading instruction, the 
grammar books of the day are beginning to make visible a 
differentiated child, a child with a specific life-course ahead of 
it. Life, labour and languages are the crucial three elements 
which begin to be conditioned by and to form conditions for our 
emerging modern disciplinary society, but my own research 
suggests that language is the site of the first organisational 
transformations. What is surprising is that the general 
6 Cohen, p. 69. 
' William Loughton, A Practical Grammar of the English Tongue, London, 1734. 
See page opposite title page and p. ix. Cf. Cohen op. cit. p. 72. 
The three themes first distinguished by Foucault in The Order of Things. 
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reorganisation of social life seems to require a series of 
apparently banal linguistic changes to make it possible. The child 
as a target of disciplinary techniques is made visible by a set of 
pedagogical and lexicographical changes. The new pedagogy, the 
explicit distinction between different types of reader, is a 
crucial step in this emergent disciplinarity. If you like, you could 
see it as the first step in Latour's process of inscription - we 
now have objects for analysis (people) who are becoming 
amenable to analysis. What we do not yet have are the technical 
means of rendering them knowable and docile. 
As an example of this new detailing, I shall deal at some 
length with a curious text which appeared in 1754. The text is an 
example of one of the many books on the government of children 
that begin to appear around this time. It pays particular 
attention to the differences between the education of boys and 
girls, and is curious in that it purports to be written by a woman, 
but in fact is the work of a man.9 John Hill, the author of this 
text, writes like a man (or woman) who thinks the times are 
changing; and we see him describe an education where all kinds of 
problems now begin to press in on the child: 
"It might be at one Time a Dispute, 
Whether a School or a Home Education 
were the best for Boys: but that must 
9 [John Hill], On the Management and Education of Children "by Juliana-
Susannah Seymour", London, Printed for R. Baldwin, 1754. 
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have been when the World was less 
wicked than it is at present; for now 
there can be none. The debauched 
Principles which the Generality of 
Youths acquire so early, and which they 
propagate so strongly and so universally 
at Schools, are such, that it is 
Destruction to be mixed among them, 
and in the way of Mischief. I am 
clearly, and against all Considerations, 
for the bringing up your sons at home."1° 
The school, then, is clearly a place of some potential trouble, and 
boys are best not sent to them. Hill reverses his judgment for 
girls, however; and again we see a constant detailing, a constant 
bringing into focus of the object of an educational gaze: 
"As to that [sc. education] of your 
Daughters, I think a little differently. I 
do not suppose that Vices and the Seeds 
of Vices are crept into Schools for 
Girls." 
In addition, for girls, reading should also be carried on outside 
the school: 
"Home should be the Place of reading 
Lessons upon the School."12 
There then follows an extraordinary passage in which Hill 
maintains that one should leave the precise content of education 
to the experts, and he, being a woman like the reader of his text, 
'Hill, p.196-7. 
" Hill, p.199. 
12 Hill, p.202. 
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is in no position to make such assertions and recommendations 
anyhow. The gradual construction of the 'expert', which we have 
seen attempted in the world of lexicography, is no doubt being 
speeded up by such commonplace texts as Hill's: 
"It would be ridiculous in me to pretend 
to describe any thing with respect to 
the Education of the Boys, so far as it 
regards their Learning, nor am I about 
to do it. You are a Woman as well as 
myself, and as little able to judge of 
the Proficiency they may make. All is 
to be trusted to the Gentleman who has 
the Care of their Education... You are no 
judge of his qualifications, so I would 
have you take the Advice of some 
learned and ingenious Person on that 
Head."13 
He then proceeds to tell us a whole series of quasi-
psychological facts about how to encourage boys to read - 
essentially, it is important to keep them fresh by keeping the 
amounts of work short, and frequently to interrupt them in their 
reading to keep them in a state of constant anticipation: 
"A Boy will have as much eagerness to 
get to the Bottom of a Page, as a Woman 
has to come to the End of a Hem... and if 
he be purposely taken away at the 
middle of a Paragraph, he will be 
impatient to return to the Book again to 
finish it... The Tutor may have marked 
beforehand that Part of the Relation 
where it is most interesting, and there 
13 Hill, p.205-6. 
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break off for that Time. No Matter that 
the Child is ever so keen to go on; the 
more of this Eagerness he has, the 
greater will be the Advantage of 
breaking it off, and he will return to it 
with the more Appetite from his Play... 
If on any Day one of them be quite 
unwilling to read at all, let it be 
omitted, rather than have the 
Appearance of a Task; and on the next, 
let Artifice, rather than Persuasion, be 
employed to bring him to it."14 
As far as I can tell, there is something new stirring here; such a 
thorough `psychologisation' of the child does not, indeed can not, 
happen previously. Hill develops the theme by suggesting how it 
is necessary to breed competition, offer rewards, foster 
ambition, and so forth, to maintain the child's interest in reading: 
"Pleasure alone may have been, after a 
Child is taught its Letters, the 
Beginning of its Attachment to Reading; 
but after that it is this Sense of Praise, 
and this Spirit of Emulation, that must 
be the Agents."15 
The child that is visible in Hill's text is already one that is quite 
familiar to us. In a contemporaneous text, that of James Nelson, 
we see similar attempts to divide up the targets of an education 
in reading.16 Nelson's overall task is to discriminate between the 
14 Hill, pp.216, 218. 
15 Hill, p.220. 
16 James Nelson, An Essay on the Government of Children, London, Printed for 
R. and J. Dodsley, 1756. 
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different sorts of education befitting men and women of different 
social classes, all of which can be justified because it is part of 
the Great Creator's plan. Nelson constantly downgrades education 
as against manners, and knowing one's station in life; thus it is 
important for women to educate themselves in such a way that 
they make themselves good companions (an over-education of 
women, for example their learning Latin or Greek, can lead to 
(unspecified) problems), while those of a lower class should not 
concern themselves with the more esoteric aspects of knowledge: 
"My Advice then is, that Boys of this [sc. lower] class never once 
attempt to learn Latin."' In addition, we see the truths of 
lexicography entering into the field: "nice grammatical Rules are 
not strictly the Province of Boys in Common Life."" Nelson even 
goes as far as to say that the education of the peasantry is less 
important to them than the education of the classes above them; 
the latter would then be enabled to treat the former with 
"Justice and Humanity".19 
I briefly mentioned above the importance of the woman 
being able to fill the role of companion, and how education was an 
instrument in the constitution of what was, in its highest form, 
the 'companionate marriage'. We see in Lady Sara Pennington's 




popular advice manual for young ladies a perfect example of how 
this was used to justify a limitation in the education of girls: 
"It is necessary for you to be perfect in 
the first four rules of Arithmetic -
more, you can never have occasion for, 
and the mind should not be burdened 
with needless application... 
"It has been objected against all female 
learning, beyond that of household 
economy, that it tends only to fill the 
minds of the sex with a conceited 
vanity, which sets them above their 
proper business... and serves only to 
render them useless wives, and 
impertinent companions. It must be 
confessed, that some reading ladies 
have given but too much cause for this 
objection... but... such ill causes proceed 
chiefly from too great an imbecility of 
mind to be capable of much 
enlargement, or from a mere 
affectation of knowledge, void of all 
reality. - Vanity is never the result of 
understanding - a sensible woman will 
soon be convinced, that all the learning 
her utmost application can make her 
mistress of, will be, from the 
difference of education, in many points, 
inferior to that of a school-boy: - this 
reflection will keep her always humble, 
and will be an effectual check to that 
loquacity which renders some women 
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such insupportable companions."20 
Again, I would suggest that such books are discursively new; 
although some of the subject matter, for example the necessity 
of women maintaining a particular place in the social order, may 
be familiar to us, the sorts of justifications, with their quasi-
psychological understandings of what is and what is not 
appropriate for particular sorts of minds, are brand new.21  
What we are witnessing here is, I think, the birth in popular 
culture of the child that was constructed for us in the far-off 
realm of lexicography. Such a child has been individuated out of 
discourse, produced as a truth effect. It is a child that is 
produced as possessing certain sorts of attributes that one day 
will be thought of as `psychological'; these attributes include 
certain sorts of literacy skills, but they have also been produced 
Lady Sara Pennington, A Mother's Advice to Her Absent Daughters, Eighth 
Edition, London: Taylor and Hessey, 1817, pp.27, 28-30, italics in original. The 
original version, which was titled An Unfortunate Mother's Advice to Her Absent 
Daughters, was published in the middle to late eighteenth century. The author died in 
1783. A more bald statement is made by N. Restif de la Bretonne, LesGynographes 
ou Idees de deux honnetes femmes sur un projet de *clement propose a toute 
l'Europe pour mettre les femmes a leur place et operer le bonheur des deux sexes, 
Paris, 1777: "All women should be prohibited from learning to write and even read. 
This would preserve them from loose thoughts, confining them to useful tasks about 
the house, instilling in them respect for the first sex, which would be all the more 
carefully instructed in these things for the second sex having been neglected." Cited 
in Furet and Ozouf, Reading and Writing, p.340-1, n.4. 
21 A nice contrast can be made with an advice manual like William Fleetwood, The 
Relative Duties of Parents and Children, Husbands and Wives, Masters and Servants, 
London: Charles Harper, 1705, which is just a standard trot through a doctrine of 
obedience based on Biblical dogma. Fleetwood's characters are completely 
psychologically uninteresting. 
Page 155 
through certain sorts of literacy practices. These practices we 
might think of as part of the habitus that such children occupied, 
and that fostered particular habits of mind. Perhaps we need to 
analyse what these habitus look like. 
I have stressed the philosophical or ontological conditions 
of possibility for the invention of a new character, or rather, for 
the making visible of a new character - the child as reader, and 
even the child as a form of subjectivity. I should stress again the 
`truth effectivity' of such moves, or what we might think of as 
the 'feedback effect' of innovations in this area. The production 
of the 'normal' reader discussed above is not merely the idealism 
of an obscure set of schoolmasters, but is a luminosity in 
discourse which reflects and intensifies objects of the gaze of 
discourse. The setting up of the normal reader is, admittedly, at 
first a philosophical and linguistic endeavour. However, this 
linguistic chimera begins to come to life as more and more 
children (and adults) are taught to read according to the latest 
fashions for what a good reader should look like. Notions of what 
it is to be a normal reader exclude other possibilities, especially 
when, as Ian Hacking dryly notes, "few of us fancy being 
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pathological, so 'most of us' try to make ourselves normal"." 
However, the normalising effects of lexicography are only part of 
the story. I shall make a couple of digressions to begin to flesh 
out the story. 
Digression I: Puritanism as a Literary Habitus 
I have referred sporadically to religion and to the importance of 
the Bible as a spur to acquiring literacy skills. Perhaps a few 
more schematic remarks might help at this point. 
It is not too difficult to tell a story which gives a central 
place to Puritanism as an incitement to literacy. As Eisenstein 
has noted, the Puritan household was subject to a nexus of 
literate interests.' Outside of 'specialists', like monks and 
bureaucrats, who were acquiring literacy skills, the Puritans 
were perhaps the most literate of groups. The sixteenth century 
22 Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1990, p. 2. See the discussion above of John Kersey and the normal reader. Hoskin, 
Cobwebs to Catch Flies, remarks that it is at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
that the word 'normal' is first used in its modern sense, being derived from an 
etymological contradiction. The normal is 'the common and the proper'; the common 
is what is shared and by extension what is vulgar, the proper is what is one's own 
and by extension what is refined and superior. The constitution of new characters in 
social life is founded on such 'fictions'. 
23 Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communication 
and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979. See also Strauss, Luther's House of Learning. 
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Reformation was the scene of expanded schooling programmes and 
mass literacy in radical Puritan areas. Mass literacy campaigns 
in Sweden, for example, were common in the seventeenth 
century.24 In Scotland, the First Presbyterian Book of Discipline 
of 1560 called for a national system of education; after an 
extensive series of legislation in Scotland throughout the 
seventeenth century, a network of parish and high schools were 
established throughout the lowlands, for the education of both 
rich and poor, paid for by the taxation of landlords and tenants.' 
Of overriding importance, however, was the relation 
between reading and the salvation of the soul. Reading the Bible 
was an important way of making your particular devotions 
outside of the church itself, and thus there seemed to be some 
point in acquiring literacy skills (which was presumably quite a 
commitment in an age without any governmental programmes 
aimed at the promotion of reading)." Puritanism, then, was the 
overriding 'logic' of a crucial literate habitus. It seems clear 
24 See, for example, Egil Johansson, 'The History of Literacy in Sweden', in H. 
Graff (ed.) Literacy and Social Development in the West: A Reader, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
25 T. P Young, Histoire de l'enseignement primaire et secondaire en Ecosse de 
1560 a 1872, Dijon, 1907, chs 2, 5, 6; H. M. Knox, Two Hundred and Fifty Years 
of Scottish Education, 1696-1946, Edinburgh, 1953, p.5-10. 
" A good example of this, although a slightly late one, is P. Doddridge, The Rise 
and Progress of Religion in the Soul, London, The Religious Tract Society, 1745. See 
especially 'Habitual Devotion', pp. 189-206, where Doddridge gives guidance on a 
whole series of techniques of self-examination and ways of maintaining communion 
with God at different times of the day. 
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that the ability to read and write transformed the way in which 
the Puritan could conceive of him- or herself in relation to the 
Almighty:27 these are very obviously conditions of possibility for 
the founding of new forms of subjectivity. The reader can enter a 
new form of relationship with the self once he or she has become 
literate (this is a point Walter Ong makes throughout his work -
in the mainstream psychological literature, David Olson has 
frequently made similar observations); the interiorisation of the 
word, to use Ong's term, has a profound effect on subjectivities 
and social life because of the importance we now realise, 
following Latour, must be attached to new ways of being able to 
make inscriptions: new techniques of inscribing empower new 
possibilities for making objects visible - in this case, the self 
can become a newly visible object.28 
Max Weber has suggested a mechanism by which these new 
techniques might be productive of new forms of subjectivity. 
Weber pointed out how the new skills which were being acquired 
by the Puritans were constantly related to a field of ethical 
practice, with the gradual formation of a particular type of 
27 See, for example, M. M. Knappen (ed.), Two Elizabethan Puritan Diaries, 
Gloucester, Peter Smith, 1966. 
28 This is the point that Jack Goody makes in The Domestication of the Savage 
Mind, London, Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
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`character' the result:29 the man of conscience. This character, 
previously found only in a select number of environments (for 
example, in the monastery), is now distributed much more widely 
throughout the population. The man/woman of conscience spends 
a great amount of time doing work on the self: constantly 
training, constantly indulging in a form of ascesis which was 
gradually becoming transformed into what Weber termed 'Worldly 
Asceticism'. Ascesis gradually became no longer limited to non-
secular environments, but was now firmly in the 'real world' as 
well. Reading the Bible was a fundamental skill in the practising 
of this 'Worldly Asceticism', since through reading the link 
between God and life in the world could be made explicit. 
However, as Weber makes clear, the realm of ethical 
practice gradually developing within Puritanism was not a simple 
reflection of the mores of religion. Weber maintains that 
`Worldly Asceticism' was a form of living which developed from 
the Doctrine of Predestination,30 but it was, in essence, an 
unforeseen development from it. This contingent set of 
" Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London, George 
Allen and Unwin, 1930, especially ch.4. In particular, Weber notes that '[t]he 
moral conduct of the average man was thus deprived of its planless and unsystematic 
character and subjected to a consistent method for conduct as a whole' (p.117). 
3° The Doctrine of Predestination as a code does not, therefore, have a simple 
causal relationship with the ethical forms of living for which it was a condition of 
possibility. These relatively independent life-techniques might then link up with a 
whole series of other objects (apart from 'Grace') such as road building or chocolate 
(Macadam, Cadbury), for example. 
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developments was to prove, however, a crucial one, since it was 
now the case that certain sorts of 'personalities', those men and 
women of conscience, could become more widespread throughout 
the social body. The sixteenth century had been the scene of mass 
literacy in radical Protestant areas of the world, but the regular 
revivals of Puritan ideas in the West in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries enabled the character of the man or woman 
of conscience to become firmly rooted in the cultural make-up of 
our societies. 
The Puritans' voracious desire for knowledge via literacy as 
the sine qua non of religious devotion was able to overcome other 
traditions in the Christian West, such as the Catholic fear of 
heresy arising from Bible study. Lawrence Stone makes a sharp 
dichotomy between the Catholics, for whom literacy was always 
problematic because of the danger of heresy, and the Protestants, 
for whom lack of literacy was always to be feared because of 
superstitions that would arise from a lack of Bible study.31  
Clearly, however, the Protestants 'won out', and literacy skills 
did begin to spread more widely. We shall notice again in a later 
period a similar theme, a similar debate: is it more dangerous to 
educate people, or to keep them ignorant? 
As I mentioned above, Puritan ideas were subject to many 
31 
 Lawrence Stone, 'Literacy and Education in England, 1640-1900', Past and 
Present 42, 1969, 69-140. See especially p.76ff. 
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revivals in the period of the Renaissance and the liberal legacies 
of the Enlightenment. As Weber points out, revivals of Puritan 
ideas were occurring regularly, at least through until the last 
great revival in the eighteenth century.32 By now, reading has 
begun to acquire different sorts of problematisations, 
problematisations which free it from a simple dependent relation 
with religion. The spread of the new 'personality' is an additional 
element, along with the linguistic changes I have described 
earlier, in the gradual elaboration of the 'complex' reading 
individual. Weber has left us with a convincing account of how 
the 'average man' became subject to a new set of what Foucault 
has termed 'technologies of the self'; my contention is that one 
can go beyond this level of description - the linguistic changes I 
have described above are beginning to 'psychologise' the Weberian 
average man - making visible a new complexity in the reader. 
Digression II: Who is Learning to Read - and Where? 
I am aware that I have talked in very general terms about the 
conditions of possibility for the insertion of new forms of 
32 Weber, p.117. 
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subjectivity into social life. These new forms spread beyond 
their more circumscribed beginnings and move out into the 
general populace (an example being the spread of 'Worldly 
Asceticism'); yet the spread of literacy is not uniform. I shall 
begin by looking at literacy practices in schools of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. 
Phillipe Aries provides the account par excellence of the 
Renaissance grammar school.33 Populated in the main by the well-
born and by males, the typical age range of the pupils was from 
ten to fourteen years of age. However, it was quite possible to 
find a nine year old studying alongside a twenty four year old (the 
latter almost certainly trying to acquire literacy to move into a 
new profession). However, as Aries makes clear, these grammar 
"Aries, especially p.154ff. It is also worth referring to Lawrence Stone, The 
Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979, 
passim. On the timetable of such schools see T. W. Baldwin, William Shakspere's 
Small Latine and Lesse Greeke, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1944, 
p.353-8. On the content of the lessons, and the importance of a training in the 
rhetorical arts, see Donald Lemen Clark, John Milton at St. Paul's School: A Study of 
Ancient Rhetoric in English Renaissance Education, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1964, especially p.178-84; Walter Ong, Rhetoric, Romance and Technology, 
London, Cornell University Press, 1971, especially pp.48-67, 71-81, 101-3; 
Foster Watson, The Old Grammar Schools, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1916, especially p.16-18. Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1988, p.257-8, describes the incredible monotony of the pedagogical 
techniques of the time, the students remorselessly repeating and memorising their 
lessons, learning only three new words a day. Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicism and 
the Early Modern State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, stresses 
how such schools had recourse to the Classics even for practical knowledge about 
such things as horticulture and engineering, and even military drill - see especially 
pp.1-7, 13-15, 28-31, 67-9. 
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schools, and other sorts of schools in the period from medieval 
times right through until the middle of the eighteenth century, 
confine themselves to teaching Latin. The equivalent of our 
primary education - elementary reading, knowledge of one's 
mother tongue, and of what one needed to get by in one's station 
in life - were taught at home or in apprenticeship to a trade.34 
The Renaissance grammar schools were a site for those who had a 
set of specific cultural purposes attached to their desire for 
education - and thus were typically well born - so it is also 
important to think outside the school environment as well, and 
get some idea of who else is learning to read. 
I have already begun to deal with the 'new world' of the 
eighteenth century (for it is there that I locate one of the 
sharpest discursive ruptures), but it is clearly the case that many 
of the innovations which we have begun to investigate were 
gradual outgrowths from a much earlier period. Eisenstein is 
surely correct when she speaks of an 'elusive transformation', 
although a profound one;35 as she points out, even rural villagers 
who would have belonged to an exclusively hearing public right 
through to the nineteenth century, would have heard material 
utterly transformed by the advent of printing. She stages an 
exemplary scene in which the storyteller has been replaced by the 
34 Aries, p.137. 
35 Eisenstein, op. cit., p.129ff. 
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(exceptional) literate villager, who reads out to other villagers 
from a supply of cheap books and ballad sheets, produced 
anonymously for distribution by peddlers. Such changes no doubt 
begin to insinuate themselves at the level of the subjectivity of 
the hearer: it also seems clear that the family became endowed 
with new functions, both educational and religious, and was 
moved in this direction by the moralising literature that began to 
flood into the home.36 In addition, there must have been profound 
effects on the public life of the citizen, even if not literate 
him/herself: the production of propaganda laid the ground for 
political parties, while the dissemination of printed reports 
began to change the meaning of participation in public affairs. 
Malesherbes observed in 1775 that "what the orators of Rome and 
Athens were in the midst of a people assembled, men of letters 
are in the midst of a dispersed people" - that is to say, the very 
nature of the link between individuals in a State has moved from 
one of actual contact (one is in touch with one's peers as one 
hears an address) to a much more impersonal and diffuse 
relation.' 
Natalie Davis's account of the impact of printing and 
literacy can be read in tandem with Eisenstein's.38 Like 
36 Eisenstein, p.133. 
" Eisenstein, p.130. 
" Natalie Zemon Davis, Printing and the People: Early Modern France, in H. J. 
Graff (ed.). 
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Eisenstein, she stresses the enormous impact that literacy had on 
the lives of ordinary people, paradoxically in spite of those 
people's own lack of literacy skills: 
"Rural literacy remained low 
throughout the sixteenth century. Of 
the women, virtually none knew their 
ABCs, not even the midwives. As for 
the men, a systematic study by 
Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie of certain 
parts of the Languedoc from the 1570s 
through the 1590s found that three 
percent of the agricultural workers and 
only ten percent of the better-off 
peasants - the laboureurs and fermiers 
- could sign their full names."39 
Among the peasants, then, the rate of literacy was low, but 
possibilities for literacy were nonetheless provided by the 
tenaciousness of Protestant booksellers, who kept trying to 
distribute the word of God in a climate where commercial 
booksellers would not take such risks for the sake of a meagre 
profit, if a profit could be gleaned at all. The Protestants opened 
up bookselling routes which awaited commercial viability for 
their concentrated use. 
In the urban areas, the situation was somewhat different. 
There is evidence for a growth in the number of teachers, and 
newly established municipal orphanages give elementary 
instruction for poor boys - and Davis adds that even some orphan 
39 Davis, p.73. 
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girls were taught their ABC." Ability to sign one's name is higher 
in these urban areas: of 115 printers' journeymen assembled in 
Lyon in 1580 to give power of attorney, two thirds could sign 
their names fully; in Narbonne in the 1560s and 1570s, one third 
of the artisans could sign their name, one third could write 
initials, and only one third were totally foreign to letters. At 
Montpellier, only twenty five per cent of the craftsmen were 
limited to making simple marks. At one end of the scale, well-
off merchants were almost completely literate; at the other, 
women outside the families of publishers, merchant bankers and 
lawyers would be almost completely illiterate." In fact, it is 
worth pointing out that many women would have developed 
literacy skills, although no doubt to a much lesser extent than the 
men. There is evidence that there were plenty of female writers, 
and reading specifically for women (such as the life of St 
Margaret, complete with its prayers for the pregnant). However, 
the fact that Erasmus felt he had to defend the education of 
women so strongly, suggests that the idea of teaching women to 
" Davis, p.83. 
'Davis, p.83-4. 
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read was not uncontroversial." 
The Eighteenth Century Incitement to Literacy 
So far I hope to have shown two things. First of all, a series of 
epistemological (though not just epistemological - power and 
knowledge constantly intertwine) developments in the world of 
lexicography at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of 
the eighteenth centuries are the conditions of possibility for a 
new 'psychologised' reader. Second, a series of cultural and 
religious developments prior to the eighteenth century are 
conditions of possibility for a new self-monitoring, self-
checking form of personality. I have tried to stress the 
contingent nature of these developments, and to suggest that they 
are not inevitable, progressive moves to a set of more correct or 
true understandings of the world. To take an example: I would not 
wish to suggest that any understanding of the relation of 
signifier to signified is 'better' than any other. What interests 
42 Erasmus, The Abbot and the Learned Lady, in The Colloquies of Erasmus, 
translated by Craig R. Thompson, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965. On 
the question of the education of women at this time, see also Dorothy Gardiner, 
English Girlhood at School: A Study of Women's Education through Twelve Centuries, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1929, especially p.156ff.; and Shirley Nelson 
Kersey, Classics in the Education of Girls and Women, Mutuchen, N.J., Scarecrow 
Press, 1981, especially p.29ff. 
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me is what such contingencies enable, and how they relate to the 
possibility of the formation of our present. 
The legacy of Puritanism for the beginning of the eighteenth 
century was enormous. By this time, levels of functional literacy 
(such as the signature) were reasonably high, although an ability 
to read or write would still be quite rare. It is worth stressing 
how piecemeal the development of what is sometimes called 
`discursive literacy' was. I have already alluded to the existence 
of literate communities, such as particular Puritan groups, but it 
also possible to extend this notion of 'communities': for example, 
artillerymen were more literate than cavalrymen - and no doubt 
the fact that the former had to read manuals to learn how to use 
the guns was a crucial factor here. We know that wigmakers had 
quite a high level of literacy, perhaps because their waiting 
rooms typically had literature in them. No doubt when there were 
no customers around, they would satisfy their curiosity about 
this relatively new (at a mass level anyway) phenomenon.' 
What sort of literature was available to these different 
`literate communities'? Clearly, a whole host of religious works, 
books of hours, etc, were common;" but literature did not just 
43 See Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965, especially p.189ff. 
" J. Feather, The Provincial Book Trade in Eighteenth Century England, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, gives some indications of the 
breadth of religious works available, and stresses how it was not the clergy but 
laypeople who were the backbone of the religious book market. See especially p.38ff. 
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stop with the Bible. For example, the distribution and use on a 
mass scale of pornography, both written and pictorial, is an early 
outgrowth of this new area of social life.45 The possibility for 
the consumption of this and other literary products was 
strengthened by a series of important contemporaneous 
developments, such as the establishment of the first road 
networks, the development of postal services, and the appearance 
of the first newspapers. 
Newspapers are an obvious place where we can see the 
spread of literary interests beyond their religious beginnings 
John Dunton's Athenian Mercury is an interesting case in point; 
Dunton invented a question and answer section in the paper which 
dealt with readers' queries. This quickly became massively 
popular and a huge success, and we can see, in the kinds of 
questions readers sent in, an intellectual curiosity in a range of 
areas - religious, philosophical, moral, sexual, and so on." This 
personal intellectual curiosity on a wide scale would seem to be 
an innovation, and to back up Foucault's general point about the 
productivity of forms of power: Foucault showed us that 
" See Ian Hunter, David Saunders and Dugald Williamson, On Pornography: 
Literature, Sexuality and Obscenity Law, London, Macmillan, 1993, p.36ff. 
" Questions were of the order of 'Did Adam have a navel?' or 'Where did the 
waters go after the Flood?' Similar concerns can be found in R. Stoddard, 'An Answer 
to Some Cases of Conscience', in P. Miller and T. H. Johnson (eds.), The Puritans, 
New York, Harper, 1938; particularly entertaining is the section 'Is it Iawfull to 
wear long hair?'. Daniel Defoe pirated this method and there was a legal dispute 
between him and Dunton as to who owned the technique. 
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Puritanism is not simply a form of social organisation which 
interdicts, but one which intensifies and produces. In the same 
way that Puritanism led to an intensification of interest in sex 
and sexuality rather than being (as common sense and most 
historical accounts would suggest) a barrier to such interests, it 
was also a vehicle for an intensification of literary interests - 
and in unforeseen directions. 
This was a time of great social and cultural change in which 
literacy plays its full part. 1710 saw the world's first Copyright 
Act, the Statute of Queen Anne;' and a whole series of disputes, 
like the one between Dunton and Defoe, led the development of 
specialist lawyers for the book trade and related areas. The 
profit margin in publishing was beginning to make such moves 
necessary and worthwhile. In addition, the law begins to attempt 
to rein in the world of publishing; the first prosecution for 
obscene publication takes place in 1727, and most interestingly, 
one of the judges maintained that the obscene publication in 
question was clearly a criminal matter (as well as a sin) because 
of the distribution of the offending material throughout the 
kingdom." Literacy could thus be seen to impinge directly on 
" Queen Anne was, incidentally, the last British royal to cure people of scrofula 
by touching them. We are clearly examining a period of great social change. 
48 See Ian Hunter et al., op. cit., p.48ff. 
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public morality." Defoe in The Storm is alive to the problem of 
the potentially universal audience of a book - "He that prints has 
a tenfold obligation".50 
At the risk of overstating the case: a series of 
technological and epistemological innovations are able to serve, 
and, of course, to shape, a new set of interests. These new 
interests are exceedingly diverse - even if one restricts oneself 
to looking at the literary interests of the Puritan household at 
this time, there are several: religious books themselves, spiritual 
autobiographies (e.g. John Bunyan), spiritual diary keeping, 
casuistry, conduct books, and so forth. A different sort of 
organisation of life and of self is both established and guaranteed 
through these various forms. I would like to stress the 
contingent nature of the development of various sorts of 
tabitus', and have already, I hope, begun to cast doubt onto 
explanations that see some necessary unfolding of the course of 
history being evidenced here - whether that be the development 
of individual experience from the constraining effect of social 
norms, or the emergence of capitalism, to take two frequently 
used explanatory devices as examples. 
" We shall see this theme again in the prosecution of Thomas Paine, as I discuss 
in Chapter 6. 
5° Daniel Defoe, 'The Storm', preface, in Laura Ann Curtis (ed.) The Versatile 
Defoe: An Anthology of Uncollected Writings by Daniel Defoe, London, George Prior, 
1 979 . 
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I have argued in this chapter that the eighteenth century is 
the scene of a variety of discursive innovations, a series of 
historical contingencies that begin to make other projects 
thinkable Discipline does not simply act on a set of individuals 
who await its invention. The individuals themselves have to be 
produced. They are produced out of pedagogy, out of a 
psychologisation of the literate individual, and out of the habitus 
of Puritanism. These, at least, are some of the themes my 
research has uncovered. 
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5: MEANINGFULNESS AND SILENCE 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether 
you can make words mean so many 
different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, 
"which is to be master - that's all."' 
`Meaningfulness' in teaching reading seems to arise, according to 
Murray Cohen, around 1750.2 This concern with meaningfulness 
first seems to surface in relation to reconceptualisations and 
reorganisations of rhetoric, but to deal with this discursive 
reorganisation would go beyond the scope of this thesis; what is 
interesting for our purposes is a move away from more 
mechanical processes of learning reading and associated arts. 
John Mason's Essay on Elocution, for example, stresses the 
importance of a good delivery which makes ideas seem to come 
from the heart,3 while John Rice's Art of Reading has much the 
same concern.4 Reading books of the middle to late eighteenth 
century all begin to raise the profile of meaningfulness in one 
' Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, VI. 
2 Cohen, Sensible Words, pp.105ff., 120ff. 
'John Mason, An Essay on Elocution or Pronunciation, Intended chiefly for the 
Assistance of those who instruct others in the Art of Reading, London, 1748. p.5. 
`John Rice, An Introduction to the Art of Reading with Energy and Propriety, 
London, 1765, p.3. 
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way or another, although the initial concern seems to be with 
giving a good oratorical performance. Reading can also be made 
`fun': in 1764, David Manson produces a set of literary cards 
(reading can become a kind of game),5 while John Wallis's 
Enigmatical Alphabet of 1790 is a set of twenty five puzzles, the 
answer to each of which is a letter of the alphabet.6 Bearing in 
mind the stunning lack of meaningfulness associated with the 
dominant tradition of learning to read, the alphabetic method, the 
introduction of `fun'' or 'meaningfulness' can be seen as to some 
extent a reversal of this trend. In addition, when one considers 
the invention of the method of 'wholes', developed by Gedike and 
Jacotot, one can see that the rather slavish, mechanical 
alphabetic method is under attack! The concern of many texts in 
this period is with good oral performance in reading, but 
paradoxically, in so doing, they provide the conditions of 
'Alan Tucker, Reading Games: Some Victorian Examples with an Essay on the 
Teaching of Reading, Wymondham: Brewhouse Private Press, 1973, provides some 
nice examples of reading games, but is surely mistaken in his assertion that we have 
to wait until 1820 for the first reading game. 
'Cited in G. S. Chalmers, Reading Easy 1800-50, London, The Broadsheet King, 
1976, pp.143, 129. 
7 We saw `fun' in Quintilian. It has hardly been on the agenda since then. 
8 Friedrich Gedike, Aristoteles und Basedow oder Fragmente fiber Erziehung und 
Schulwesen bei den Alten und Neuren, Berlin and Leipzig, 1779; ElnigeGedanken 
fiber die Ordnung und Folge der Gegenstande des jugendlichen Unterrichts, Berlin, 
1791; Jean Joseph Jacotot, Enseignement universel... Langue maternelle, Third 
Edition, Louvain, 1827. The method of wholes is the opposite of the alphabetic 
method, although was often learned in tandem with it. The child/reader first learns 
meaningful wholes (in Jacotot's original idea Telemaque, a 400 page book) and then 
learns how to decipher them. 
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possibility for the virtual elimination of reading aloud. This is 
because good reading aloud is seen to necessitate an 
understanding of what you are reading: the real reading soon 
comes to be seen as the internal, silent reading. 
The Move to Silent Reading 
It may come as a surprise to some that virtually all reading, up 
until about 1800, was reading aloud. The silencing of reading 
(and writing, which also would have been engaged in aloud) was a 
crucial step for the formation of modern disciplinary society, as I 
shall explain below. At this point, I need to make a digression on 
silent reading, for which I need to start with the problem of the 
sign for the ancient Romans. Latin, as the first copying culture 
(copying from the Greek), instigates clearly, perhaps for the first 
time, the problem of the sign - what is the relationship between 
the word and the thing represented.9 The first recorded 
enunciation of this problem that I know of is made by Terence in 
the Ade1phi in around 160 B.C. - "verbum de verbo expressum 
A (different) specific problem of the sign was discussed above in relation to the 
`double sign'. A useful orienting text for the problem under consideration here is 
H. L. Pinner, The World of Books in Classical Antiquity, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1958. 
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extulit", as the playwright represents his achievement:° Cicero 
concerns himself particularly with this problem in the Tusculan 
Disputations," and at some length. He is particularly concerned 
with the problems of equivalences between languages, and comes 
to the conclusion that Greek is deficient and inferior to Latin. 
For example, Cicero regards the Greek `novos' as less precise than 
the Latin, which 'represents' it by both 'labor' and `dolor'; Cicero 
cannot fail to be disturbed by the realisation that the Latin 
`translations' of the Greek represent not equivalence, but rather 
different ranges of the human condition.12 
The relationship between Latin and Greek, however, was not 
a static one, but, we might say with hindsight, dynamically bound 
up with power-knowledge relations. Surprisingly, even in the 
Roman world, Greek had become far more prevalent than Latin by 
about 180 A.D., yet two centuries later the situation had become 
reversed - Greek was becoming an almost exclusively written 
language. This does not seem to be simply a decline in the use 
and importance of Greek, but a move into a new interlinguistic 
and intertextual world, connected with a new 'legalised' and 
`codified' writing of the world. Eventually, we see the exclusive 
'° 'The translation was made word for word'. Terence refers to his use of a scene 
from the Greek playwright Diphilus; Ade1phi, Prologue, 11, 6-11. My point here is 
that the problem of the relation between signs was first enunciated, I might even 
risk saying 'discovered', through considerations of the problems of translation. 
" Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, II, 35; III, 7-8. 
12 Cf. the range na611, v000s, crrocp4ta, morbus, perturbatio. 
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use of Latin in legal settings, and its preeminence was an 
important step towards the visual and silent preeminence of the 
sign. Soon enough, Latin was being used in formal settings by 
people who would not speak it as their mother tongue. Such 
individuals might well, I would hazard a guess, ponder the 
problem of the equivalence of signs between their native language 
and the Latin that they used in more formal settings. 'Learned 
Latin' developed as a direct result of writing,13 and became 
essentially a language learned through reading and writing rather 
than speech; it was learned particularly through pedagogic texts 
(word-books and grammars), and these were the media through 
which a new pedagogic reading and writing of the sign ensued - 
the world came to be written in different ways and, importantly, 
by different people (pedagogues). The clearest indication of the 
development of this new world can be seen in the way that the 
vernaculars of the Latin West used the already existing alphabet 
for their own writing. By the thirteenth century, a whole network 
of new books of the written sign was being produced, with their 
implicit origins being in books of double signs; for while the 
discourse is of 'Learned Latin', constant reference to its basis in 
Greek is made. The equivalence (or problem of equivalence) of 
' This is a point that Walter Ong makes repeatedly. See especially Interfaces of 
the Word, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977, p.24-9 and Orality and Literacy, 
p.112. 
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sign-systems could now be seen and read, if not theoretically, 
certainly at the level of the signifier. Henceforth, the problem of 
the sign is ever-present, but it surfaced again particularly in the 
seventeenth century, as I have discussed above. 
Paul Saenger has demonstrated how this emerging new 
textuality in turn produced a new orientation to the page:" 
instead of the ancient world's preference for reading aloud and 
oral composition (by means of dictation), silent reading and 
written composition infiltrated the university world of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, spreading thence more widely, 
particularly to the Court. This certainly seems a plausible story, 
since it is unlikely that anyone would gain much from reading 
aloud the purely 'formal' language that Latin had now become. 
Saenger suggests that the conventional view, that oral 
communication prevailed in the middle ages until the invention of 
"Paul Saenger, 'Silent Reading: its Impact upon Late Medieval Script and 
Society', Viator 13, 1982, 367-414. 
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printing instigated the Modern Age, is a vast oversimplification.15 
To expand on this somewhat: for the Romans, a written text was 
essentially a transcription which, rather like modern musical 
notation, became intelligible only when performed orally. In 
similar vein, Leclercq has demonstrated the prevalent `orality' of 
the early Middle Ages - how, for example, twelfth century authors 
used dictation when composing their texts, and how monks of the 
twelfth century and before had habitually read aloud even in 
private.16 Other indications and evidence are consistent with 
this, such as St Augustine's documented astonishment that St 
Ambrose read and studied with his lips sealed.17 Theoretically, 
the oral nature of reading and writing should come as no surprise: 
15 A view expressed in, for example, Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: 
the Making of Typographic Man, London, Routledge And Kegan Paul, 1962, p.89-90; 
Walter J. Ong, Systems, Space, and Intellect in Renaissance Symbolism, Bibliotheque 
d'humanisme et Renaissance 18, 1956, p.229; Ramus, Method, and the Decay of 
Dialogue, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1958, pp.x, 79, 128, and passim; The 
Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1967, p. 58-61; 'Commonplace Rhapsody: Ravisius, 
Textor, Zwinger and Shakespeare', in Classical Influence on European Culture A.D. 
1500-1700: Proceedings of an International Conference Held at King's College 
Cambridge April 1974, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.104-
107; Elizabeth Eisenstein, 'Some Conjectures about the Impact of Printing on 
Western Society', Journal of Modern History 40, 1968, p.30-1; l'avenement de 
l'imprimerie et le reforme', Annales 36, 1971; The Printing Press as an Agent of 
Change, pp.10-11, 698; Cecil H. Clough, 'The Cult of Antiquity: Letters and Letter 
Collections', in C. H. Clough (ed.) Cultural Aspects of the Italian Renaissance: Essays 
in Honour of Paul Oskar Kristeller, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1976; Pierre Francastel, 'Poussain et l'homme historique', Annales 19, 1964, p.6. 
16 Leclercq's work was based upon consideration of the scanned and formulaic 
nature of texts of that time, in a thesis analogous to that of Parry, who discovered the 
oral nature of the Greek Epic. See Jean Leclercq, L'amour des lettres et le desk de 
Dieu, second edition, Paris, 1963, pp.2lff., 165-6; Recueil d'etudes sur Saint 
Bernard, Rome, Spinetti, 1962-1966, passim. 
"Saint Augustine, 'City of God' 6.3, in Confessions. 
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a pictographic system is more amenable to silent comprehension 
and writing, and so we know, for example, that Chinese priest and 
mandarin bureaucrats were able to communicate silently to the 
gods in written prayer. Our own phonetic system seems to have 
encouraged the reader to read orally - and this would have 
particularly been the case for the Romans, who did not make use 
of word division (that is to say, texts did not have spaces 
between individual words). It was the invention of word division 
that gave written Latin an ideographic value similar to that of 
pictorial systems. Saenger suggests that word division began as 
an aid to oral reading for Saxon and Celtic priests in the seventh 
and eighth centuries, probably because their Latin was not good 
enough to cope with an undivided text. The practice spread into 
continental Europe during the ninth and tenth centuries. Once it 
became common practice to write Latin using word division, it 
was only a short step to making use of this technique for the 
Western vernaculars. 
It is ironic that this aid to reading aloud provided the sine 
qua non for silent reading and copying, but this does appear to be 
the case. The new ideographic value that single words had (at 
first in the writing of Latin, but later, of course, in the writing 
of the vernaculars) made it much easier to copy and read without 
giving a performance, as it were, of the text. The silent copying 
Page 181 
of texts by medieval scribes began in the ninth century, certainly 
at Tours in the silent monastery; there is also some evidence that 
monks used silent writing less formally to communicate and 
avoid censure.18 By the eleventh century, silent copying was 
considered a normal part of monastic life, in France at any rate. 
However, it is clear that not all reading in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries was silent, and, in particular, reading 
outside the scriptorium was still predominantly oral in character. 
Leclercq showed that the twelfth century author dictated (to self 
or scribe), and Valois's work on the pseudometrical prose of the 
time demonstrated how reading aloud continued into the High 
Middle Ages and beyond.19 
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in France and 
England, the nobility were beginning to accept silent reading and 
composition; thirteenth and fourteenth century changes of library 
architecture in the Oxbridge colleges (moving from cloistered 
arrangements to central halls) would seem to reflect a move from 
oral to silent reading, and Oxford University's regulations of 
1412 recognised the library as a place for quiet. Now, although 
we can trace this gradual move to silence among the upper 
18 Saenger, p.378ff. 
19 Leclerq, op. cit.; Noel Valois, De arte scribendi epistolas apud Gallicos medii 
aevi scriptores rhetoresque, Thesis at the University of Paris, 1880. 
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classes,' the lower orders would have read and been taught to 
read orally, well into the nineteenth century. 
To sum up: the 'silencing' of reading has begun to take place, 
perhaps mainly because of a technical contingency, and has 
become a useful mode of operation, particularly in religious 
settings. The educational world has also come to make use of 
silenced reading, and from there it has begun to spread abroad, 
particularly among the nobility. Meanwhile, reading has been 
bathed in a new glow, with 'meaningfulness' coming to occupy a 
preeminent place. One might imagine that silent reading must 
just be a step behind meaningfulness (since silent reading 
enables the reader to back-track and go over parts not easily 
understood the first time, while oral reading will usually entail 
the sacrifice of some understanding, particularly of the more 
difficult pieces of a text); but silent reading as a universal 
phenomenon for all classes of society does not emerge until the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. 
20 Interesting in this regard is George Steiner on the development of the 'classical 
act of reading'. See, for example, After the Book?, in On Difficulty, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1978. 
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Meaningfulness Gathers Pace: Different Meanings for 
Different People 
`Meaningfulness' takes its time to insinuate itself as an 
important concept in educational practice, but begins to coexist 
as a strategic goal of teaching alongside the differentiation of 
different types of reader.21 The new pedagogy, then, seems to be 
formulated along a double axis, both of which give a domain to a 
kind of psychology of the reader. Meaningfulness (which is 
becoming silent) sets up the possibility of different sorts of 
reading and understandings of reading, some of which, of course, 
will be judged better than others. This clearly adds a new domain 
to a disciplinary function, which previously was limited to a 
concern with how good a performance the reader had given (we 
again epistemological changes are inevitably more than they seem 
at first sight). A more formal assessment of the reader is not 
long coming. In addition, in our second axis, this new, meaningful 
reader is being more and more precisely differentiated by 
different sorts of texts (and within texts) which guarantee and 
are guaranteed by the child reader. We saw that Gildon split his 
text and targeted/created a series of differentiated readers. By 
the middle of the eighteenth century, this process was continuing 
21  See the discussion of Gildon's Grammar above. 
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apace. So James Gough can take this a stage further: 
"But these [sc. earlier grammars] seem 
to have been written for Men rather 
than for Children, so that there still 
seemed to be room for a practical 
English Grammar for the Use of 
Schools; which must not be a Critical 
Grammar of the Language, but a 
summary of the most material Rules 
observed by good Writers in the 
Construction thereof..."22 
The force of Gough's move is to initiate the idea of separate 
texts: children can now have their own specific text, while the 
teacher, or whoever is "desirous to be... compleat Masters of the 
Language" is referred to another text, such as Greenwood's or 
Brightland's grammar. James Buchanan's text is an example of 
the closer and closer delineation of the teacher; as Cohen points 
out, he uses the full range of printer's devices - the ample 
footnotes act as a teacher's manual, giving additional examples 
and questions that might be helpful for the teacher, while italics 
give rules and principles, specifically for those working on their 
own.23 Both teacher and pupil, then, are being ever more closely 
written, ever more closely defined. 
22 James Gough, A Practical Grammar of the English Tongue, Dublin, 1754, p.i, 
italics in original. Quoted in Cohen, op. cit., p.83. 
23 James Buchanan, The Complete English Scholar, London, 1753. Cf. Cohen, 
p.82. 
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Several writers have noticed how the child is in the process 
of being invented in this period.24 John Newbery, the publisher 
known as the father of the book trade for children, was active at 
this time;25 the child, now recognisably dressed as a child, at 
least by the nobility, was becoming a figure that we moderns 
might identify with. What is interesting about Newbery's book is 
how coherent the child is; one book will serve boys and girls of 
all ages - although the 'afterthought' of the ball or pincushion 
does make some concession to the gender of the reader. Almost 
as soon as they appeared, however, children's books were to 
engage in a similar fractioning to that taking place in the more 
24 See Aries, Centuries of Childhood, Stone, Family, Sex and Marriage; J. H. 
Plumb, 'The New World of Children in Eighteenth Century England', Past and 
Present 67, 1975, 64-95. Plumb's seminal article raises a number of problems 
about the interpretation of 'childhood', and the nature of historical research in an 
area like this; these are admirably documented by Ludmilla Jordanova, 'New worlds 
for children in the eighteenth century: problems of historical interpretation', 
History of the Human Sciences3, 1, 1990, 69-83. Jordanova criticises Plumb's 
attempt to tell a generalised history of childhood, and to construct a monolithic 
'world' they inhabited and inhabit, as if 'children' were of a piece, and able to be 
separated from adults and their life. It should be clear that such a project is not 
what is intended in this thesis; by reading the historical evidence available, I am not 
seeking to talk of childhood itself, to say what the referent was 'really' like. I am 
more interested in the attempts to constitute childhood that the historical record 
betrays. Of course, the constitutions are not just of academic interest, but enter into 
the realm of the true and the false. 
25 A nice account of Newbery's work is given in F. J. Harvey Darton, Children's 
Books in England: Five Centuries of Social Life, Second Edition, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1958. Newbery's most famous book, and perhaps the 
first 'children's' book, was A little pretty pocket book intended for the instruction 
and amusement of little Master Tommy and Pretty Miss Polly with an agreeable 
letter to read from Jack the Giant Killer as well as a ball and pincushion the use of 
which will infallibly make Tommy a good boy and Polly a good girl; to the whole is 
prefixed a letter on education humbly addressed to all parents, guardians, 
governesses, etc, wherein rules are laid down for making their children strong, 
healthy, virtuous, wise and happy, London, 1743. 
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ethereal realm of the dictionary and the grammar, a fractioning 
which, as I have been contendihg, begins to produce the child in 
its image. Mrs. Barbauld writes her reading book for the two- to 
three-year-old; Lady Fenn writes hers for the five- to eight-
year-old; John Marshall publishes a reader for four- to five-year-
olds.26 
The child that is slowly being elaborated is also needed for 
linguistic theory. As I outlined above, the world of lexicography 
was moving from universal explanations of a one true language, to 
a concern with the general and the specific. It is now no longer 
the case that the question of the origin of language can be settled 
by reference to some moment before Babel, to a divine 
intervention; language, now it has assumed a temporal dimension, 
needs to be understood in terms of its development. Cohen 
suggests, plausibly enough, that there were two possible routes 
that this investigation could take: it could either look at the 
language of the undeveloped language of primitive cultures, or it 
could look at the undeveloped language of the child.27 These can 
" Mrs. Barbauld, Lessons for Children from Two to Three Years Old, London, 
1778 (Mrs. Barbauld also provided sequels which brought these texts up to the level 
of older children); [Lady Fenn], Cobwebs to Catch Flies; or Dialogues in Short 
Sentences, adapted to children from the age of three to eight years, London, J. 
Marshall, 1783; Anonymous, Familiar Dialogues for the Instruction and 
Amusement of Children of Four and Five Years Old, London, J. Marshall, 1783. An 
excellent guide to the many similar texts around in this period, complete with many 
illustrations of the original, is Joyce Irene Whalley, Cobwebs to Catch Flies: 
Illustrated Books for the Nursery and Schoolroom 1700-1900, London, Elek, 1974. 
27 Cohen, p.122. 
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quickly become conflated, however, as we see in James Burnet's 
tome: he finds the first stages of the "progress of the human 
mind" in primitive languages and in children, as well as in those 
who are deaf.' At a stroke, the child is seen in a completely new 
way, and is immediately constituted as a fit object for 
scientific/linguistic investigation - in which context the 
interest in (or even furore around) the Wild Boy of Aveyron is 
perhaps a little more understandable.29 
I have dwelt at some length over the invention of two sets 
of practices which are, I maintain, essential to our understanding 
of the intervention of governmental strategies in the lives of 
schoolchildren. First of all, reading is being transformed such 
that the meanings that can be obtained from reading are coming 
to be the most important parts of the whole process; reading is 
now slowly becoming reading for meaning rather than giving a 
" James Burnet [Lord Monboddo], Of the Origin and Progress of Language, 
Second Edition, Edinburgh, 1774. See also Cohen, p.125. 
Victor, the boy found living rough in the forests of Aveyron at the end of the 
eighteenth century, is perhaps the first subject of a psychological inquiry. I would 
contend that the sorts of interests shown in Victor in this period just could not have 
happened even fifty years earlier. Nikolas Rose, The Psychological Complex, p.11ff., 
makes a case for the Wild Boy as initiating modern psychological enquiry. See Jean 
Itard, The Wild Boy of Aveyron, London, New Left Books, 1972. Monboddo and others 
like him are beginning to debate the question of the nature of language in the child, 
and the relative contributions of powers inborn in the child and of the society that 
surrounds him or her. See, for example, Anselm Bayly, An Introduction to 
Languages, Literary and Philosophical... Exhibiting at one view their Grammar, 
Rationale, Analogy and Idiom, London, 1758, p.24-5. Cf. Cohen, p.125. 
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good oral performance. Such a shift no doubt has repercussions 
as to how important reading is as a technology of the self, since 
reading would seem to become necessarily more reflective and 
careful. At the same time as reading is being transformed such 
that the emphasis is on meaning, the reader who interacts with 
this 'meaningful' text is being reassessed, rewritten even. There 
are different meanings for different people - children, boys, 
girls, teachers, all begin to get their own texts and come to be 
more and more like the texts that claim to be merely helping 
them. These texts, of course, do more than that: in 'representing' 
the interests of their specific readerships, they prescribe what 
the 'typical' reader looks like. 
Silent reading may look like an obvious accompaniment to 
reading for meaning: after all, how can one understand a difficult 
text if one has to concentrate on performing it, and cannot go 
back and try to take in more slowly the bits that escape one the 
first time? However, this self-evident link is only so because it 
has been made self-evident; meaningfulness and silent reading 
come from entirely different roots. Silent reading, when by pure 
chance it appears, is welcomed as a useful technique. Yet, as we 
shall see, other consequences flow from the silencing of the 
reader - in particular, the examination. Who would have thought 
there could have been a relation between medieval monks with 
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poor Latin and the disciplinary technique par excellence ? 
I shall try the reader's patience no more. Let us look at 
some good, old-fashioned politics. 
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6: TOWARDS A PEDAGOGICAL 
EXPERIMENT: MONITORIALISM 
"How many hours, days, months have 
been prodigally wasted in unproductive 
occupations! What a host of half formed 
impressions and abortive conceptions 
blended into a mass of confusion... In 
the best regulated mind of the present 
day, had there not been, and is not there 
some hours every day, passed in reverie, 
thought ungoverned, undirected?"' 
I hope to have have shown that a series of changes, both gradual 
and sudden, have radically transformed/produced the object of my 
inquiry. The child has begun to be rigorously specified, and in 
this process of specification, has become an appropriate object 
for still further knowledge institutions and disciplinary 
techniques. The nineteenth century will see several crucial 
interventions into this still developing object. I shall discuss the 
hegemony of silent reading, the examination, and mass schooling; 
perhaps most importantly, we shall see the birth of the human 
sciences, and in particular psychology, which objectify and 
civilise the child reader still more - render him or her a docile 
' Thomas Wedgwood. 
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body. But we still need to add some more pieces to the jigsaw 
before we can move on. 
Two hundred years ago, in March 1791, one intellectual 
writes a response to another: they had both been concerning 
themselves with the recent events in France. A veritable uproar 
occurs: trials, escape plans, new laws, a state of national 
emergency. What is going on? 
Language and Class 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the state of language could 
be monitored by examining three authoritative texts: Lowth's 
Grammar, Samuel Johnson's Dictionary, and Harris's Hermes.2 I 
have outlined how universal grammar projects were gradually 
being worn down in the course of the eighteenth century; but it is 
reasonably clear that this new interest in the specificities of 
language did not extend to a belief in the equality of the different 
types of language. The kind of 'refined' English that the great 
2 This, at least, is the claim of Olivia Smith, The Politics of Language 1791-
1819, Oxford, Clarendon, 1984, p.3ff. The following section borrows heavily from 
her work. See also Lowth, Short Introduction to English Grammar, Samuel Johnson, 
A Dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols., London, 1755; Harris, Hermes. I have 
already talked a little about two of these works; a useful discussion of the third is set 
out in R. De Maria, Johnson's Dictionary and the Language of Learning, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1986. 
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three texts endorsed was very Latinate; familiarity with the 
Classical authors and the attaining of Classical modes of 
expression were the guarantee of intellectual and moral fitness 
to participate in cultural life. By contrast, the vulgar language of 
the masses necessarily debarred them, so the story went, from 
being able to express any lofty thoughts. The expression of the 
sensations and the passions was the natural limit of the vulgar 
language. It is perhaps impossible to overstate how important 
such conceptions of language were in the way cultural life was 
organised. The unthinkable was the existence of a vulgar or 
vernacular speaker who could be both moral and intelligent. 
The attempt to model English on the 'more perfect' 
Classical languages clearly had an element of the assertion of 
national and cultural superiority. Thus James Buchanan argues 
that because the English are respectable, then the rules for the 
conjugations of the verb must be complex; to claim it were 
simple "is manifestly alarming, that the English Language is 
nothing superior to that of the Hottentots; and that the wisest 
and most respectable Body of People upon the Face of the Globe, 
own a Language which is incapable of ascertaining their ideas, or 
of exhibiting the Soul, and its various Affections."3 
Certain writers, however, began to question these ideas, 
3 James Buchanan, The British Grammar, London, 1762, p.105, cited in Smith, 
P.9. 
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and to attempt the impossible - to produce a work of intelligence 
and substance in the vernacular. This was no simple academic 
conceit, however, but was an act of political will. As I discussed 
above, the teaching of reading was coming to be more and more 
tailored to the needs of the recipient, something which William 
Cobbett, among others, railed against. Cobbett was alive to the 
fact that the prescription of the texts was also a form of 
proscription, and a way of maintaining class divisions. Sunday 
Schools,4 a form of free education which had spread from the end 
of the eighteenth century, were very careful in how far they 
instructed their charges - their main duty was to teach deference 
and industry. The dame schools taught along the same lines. The 
dominant voices in these cheap or free modes of education at the 
time - Trimmer, Hanway, More - all stress the dual goal of 
attaining political quietude and religious piety.5 According to 
Trimmer, students were taught enough writing to be shopkeepers 
or servants, learning handwriting which only they could read; 
students who would become teachers were, by contrast, taught a 
`The Sunday Schools actually became very popular, with an attendance figure of 
nearly a million by the 1830s. See M. G. Jones, The Charity School Movement, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1938, p.142-54; M. E. Sadler and J. W. 
Edwards in Education Department, Special Reports on Educational Subjects, London, 
H.M.S.O., 1898, ii; Frederic Hill, National Education, London, 1836, i, p.4-10. 




One more example, slightly lengthy, again culled from the 
work of Olivia Smith, will perhaps make clear just how things 
stood at the turn of the century, and how important the 
apparently arcane contents of a dictionary could be in relation to 
political struggle.' Leeds Grammar School made a petition in 
1805 to add arithmetic and modern languages to its syllabus 
(which at that time included just Latin and Greek).8 The petition 
was originally successful, but the decision was then overturned 
by the judge, who ruled that as a free school, Leeds must be a 
free grammar school; and as a grammar school was defined in 
Johnson's Dictionary as a school for teaching the learned 
languages, it would not be lawful for it to do anything else, at 
least with its endowment. The movement towards elitism in 
grammar schools was already in progress, and this ruling could 
only hasten it: Latin and Greek were now the only subjects that 
could be taught free of charge, a state of affairs which had a 
detrimental effect on the attendance of the poorer pupils. Things 
'Sarah Trimmer, Reflections upon the Education of Children in Charity Schools, 
London, 1792, pp.21, 23; Smith, p.13. 
'Smith, p.16-17. 
'More details on this case can be found in John William Adamson, English 
Education 1789-1902, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1930, p.43ff. 
Language has been linked with the possibility of class struggle for a longer period 
than I have stressed, though not in quite the same way. An early voice warning 
against the dangers of educating the lower orders (an obsession that will grow from 
now on) is T. Sheridan, British Education, or, The Source of the Disorders of Great 
Britain, London, 1769. 
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came to such a pass that when in 1810 the directors of Harrow 
were in court for not fulfilling the obligations of their trust, they 
were able successfully to defend themselves by arguing that as a 
grammar school, Harrow was "not now adapted generally for 
persons of low condition, but better suited to those of a high 
class".9 
Such was the backdrop against which Thomas Paine's 
Rights of Man would have been received:9 Paine attempted the 
`impossible' style, an intellectual vernacular prose, that owed 
much to to the style of Edmund Burke's Reflections on the 
Revolution in France and to which it was a reply." Paine's 
project was a colloquial articulation of hitherto unexpressed 
political ideas, and a refutation of the political implications of 
the literary skills marshalled by Burke: what is interesting is 
that it was less the radical content in Paine's work that was 
important but the way in which the content was expressed - the 
medium really was the message. The success of Paine's venture 
can be measured by the repression and retaliation that followed 
Adamson, p.63-4. 
10 Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, in Maurice D. Conway (ed.) The Writings of 
Thomas Paine, 4 vols, New York, Franklin, 1894-6. 
" Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Oxford, Clarendon, 
1969. Burke's style was a curious one which was recognised as both refined and 
vulgar. Philip Francis, on reading an early draft of the Reflections, advised against 
publication, seeing in its emotive tone the fuse for a pamphlet war which could only 
aid the radicals' cause. See Alfred Cobban and Robert A. Smith (eds.) The 
Correspondence of Edmund Burke, Vol. 4, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1967, p.85-7; Smith, p.37. 
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its publication. 1792 saw Paine's tria1,12 the King's 
Proclamation, the Treasonable Practices Act, the Suspension of 
Habeas Corpus Act; 1794 saw treason trials and another 
Treasonable Practices Act; and in 1795 the prohibition of the 
publication of radical tracts was established in law, further 
legislation being added in 1798. A 'Pamphlet War' ensued, as 
radicals and conservatives took each other on, although both sides 
were caught in a paradox: the radicals needed to prove they were 
not 'vulgar', but were faced with the problem of how to write in a 
plain style that did not show vulgarity; the conservatives, 
meanwhile, because of their desire to forestall the growth of 
democratic ideas, did not want to extend either literacy or 
political awareness, which the production of pamphlets was 
always in danger of doing. The Association for preserving Liberty 
and Property against Republicans and Levellers, which was 
almost certainly government backed, was formed in November 
1792, and published the Liberty and Property series, advising 
12 Burke sold about 30,000 copies of his Reflections. Paine's response, in March 
1791, was at first an edition which cost 3/-, but even at so expensive a price it sold 
about 50,000 to 60,000 copies. In the Spring of 1792, a second part was published 
at 6d, along with a cheap reprint of part one. By the following year, perhaps 
200,000 copies were in circulation, and by the time of Paine's death in 1809, the 
total circulation was perhaps as high as 1,500,000 (the total population of Britain 
at the time was no more than 16,000,000). Interestingly, only the second part of 
The Rights of Man was prosecuted, its cheapness and availability being seen as 
evidence of the author's malicious intent. Part I was not prosecuted because it was 
thought that its price prevented those who could not argue against it from purchasing 
it. Price and style, then, were the two means by which the government decided 
whether or not a book should be prosecuted. 
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workers on financial self-improvement and on the merits of 
ignoring books, with such quotes as "I seldom read anything 
except my Bible and my Ledger".13 Church and government aided 
the association in many ways, but most importantly by help with 
distribution. 
However, Paine's ambition was ultimately realised, because 
the concept of vulgarity seems to lose its force in the period 
between 1780 and 1815. Once again, reading and writing were 
transformed in the period after the Napoleonic Wars:" a new kind 
of writing emerged, epitomised by by William Hone's ground-
breaking The Political House that Jack Built, an account of the 
Peterloo massacre:5 I contend that such political writing has its 
conditions of possibility in the Paineite deconstruction of 
vulgarity as a barrier to certain sorts of thought. Nonetheless, it 
would be hard to underestimate the fear that the prospect of an 
education for the lower orders still incited in their social 
superiors. Robert K. Webb outlines a couple of anecdotes which 
'Association for preserving Liberty and Property against Republicans and 
Levellers, Liberty and Property preserved against Republicans and Levellers. A 
Collection of Tracts, London, 1793, no.4, p.8. 
"The analysis of this shift is beyond the scope of the current thesis, although it 
is clear that some of the technological changes I have touched on already were 
relevant factors: thus, the growth of newspapers as a source of intellectual 
information, and changes in the copyright law were the sort of discursive 
reorganisations that facilitated this transition. Again, Smith is worth consulting on 
this topic; see p.154-201. 
' [William Hone], The Political House that Jack Built, London, 1819; see Smith, 
p.165ff. 
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perhaps enable us to comprehend this depth of feeling. First: in 
Peacock's Nightmare Abbey, Mr. Flosky is made to say, "How can 
we be cheerful when we are surrounded by a reading public, that 
is growing too wise for its betters?" Second: a newspaper report 
from 1828 details how a barrister told magistrates at 
Westminster that a forger owed his trip to Botany Bay to the 
`march of intellect'; to which some of the magistrates responded, 
"Hear, hear".16 
This period in the study of the production of literate 
subjects is important, I think, because we are witnessing the 
birth of new ways of intervening into the lives of readers. In a 
sense, this is a necessary prerequisite for what what Foucault 
has described as a reversal of the political axis of 
individualisation, and which I shall discuss in more detail below. 
Someone like Hannah More was, at the time, widely criticised by 
Tories for her insistence on educating the lower orders; but her 
reply showed just what her technique was all about - "I allow of 
no writing for the poor... My object is not to make them fanatics, 
but to train up the lower classes in habits of industry and 
piety".17 As James Donald points out, she was not working in the 
'Robert K. Webb, The British Working Class Reader 1790-1848: Literacy and 
Social Tension, London, Allen and Unwin, 1955. The report on the Westminster 
magistrates comes from Sphynx, 9 April 1828. 
" Cited in Brian Simon, Studies in the History of Education: The Two Nations and 
the Educational Structure 1780-1870, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1960, 
p.133. 
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context of a simple fear of the growth of literacy in the lower 
classes: 
"The threat she saw lay in the 
conjunction of this already existing 
competence with a number of other 
factors - with the increasing 
urbanization of the working class, with 
techniques of printing, publishing and 
distribution that could make material 
widely available quickly and 
comparatively cheaply and, above all, 
with a popular political discourse 
newly formulated in the wake of the 
American and French revolutions."" 
In a sense, Paine was an incitement to these new forms of 
knowing the lower orders and regulating them. The task, from 
this point on, lay in the production of new forms of reader. Yet 
this is clearly not an overarching political ambition of the state; 
a series of contingencies open up new possibilities which may or 
may not be developed and made use of - and the take up of these 
possibilities is correspondingly piecemeal There is still much 
opposition to such a move, which continues to be mobilised 
through until Forster's Education Act of 1870 and even beyond; 
yet it is important for us to note the seeds of such a 
reconceptualisation. 
"James Donald, Language, Literacy and Schooling, Milton Keynes, Open 
University Press, 1986, Unit 29, p.51. Much of what follows is based on Donald. 
See also Donald's development of his ideas in his more recent Sentimental Education: 
Schooling, Popular Culture and the Regulation of Liberty, London, Verso, 1992. 
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While the reaction to the Paine episode can easily be read 
as an instance of repressive action by the State, it is also much 
more than this. The processes of governmentality that are going 
on here are not just limited to the officers of the State; 
philanthropists, educators, philosophers, are all involved in this 
process. The education of the lower orders may still evoke 
controversy, but the political landscape has been so 
fundamentally changed that it is becoming clear that the problem 
cannot just be ignored. The threat is now that the lower orders 
will educate themselves, will acquire dangerous ideas from who 
knows where. From now on, the discourse arranges itself around 
the problem of changing the hearts and minds of men, and 
education is the means to effect such transformations. We are 
seeing a period before education was 'black boxed': it is now, of 
course, common sense that education is a good thing, maybe even 
a human right. The situation was not so clearcut at the end of the 
eighteenth century. 
In 1807, the Whigs attempted to get a bill through 
parliament to establish parish schools. The bill failed, but in the 
debates round it we can see the polarisation of views that I am 
contending the Paineite revolution made possible. Davies Giddy, 
President of the Royal Society, was among those opposed to the 
bill: 
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"However specious in theory the project 
might be of giving education to the 
labouring classes of the poor, it would, 
in effect, be found to be prejudicial to 
their morals and their happiness; it 
would teach them to despise their lot in 
life, instead of making them good 
servants in agriculture, and other 
laborious employments to which their 
rank in society had destined them; 
instead of teaching them subordination, 
it would render them factious and 
refractory, as was evident in the 
manufacturing countries; it would 
enable them to read seditious 
pamphlets, vicious books, and 
publications against Christianity; it 
would render them insolent to their 
superiors; and in a few years, the result 
would be, that the legislature would 
find it necessary to direct the strong 
arm of power against them."19 
The pamphlet war that ensued, was, as I have noted, entered 
into with some trepidation by the conservatives because it led to 
a necessary incitement to literacy, something which they hoped 
to avoid; on the other hand, Paine and his like needed to be 
countered in some way. Societies like the SPCK and the RTS2° 
gave away a series of tracts as well as Bibles, often with the 
enticement of food, as well as at public gatherings like 
executions; but there was always the problem that they might not 
'Cited in Simon, p.132; Donald, Language, Literacy and Schooling, p.52. 
20 Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, Religious Tract Society. 
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be read, or might even be used to make fires!21 The problem was 
one that one that faced an alliance of educators, clergy, and 
anyone else worried about the question of the lower orders. 
In addition, those on the side of the lower orders (if it 
makes any sense to talk about 'sides') were entering into the 
equation. Wily radicals, for example, were putting their own 
material inside RTS covers.22 The almanac was possibly a more 
popular literary form for the radicals' messages; unstamped (i.e. 
illegal) almanacs appeared quite frequently - the SDUK23 made use 
of this convention, recognising its popularity, for their first 
publication. Overall, we should be careful not to underestimate 
the desire of the labouring classes to become literate, and the 
lengths they would go to to achieve this aim. Small reading and 
study groups crop up frequently in Trade Union history; the Leeds 
Mutual Improvement Society, for example, was a small self-help 
literacy group which cost its members 3d a week. The problem, 
then, of the education of the masses is not simply one which is 
answered by the State; it is one in which the processes of 
constructing a form of governing people is entered into by a 
variety of bodies. 
21  There is some concern about this at the time in, for example, Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London, i, December 1838, p.457-8, and xi, August 1848, 
p.218. 
22 Christian Spectator, 19 June 1839, p.107; Poor Man's Guardian, 11 January 
1834. 
"Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. 
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We saw above how Giddy expressed his fear of the lower 
orders; there were other upper class views on the 'problem' of 
working class literacy, of course. Patrick Colquhoun, for 
example, accrued a mass of statistics on the urban poor; he was 
one of the first to make correlations between illiteracy and 
criminality, and consequently began the call for an organised 
police force. The education of the lower orders struck him as a 
necessary evil, provided they were not over-educated: 
i6 . .. the higher and noble aim of 
preventing those calamities which led 
to idleness and crime, and produce 
poverty and misery, by guiding and 
properly directing the early conduct of 
the lower orders of the community, and 
by giving a right bias to their minds, 
has not, as yet, generally attracted the 
notice of those who move in the more 
elevated walks of society... The 
prosperity of every state depends on the 
good habits, and the religious and moral 
instruction of the labouring people. By 
shielding the minds of youth against the 
vices that are most likely to beset 
them, much is gained to society in the 
prevention of crimes, and in lessening 
the demand for punishments... It is not, 
however, proposed by this institution, 
that the children of the poor should be 
educated in a manner to elevate their 
minds above the rank they are destined 
to fulfil in society, or that an expense 
should be incurred beyond the lowest 
rate ever paid for instruction. Utopian 
schemes for an extensive diffusion of 
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knowledge would be injurious and 
absurd."" 
Colquhoun does not enunciate a need to wring all that one can 
from the lower orders; his aims are more conservative. Yet there 
is no hint of simple interdiction in his pronouncement - he 
realises that the (potentially dangerous) education of the poor 
may be pragmatically useful.25 Perhaps it is gradually becoming 
clear that there is now no going back to the uncontested 
linguistic and educational hegemony that the higher orders 
enjoyed only a few years before. 
Colquhoun provides us with a nice link between the 
problems uncovered by Paine and the monitorial system of 
schooling; the latter is, in fact, the 'institution' Colquhoun refers 
to above. After Paine, it is no longer possible just to deny 
education to the lower orders; but monitorialism is an attempt to 
make sure that that education is a fitting one. But before we 
continue, it is worth making a brief excursus on the character of 
literacy in this period. 
" Patrick Colquhoun, New and Appropriate System of Education for the 
Labouring People, London, 1806. 
25 Colquhoun anticipates a concern with the expense to the nation that the poor 
create. The state of the poor, and particularly the state of their morals, has already 
become of the utmost importance, but there is also this rather simple discursive 
concern with how expensive they are. A discursive shift enables popular education to 
be seen as one way of reducing these costs by giving the poor 'a chance' (see John 
Morley, below). Thus the 1841 Report of the Poor Law Commissioners goes into 
great detail about the cost of the poor as a kind of rationalisation for the extension of 
education. See Poor Law Commissioners, Seventh Annual Report, Parliamentary 
Papers 1841, xi.201. 
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Digression I: Who is Reading? 
Thomas Laqueur's estimate of the numbers of people who could 
read and write in England in the mid-eighteenth century is 
surprisingly high. In 1754, he claims, 60 per cent of men and 40 
per cent of women were able at least to sign the marriage 
register; even more were probably able to read.26 We can update 
these figures by looking at Richard Altick,27 who suggests the 
following distributions for literacy: 














1851 69.3 2.0 54.8 3.7 
1861 75.4 6.1 65.3 10.5 
1871 80.6 5.2 73.2 7.9 
1881 86.5 5.9 82.3 9.1 
1891 93.6 7.1 92.7 10.4 
1900 97.2 3.6 96.8 4.1 
As we can see, Altick suggests that high levels of literacy are 
established by the middle of the nineteenth century. For Altick, 
these levels begin to rise after the Napoleonic wars, having 
" Thomas Laqueur, 'The Cultural Origins of Popular Literacy in England 1500-
1850', Oxford Review of Education 2, 3, 1976, 255-275, p.255. 
27 Richard D. Altick, The English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass 
Reading Public 1800-1900, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1957, p.171. 
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remained much the same from about 1790. Lawrence Stone 
suggests that literacy of the urban and rural middle classes had 
risen to 95 per cent by 1840, from a level of 75 per cent some 
sixty years earlier. The literacy levels of the lower classes did 
not reach a level of 30 to 35 per cent until 1800; by the early 
nineteenth century it had risen dramatically to about 60 per 
cent.28 
Another source of evidence about levels of education is 
school attendance, although we must of course be wary about 
what conclusions we draw from these for literacy levels. In 
1816 in England, 875,000 children - out of a potential 1,500,000 
- attended some sort of school for some period, and in 1835, 
1,450,000 out of a potential 1,750,000 did likewise. By this 
latter date, the average duration of school attendance was about 
one year; fifteen years or so later, the average attendance time 
had doubled. By the end of the century, under the impress of the 
1870 Act, virtually all children attended school until the age of 
twelve. 29 
In 1833, the working class population of England and Wales 
was about 12,400,00, of whom about 2,604,000 were aged 
between three and twelve years. At this point, nearly 900,000 
children were estimated to have been through some sort of 
28 Stone, 'Literacy and Education in England', p.109-12. 
29 Donald, op. cit., p.48-9. 
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school, a figure which had nearly doubled by 1851.3° 
Finally, we have some information from the Census of Great 
Britain of 1851. 988,615 boys attended day schools, of whom 
870,061 were taught reading (88%); 829,409 girls attended day 
schools, of whom 738,526 were taught reading (89%).31  
Literacy, then, was clearly rising quickly throughout the 
population until it was almost de rigeur. As promised, we shall 
now turn to looking at some of the institutions that sought to 
implant this literacy, beginning with the monitorial system that 
Colquhoun supported. 
Monitorialism: An Experiment in Surveillance 
The monitorial school in Westminster developed by Andrew Bell 
was graced by the presence of Colquhoun as Chairman of 
Committee.32 Colquhoun praised the surveillant organisation of 
the school, which clearly had affinities with his own ideas for 
the organisation of a police force to report back on the activities 
30 Adamson, English Education, p.23; A. E. Dobbs, Education and Social 
Movements, London, Longmans, 1919, p.89-90. 
'Census of Great Britain 1851. Education: Report and Tables. Parliamentary 
Papers 1852-3, (1692), xc.1. 
32 Bell's system is outlined in An Analysis of the Experiment in Education, made 
at Egmore, near Madras, London, Cadell and Davies, 1807. 
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of the lower orders: 
"The province of the master or mistress 
is to direct the whole machine in all its 
parts... It is their business to see that 
others work, rather than work 
themselves. The master and mistress, 
from their respective chairs, overlook 
every part of the school, and give life 
and motion to the whole. They inspect 
the classes one after another; call upon 
the monitors occasionally to bring them 
up: that they might specifically 
examine the progress of each pupil.s33  
Bell and Lancaster were the most famous exponents of this 
monitorial system, which functioned on a system of mutual 
instruction (pupils were strictly hierarchised and given duties in 
relation to the teaching and regulation of their inferiors) and 
constant surveillance.' These schools were 'total institutions': 
their concerns lay not merely with education, but extended to the 
inculcation of useful habits, especially cleanliness.35 The 
" Cited in Donald, p.54. 
34 The system of mutual instruction was seen at the time as a significant advance 
on the old individual method. M. Herpin, Sur l'enseignement mutuel, les ecoles 
primaires des campagnes et les salles d'education de l'enfance, Paris, 1835, in his 
advocacy of mutual instruction calculated that under a system of individual 
instruction, in a six hour school day, with a class of sixty pupils, each would only be 
occupied for about four minutes - the rest of the time was wasted. 
" The Reverend W. Johnson's evidence to the Select Committee on Education 
concentrated on this aspect of monitorialism: "After prayers every morning, a 
regular inspection of the hands and faces of the children takes place; so that 
cleanliness growing into a habit, attaches itself to the child as he grows into life." 
Select Committee on the State of Education, Parliamentary Papers 1834, ix, p.13. 
See also Select Committee on the Education of the Lower Orders in the Metropolis, 
Parliamentary Papers 1816, iv, which also concerns itself extensively with the 
relation between education and cleanliness. 
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monitorial schools were distinguished by their religious 
affiliation, Bell's being the school of the established Church.' 
Bentham, perhaps the central figure of Foucault's Discipline and 
Punish, also drew up plans for a similar monitorial school on the 
model of the Panopticon, surveillance and rigorous control of the 
inmates/students being the ultimate goal of the institution.37 
Panopticism is the sign of a new form of political control. 
Bentham's Panoptic model was one in which a collection of cells 
were arranged in a circle with a gap in the middle. The 
architecture and lighting are such that each inhabitant of the cell 
is completely individualised, cut off from the possibility of any 
knowledge about or communication with his fellow detainees. In 
the middle of this arrangement is a central tower, which contains 
the warden; the lighting is again such that the prisoners/students 
never know when they are being observed: thus they must behave 
at all times as if they were being observed. In fact, there is no 
" Lancaster's schools were set up under the 'British and Foreign School Society', 
the society of the dissenters; while Bell's were set under the aegis of the Anglican 
Church as the 'National Society for Educating the Poor according to the Principles of 
the Established Church'. 
" Thomas Wedgwood was another figure who planned a new rational system of 
education, with an explicit link to the logic of the workplace. He was particularly 
concerned with the unregulated use of time: "How many hours, days, months have 
been prodigally wasted in unproductive occupations! What a host of half formed 
impressions and abortive conceptions blended into a mass of confusion... In the best 
regulated mind of the present day, had there not been, and is not there some hours 
every day, passed in reverie, thought ungoverned, undirected?" Letter from Thomas 
Wedgwood to William Godwin, 31 July 1797, cited in David Erdman, 'Coleridge, 
Wordsworth, and the Wedgwood Fund', Bulletin of the New York Public Library lx, 
1956. 
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need for the warden actually to be present in the tower - the 
prisoners would be none the wiser. For Foucault, such an 
arrangement is a powerful metaphor for modern systems of 
discipline. Constant surveillance is guaranteed, not by the 
external actions of the warden, but by the inmates themselves, 
who become, as it were, their own gaolers, taking upon 
themselves the responsibility for their own good behaviour.38 
The monitorial system of education was, in fact, unpopular" 
and, many believed, unsuccessful; yet we see in the principles of 
monitorialism the beginnings of crucially important disciplinary 
techniques. "The success of disciplinary power derives no doubt 
from the use of simple instruments; hierarchical observation, 
normalizing judgement and their combination in a procedure that 
is specific to it, the examination."4° Hierarchical judgement was 
central to the reorganisation of teaching of which monitorialism 
was a sign. Surveillance is actually built into the business of 
instruction, even supersedes it as the logic of the school: "It is 
not the monitor's business to teach, but to see that the boys in 
38 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, especially p.195-228. On page 228, 
Foucault remarks: "Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, 
barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?" 
" Although I say this with some reservation - they may have been unpopular but 
they were packed. In 1813, Bell's National Society boasted 230 schools containing 
40,484 scholars, in 1820, 1,614 schools with 200,000 scholars, and by 1830, 
3,670 schools with 346,000 scholars - see Sadler and Evans ii, p.446. 
40 Foucault, op. cit., p.170. 
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his class, or division, teach each other."" The system of mutual 
instruction which was so important to the monitorial schools, 
then, was a guarantee both of knowledge acquisition and of 
hierarchised observation. As Foucault suggests, the new form of 
power which such institutions presage is a kind of anonymous, 
silent and ever-present one; a power which does not need to rely 
on force: 
"The power in the hierarchized 
surveillance... is not possessed as a 
thing, or transferred as a property; it 
functions like a piece of machinery. 
And, although it is true that its 
pyramidal organization gives it a 'head', 
it is the apparatus as a whole that 
produces 'power' and distributes 
individuals in this permanent and 
continuous field. This enables the 
disciplinary power to be both absolutely 
indiscreet, since it is everywhere and 
always alert... and absolutely 'discreet', 
for it functions permanently and largely 
in silence. Discipline makes possible 
the operation of a relational power that 
sustains itself by its own mechanism... 
Thanks to the techniques of 
surveillance, the 'physics' of power, the 
hold over the body, operate... without 
recourse, in principle at least, to 
excess, force or violence. It is a power 
which seems all the less 'corporal' in 
that it is more subtly `physicar."42 
4' Joseph Lancaster, Improvements in Education; Abridged, Containing a 
Complete Epitome of the System of Education Invented and Practised by the Author, 
London, J. Lancaster, 1808, p.19, italics in original. 
42 Foucault, op. cit., p.177. 
Page 212 
The second 'simple instrument' was normalising judgement: 
"The best boy stands in first place; he 
is also decorated with a leather ticket, 
gilt, and lettered, merit, as a badge of 
honour. He is always the first boy 
questioned by the monitor... If he tell 
readily what letter it is, all is well, 
and he retains his place in the class; 
but if he fail, then he forfeits it, 
together with his number and ticket, to 
the next boy below him who answers 
the question aright. 
"This promotes constant 
emulation."43 
"In short, the art of punishing, in the 
regime of disciplinary power, is aimed 
neither at expiation, nor even precisely 
at repression. It brings five quite 
distinct operations into play: it refers 
individual actions to a whole that is at 
once a field of comparison, a space of 
differentiation and the principle of a 
rule to be followed. It differentiates 
individuals from one another, in terms 
of the following overall rule: that the 
rule be made to function as a minimal 
threshold, as an average to be respected 
or as an optimum towards which one 
must move. It measures in quantitative 
terms of value the abilities, the level, 
the 'nature' of individuals. It 
introduces, through this 'value-giving' 
measure, the constraint of a conformity 
that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces 
the limit that will define difference in 
relation to all other differences, the 
" Lancaster, p.19. 
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external frontier of the abnormal (the 
shameful class of the Ecole Militaire). 
The perpetual penality which traverses 
all points and supervises every instant 
in the disciplinary institutions 
compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, 
homogenizes, excludes. In short, it 
normalizes."'" 
This tactic of normalising judgement reaches its first stage in 
the monitorial schools of men such as Bell and Lancaster. The 
hierarchisation of the pupils is, as we have seen, a relative one, 
where pupils are ranged from best to worst. This, however, is a 
less than perfect way of rendering each individual calculable, 
`individualising' them, as it were. The mark gained from the 
examination is the tool that will complete the job. 
It is clear from contemporaneous sources that the 
management and regulation of children is in fact far more 
important than the subjects they are taught. William Allen's is a 
typical voice: 
"A person may be well qualified to 
teach reading and writing, and yet be 
incapable of managing a school upon the 
economical plan of the new system of 
education, which is the only means of 
instructing the great mass of the 
people, except at enormous expense."" 
" Foucault, op. cit., p.182-3, italics in original. 
" Select Committee on Education of Lower Orders, Parliamentary Papers 1818, 
(426), iv.55, p.63. Allen hits upon the other great virtue of the monitorial system: 
it was very cheap. 
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Regulation has come to supersede education as an organisational 
logic of the school. The insertion of this form of regulating 
children, through monitoring them and getting them to monitor 
themselves, is a vital step in the establishment of modern forms 
of government. No doubt in part, it is merely a solution to a 
technical problem: how to educate a huge number of children. In 
answering this question, the monitorial schools came upon a 
technique that was to ensure the docility of those subjects 
caught up in the discourses of literacy (remember, these schools 
are doing little else other than teaching literacy skills). Reading, 
then, is being constituted as a necessary technology of 
government in a variety of ways: first, it is the reason why the 
children are there in the first place, the glue that holds the 
school together; second, it is the medium that has its own force 
(the monitorialists sought to answer the question 'how to 
instruct with discipline?'); third, it is the medium through which 
useful habits may be learned by the school population - the texts 
used by these schools are still the old religious ones. Discipline 
has infested the school, but it has done it through the teaching of 
reading, its logic deriving from a series of problems which are, 
ultimately, connected up with language. 
A few strands need to be drawn together. First of all, our 
old friend, silent reading: this has made its way patiently through 
Page 215 
the religious institutions and the universities, and by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century is the norm in the school as 
well. Lancaster boasts that his school "procures that great 
desideratum of schools, quietness, not by terror, but by 
commanding attention".46 Keith Hoskin argues that both reading 
and writing must now be engaged in silently; in particular, he 
notes that books like Cassell's Popular Educator warn against the 
idiocy of each stroke of the pen being imitated by the mouth - as 
if, Hoskin suggests, an old practice had suddenly been rendered 
strange.47 We may not know precisely when silent reading became 
dominant, but we can surmise that its introduction is not just 
technical, but is also political. The silencing of the reader, of the 
schoolchild, is in itself clearly a disciplinary measure - a method 
of getting children to work that is at once more orderly and 
respectful. In addition, the examination (Foucault's 'specific 
procedure') requires silence, once it has moved from being a 
largely oral and individual procedure to one conducted on many 
candidates simultaneously in silence in a large hal1.48 
Another old friend: the examination. The school had become 
46 Lancaster, p.26, italics in original. 
" Hoskin, Cobwebs to Catch Flies, p.8. 
" It takes a long time for the examination to become modernised. It seems clear 
that most examinations at Universities, for example, would have been oral in nature, 
and there is some evidence to suggest that they may have been something of a farce up 
until the nineteenth century. See Stephen Rothblatt, 'Failure in Early 19th Century 
Oxford and Cambridge', History of Education 15, 1986, 1-21. 
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"a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination",49 and in so 
becoming, has begun to change the nature of its technical objects, 
the students. In particular, Foucault points to the way in which 
the objects of the gaze of the examination are turned into 'cases' 
with 'case histories':50 ordinary individuality, as Foucault notes 
and as is discussed earlier in this thesis, is transformed, is 
moved from below the threshold of description to assume a new 
visibility as the 'case'. The examination actually constitutes the 
individual, produces him/her as a replacement for the 'memorable 
man' located within a family genealogy, made visible by kinship 
ties and ceremonies of a very different order. The birth of the 
psy-sciences, only just around the corner, coincides with this 
reversal of the political axis of individualisation: 
"All the sciences, analyses or practices 
employing the root `psycho-' have their 
origin in this historical reversal of the 
procedures of individualization. The 
moment that saw the transition from 
historico-ritual mechanisms for the 
formation of individuality to the 
scientifico-disciplinary mechanisms, 
when the normal took over from the 
ancestral, and measurement from 
status, thus substituting for the 
individuality of the memorable man that 
of the calculable man, that moment 
" Foucault, op. cit., p.186. Foucault continues: "It became less and less a 
question of jousts in which pupils pitched their forces against one another and 
increasingly a perpetual comparison of each and all that made it possible both to 
measure and to judge." 
50 Foucault, op. cit., p.191. 
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when the sciences of man became 
possible is the moment when a new 
technology of power and a new political 
anatomy of the body were 
implemented."' 
The strong claim is made, then, that the kinds of disciplinary 
tactics that one can see in, for example, monitorialism, are a 
condition of possibility for the sciences of man, and in particular 
the `psy-sciences'. 
A convergence of a variety of discursive forms have 
provided the conditions of possibility for a new way of inscribing 
individuals and of making them calculable. In this chapter, I have 
shown how a series of linguistic disputes, made obvious in 
examples like the the events around The Rights of Man, propel the 
debate about the education of the masses briskly forward. We 
still see many objectors to education on a mass scale, and many 
attempts to limit degrees of education, but the battle is all but 
over. Government can no longer be about repressing, saying no, 
keeping things hidden. The most efficient government is that 
which gets the governed to do the work themselves. In 
monitorialism we see this explicit aim; and the use of the 
techniques of silent reading and of the examination, themselves 
with a long and varied history, are, it just so happens, perfect for 
the job. Once again, we have seen the formation of something 
'Foucault, op. cit., p.193. 
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recognisably modern: but it has been formed out of a variety of 
discursive odds and ends. Educating people and teaching them to 
read seems to be be neither a conspiracy to keep people in their 
place, nor a humanitarian gesture, the concession of a right. It 
seems more that it is about new forms of government, and the 
convergence of contingencies. 
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7: MORALISATION: FOR LOVE'S SAKE 
"The primary function of writing, as a 
means of communication, is to 
facilitate the enslavement of other 
human beings... The struggle against 
illiteracy is indistinguishable, at 
times, from the increased power 
exerted over the individual citizen by 
the central authority."' 
Claude Levi-Strauss sums up a popular set of ideas about the 
function of education in the modern age; and to an extent, he is 
right - how do you govern someone who does not read or write? 
How do you get them to read all the things that guarantee their 
successful functioning in an advanced liberal democracy? One 
gets a sense of this when one travels to a country where one 
cannot speak the language. One is almost completely removed 
from the rights and duties of citizenship: simultaneously 
helpless, yet immune from the demands of that society. But we 
have begun to see ways in which Levi-Strauss may be overly 
pessimistic. First of all, literacy skills are Janus-like: we saw 
how the Puritans opened up literacy routes which were to be 
taken up by pornographers, for example. Teach someone to read 
the Bible and they may go off and read Thomas Paine. Monks may 
' Claude Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, New York, Pantheon, 1965, p.292-3. 
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use writing to communicate with each other secretly and avoid 
censure. All of which is to say: power does not merely impress 
itself on a compliant target - power coexists with resistance. 
Second, to analyse the situation in terms of the actions of the 
State upon the poor helpless individual, dwarfed by this 
leviathan, is perhaps not the approach that does most justice to 
the evidence we have seen so far. We have seen the development 
of `governmentality', but this is not a synonym for the actions of 
the State; rather, we have seen a reorganisation of the relation 
between the individual and techniques of government of the self. 
The individual has a stake in this process, and has come to be an 
important site in the production of government. One must learn 
to govern oneself if one is to be an adequate citizen. 
This is exactly why the experiment in surveillance that Bell 
and Lancaster ran is so important: it marks out for us a new 
conception of the field of government, and seeks out new ways of 
intervening into the lives of the population - regulating the child, 
and particularly the poor child, in the name of the maximisation 
of capacities. However, I would suggest that the monitorial 
schools do not by any means perfect the technologies of 
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discipline;' I suggest rather that they delineate a path for 
modern education. First of all, they do not yet introduce the 
examination mark; secondly, and a topic that will be dealt with at 
more length below, they do not yet stumble upon one of the most 
powerful disciplinary technologies available, the 'special 
relationship' between the teacher and the pupil. 
The examination in schools would appear to become written, 
and to adopt a mathematical system of grading, at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century.' It does not seem to have been a 
technique which the monitorial schools employed at first - that 
was a job to be left to their successors. It could be argued that 
the lack of techniques for turning a population into calculable 
subjects, in the way the examination mark does, was the 
Achilles' heel of monitorialism: what was still needed was a way 
of getting the student to discipline the self through self- 
2 It is noticeable that many writers on the monitorial system at the time do not 
privilege any kind of cunning operation of power, but rather regard the schools as 
ideal sites for the rote learning of useful principles. Thus I would maintain that the 
disciplinary functions of such schools are limited. For example, Abbe Affre 
generally supported the new system of schooling, but thought the system of mutual 
instruction was misguided because it decreased the amount of time that children 
spent in schools - Affre thought it safer to keep them in schools as long as possible. 
He had similar 'simple' disciplinary hopes for his book, Nouveau Traite des Ecoles 
Primaire ou Manuel des lnstituteurs et des Institutrices, Paris, 1826; he hoped that 
it would "above all serve to weaken the spirit of independence which our revolution 
has caused to germinate in so many heads." This would work through the reading of 
"good authors" who stress "order and submissiveness." See Furet and Ozouf, 
Reading and Writing, p.121. 
'Keith Hoskin, 'The Examination, Disciplinary Power and Rational Schooling', 
History of Education 8, 1979, 135-46. 
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evaluation.4 A more precise technology than rank ordering is 
required for such a task, since rank ordering provides the most 
useful information to those at the top and the bottom of the 
distributions, but for the great mass in the middle, the precise 
details of their progress or of their failings are invisible. Hoskin 
and Macve estimate that in the colleges in the United States, and 
in the monitorial schools in England, mathematical-type marking 
systems, such that we would be familiar with today, get 
introduced around 1820.5 
A range of disciplinary techniques, then, have been woven 
into the popular schools. The children have been silenced, and 
their very form of visibility has begun to be transformed by the 
reversal in the political axis of individualisation: such a 
transformation is achieved by that disciplinary technique par 
excellence, the examination. The apparatus of the examination, 
and the mark derived from it, act as inscription devices, making 
children 'legible' within educational settings. In addition, the 
goals of the popular schools were the ones familiar to us from 
the ideas of Jonas Hanway and his like. First of all, there was 
importance of teaching literacy skills to enable the Bible to 
become a literary resource for the new citizen who is gradually 
See Keith W. Hoskin and Richard H. Macve, 'Accounting and the Examination: A 
Genealogy of Disciplinary Power', Accounting, Organizations and Society 11, 2, 
1986, 105-36, see especially pp.125, 128. 
'Hoskin and Macve, p.129. 
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being unveiled; schooling is seen as having a role to play in 
improving the moral (and, indeed, the physical) wellbeing of the 
urban poor.6 Second, the kind of links that were being drawn 
between crime and illiteracy began to make the school seem 
something of a necessity.' A third theme was in training up 
students for useful employments.8 We can think of the child being 
extorted out of a new site of perception-enunciation, a new grid 
of visibility-sayability. In linking together a whole series of 
previously separate discourses, on crime, on education, on 
6 A theme in the writing of, for example, Sir Thomas Bernard. See his edited 
collection Of the Education of the Poor; being the first part of a digest of reports of 
the Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor; and containing a selection of 
articles which have reference to education, London, 1809. 
' A point dealt with in some detail in Jones and Williamson, The Birth of the 
Schoolrom. As I mentioned above, Patrick Colquhoun was one of the first to concern 
himself with such links, and Mary Carpenter also began looking at the statistics on 
prison populations and the inmates' state of literacy. See her Reformatory Schools, 
for the Children of the Perishing and Dangerous Classes, and for Juvenile Offenders, 
London: C. Gilpin, 1851. Literacy was always on the agenda as a possible resource to 
be used to intervene in such problems, especially once it began to be understood that 
reading had proved a 'successful' reformatory aid in the prisons. The discourse 
linking crime to illiteracy seems to appear throughout the Western world at this 
time; in some countries, it seems to be the most important factor in pushing them 
towards a universal free public education system, as Suzanne de Castel! and Allan 
Luke argue is the case for Canada. See their 'Defining "Literacy" in North American 
Schools: Social and Historical Conditions and Consequences', Journal of Curriculum 
Studies 15, 1983, 373-89. The late nineteenth century Ontario educationalist 
Archibald McCallum put the argument very clearly: "Over seven percent of New 
England's population over ten years of age can neither read nor write; yet 80 percent 
of the crime in these states was committed by this small minority; in other words, 
an uneducated person commits fifty-six times as many crimes as one with 
education." 'Compulsory Education', in A. Prentice and S. Houston (eds), Family, 
School and Society in Nineteenth-Century Canada, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1975, p.176-7. 
'See, for example, Jelinger C. Symons, 'On Industrial Training as an Adjunct to 
School Teaching', in Alfred Hill (ed.) Essays on Educational Subjects, read at the 
Educational Conference of June 1857, London, Longman, Brown, 1857. 
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literacy, on the state of the poor, and so on, new ways of 
understanding the population and of intervening into the behaviour 
of particular groups were now becoming possible. 
Health, Crime, Education 
As I have suggested, such a series of arrangements are precursors 
of more cunning and insidious techniques, which soon began to 
insert themselves into educational concerns. From a period 
beginning around 1830, a new domain of political knowledge, 
based around what Jones and Williamson call 'the moral 
topographies of classes', began to be formed.9 This new domain 
was extorted out of three sites of 'perception-enunciation', as 
Jones and Williamson put it.1° First of all, the recently-formed 
town police forces defined one site; they divided the town up into 
police districts and, in time, extracted from these districts 
statistics about types and rates of crime." Second, the formation 
of town health boards, which likewise divided the town up into 
Jones and Williamson, p.78. 
'° Their use of this terminology derives from The Archaeology of Knowledge. I 
talked in similar terms in 'The Theoretical', above, about fields of visibility and 
sayability. 
"See, for example, Henry Miller, Papers Relative to the State of Crime in the 
City of Glasgow, Glasgow, W. Lang, 1840, cited in Jones and Williamson, p.78. 
Miller was Superintendent of the Glasgow Police. 
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districts, produced another set of statistics on illness rates, 
infant mortality, etc.12 The third type of site was defined in 
relation to the spaces of the prison and the workhouse, and 
focused on the construction of what we might think of as the 
inmate's 'career', that is to say, the circumstances that led to 
the person coming into 'vicious courses'.13 All of these knowledge 
projects, though, needed the development of statistical 
techniques to enable them to emerge; this was happening at about 
the same time, by happy coincidence - one can almost see the 
human sciences being constructed in front of one's eyes.14  
Swiftly enough, patterns of crime and of disease, both 
12 See, for example, Sir James Phillips Kay-Shuttleworth, Four Periods of 
Public Education, London, Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 1862, p.5. There 
are many writers and theoreticians at this time who concern themselves with the 
moral and physical condition of the working classes, Kay-Shuttleworth among them; 
see, for example, Edwin Chadwick, Report on the Sanitary Conditions of the 
Labouring Population of Great Britain, London, 1842. 
'3 See the following, all of which attempt to develop the notion of a criminal 
`career' or life-course': Society for the Improvement of Prison Discipline and the 
Reformation of Juvenile Offenders, Fifth Report, London, 1823; Glasgow Society for 
repressing Juvenile Delinquency, Report of the Directors, Glasgow, 1839; William 
Beaver Neale, Juvenile Delinquency in Manchester: its causes and history, its 
consequences, and some suggestions concerning its cure, Manchester, 1840. 
"Hacking, The Taming of Chance, puts a strong case for statistics as the discourse 
without which none of the human sciences can come into being, setting down as it does 
the modern techniques of calculation in a world that was slowly becoming more and 
more indeterministic. Hacking argues that the loss of belief in all events as divinely 
pre-determined required a new set of explanatory categories. Statistics gave us this 
by allowing us to understand the statistical regularity (and thus governability) of 
chance. 
Page 226 
geographical and historical, could be extracted from the data;15 it 
became clear that the overlaps were more striking than the 
discrepancies: health and crime seemed to exist in an inverse 
relationship.16 Just as we saw earlier a series of techniques 
which actually began to produce the child by detailing it more and 
more, in the same way these power-knowledge techniques 
predicated on incidences of crime and disease began to be the 
parameters through which the character of a class was 
understood. What is important for our purposes is the notion of a 
class as an entity with its own inherent qualities connected with 
health and crime - in the case of the 'dangerous classes', an 
inherent quality as dangerous to themselves, and, more 
particularly, to others (especially the 'perishing classes'). 
We see a clear summary of just what was meant by the 
notions of 'dangerous' and 'perishing' classes in Mary Carpenter: 
'The first Registrar General of England and Wales, William Farr, is famous for 
his work both on disease and on crime rates, which seem to be the areas in which the 
discourses we are interested in can surface. See, for example, 'On the Law of 
Recovery and Dying in Small Pox', British Annals of Medicine, Pharmacy, Vital 
Statistics and General Science 2, 1837, 134-43; 'Opening Address', in Fourth 
Session of the International Statistical Conference, London, 1860. 
'For example, the prison inspectorate began to see religious and moral education 
as a way to stem the rising crime rate, especially among the children of the urban 
poor. See First Report, Parliamentary Papers 1836, xxxv, p.83ff, and 
Parliamentary Papers 1840 (490) x1.385. A useful account of some of these policy 
moves is given in Richard Johnson, 'Educational Policy and Social Control in Early 
Victorian England', Past and Present 49, 1970, 96-119. Conversely, the school 
inspectors began to sound more like prison inspectors, needing to answer questions 
like "What is the nature and height of the fence with which the playground is 
enclosed?" - see Form of Report for Her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools, Minutes of 
the Committee of Council on Education, 1840-1, p.3. 
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"That part of the community which we 
are to consider, consists of those who 
have not yet fallen into actual crime, 
but who are almost certain from their 
ignorance, destitution, and the 
circumstances in which they are 
growing up, to do so, if a helping hand 
be not extended to raise them; - these 
form the perishing classes: - and of 
those who have already received their 
prison brand, or, if the mark has not yet 
been visibly set upon them, are 
notoriously living by plunder; - who 
unblushingly acknowledge that they can 
gain more for the support of themselves 
and their parents by stealing than by 
working, - whose hand is against every 
man, for they know not that any man is 
their brother; - these form the 
dangerous classes. Look at them in the 
streets, where, to the eyes of the 
worldly man, they all appear the scum 
of the populace, fit only to be swept as 
vermin from the face of the earth; - see 
them in their homes, if such they have, 
squalid, filthy, vicious, or pining and 
wretched with none to help, destined 
only, it would seem, to be carried off by 
some beneficent pestilence; - and you 
have no hesitation in acknowledging 
that these are indeed perishing and 
dangerous classes."17 
`Dangerousness', then, was closely related to the possibility 
of crime, which in turn was seen to flow from the unhealthy 
conditions in which such classes existed: 
"In Manchester and the manufacturing 
" Carpenter, p.2-3, italics in original. 
Page 228 
districts, as everywhere else, the class of 
criminals spring chiefly from the most 
abject, ignorant, improvident and poverty 
stricken of the population; and the 
quarters which they occupy are the lowest, 
the most incommodious and loathesome in 
the city... Here, then, the narrow, ill-
ventilated, and filthy streets, with their 
stunted and filthy hovels, markedly 
contrast with the spacious warehouse, the 
lofty factory, and the public buildings 
situated in the more airy and commodious 
quarters of the town; and while such is the 
uninviting character of the external 
appearance, it is only exceeded by the 
confinement, darkness, nakedness, and 
filth which characterise the thickly 
populated dwellings of a class who live by 
a mingled recourse to elemosynary relief 
and criminal pursuits, and whose honest or 
illicit gains are spent with equal 
improvidence and profligacy... It is from 
such a region of physical degradation that 
contagion and pestilence spread abroad, 
and it is out of such a community that 
crime has its birth, and principally 
emanates."" 
This notion of dangerous classes as a particular danger to health 
was articulated in relation to those classes who were 'at risk' 
from them: the 'perishing classes'. Thus was established a 
mutual relation between two classes who were viewed as having 
intrinsic qualities or characteristics, as either dangerous or at 
risk in terms of their health. The theoretical establishment of 
'8 Neale, p.8-10; cited in Jones and Williamson, p.83. 
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such classes enabled the elaboration of notions of treatment and 
prevention, frequently understood in terms of public hygiene. Of 
course, the most obvious such 'treatment' or 'prevention' was the 
establishment of compulsory education, which sought to make 
appropriate interventions that were guarantees of health.19 In the 
debates of the time, many saw education as providing an almost 
magical solution to crime: 
"And do you consider that as a means of 
prevention [sc. of crime], education 
stands pre-eminent?" 
"So much so, that I conceive a well 
digested system of national education 
skilfully carried into execution, would 
in the course of a generation or two 
almost extirpate crime."' 
Others, however, were more circumspect: 
"I must further observe, that, though 
the ultimate effects of education be to 
diminish crime, the steps by which it 
works out this change are many, and 
slowly made, and nothing can be less 
judicious than to insist upon the 
19 A kind of sub-discourse existed, which insisted on the necessity of educating the 
young; they were both fit subjects for a corrective education, and were believed to 
take home their good lessons and spread useful knowledge most effectively throughout 
their family. For example, H. S. Tremenheere, an education inspector, reported that 
not only were children the beneficiaries of their instruction, but also that the 
parents were "led insensibly to better habits by observing the effects of the school 
upon their children." See Parliamentary Papers 1849, xxii, 12. 
20 Select Committee on the State of Education, Parliamentary Papers 1834, ix, 
p.49, evidence of Professor Pillans. A detailed breakdown of the 'cost' of crime, that 
is to say, the expense of prisons and police, which is explicitly linked to lack of 
education, is given in R. A. Slaney, Speech of R. A. Slaney, Esq., M. P., in the House 
of Commons on Thursday, November 30, 1837 on The State of Education of the 
Poorer Classes in Large Towns, London, J. Hatchard, 1837. 
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diminution of vice as the due and 
invariable result of elementary 
instruction."21  
As I have suggested already, the growth of the science of 
statistics in the nineteenth century enabled the police and health 
boards to notice patterns of disease and patterns of crime, and to 
conclude that these two must somehow be linked, assuming a 
topographical link to be evidence of a causal link. This is perhaps 
the beginning of an understanding of the relation between the 
individual and the state which emerged by the end of the 
nineteenth century and which sees an intimate link between the 
political health of the nation and the 'health' of the individual. 
This is a refinement of an earlier view which, from at least the 
seventeenth century, had linked the political health of the nation 
with the condition of the inhabitants of that nation.22 This 
refinement, this 'individualisation' of the members of the 
population, seems to be something which relates to a new way of 
calculating individuals and populations. 
21  Select Committee, p.221, evidence of the Lord Chancellor. It should be borne in 
mind that the Lord Chancellor was opposed to compulsory mass education, and thus 
his playing down of the effects of education on crime may well reflect an overall 
strategy that was accordingly hostile to the extension of the educational network. 
Other voices opposed mass education more vehemently; Richard Lloyd, for example, a 
rector who published many books on the importance of a properly regulated 
Christian education, believed mass secular education could only inflame the lower 
orders to rebellion - see his A Letter to a Member of Parliament, London, Rivington, 
1821 
22 Keith Tribe, Land, Labour and Economic Discourse, London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1978. 
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The class (and the individual) was now much more 
thoroughly theorised as having its own particular characteristics, 
which were thought of very much in the way of a contagion: 
members of a class almost 'breathed in' their class 
characteristics from the area they lived in; likewise, nearby 
individuals and classes were susceptible to any malign influence. 
How might this 'dangerousness' be combated? 
Two 'obvious' strategies were undertaken. First of all, 
attempts were made to break up the topography that seemed to 
emit these dangerous characteristics; in particular, known 
rookeries were broken up.' The topography was also altered by 
attempts to improve the physical conditions under which the 
labouring poor lived, especially through the provision of clean 
water and adequate sewerage facilities. The science of sanitary 
engineering, then, rapidly became of crucial importance, but its 
`hygienic' (health) value was of a double character, equating the 
provision of physical hygiene with a more thoroughgoing 'health' 
in the population, and in particular in relation to the dangerous 
and perishing classes. The supply of water on a regular basis to 
the large cities was an enormous problem, but one which in its 
23 Two examples will suffice: Jones and Williamson cite the deliberate routing of 
New Oxford Street in London to break up the notorious area of St. Giles - see also 
J. J. Tobias, Crime and Industrial Society in the Nineteenth Century, London, 
Penguin, 1967. A similar tactic led to the decision about where to site Manchester's 
Central Station (J. Halforth, pers. comm.). 
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solution "enabl[ed] cities of unprecedented size and complexity to 
develop". As such, "[t]he real heroes of the age were not the 
general run of doctors, politicians or businessmen, but a 
forgotten group of sanitary reformers."24 
The urban areas of nineteenth century Britain were still 
rather dangerous places to live, with frequent outbreaks of 
diseases which killed thousands. Much energy was expended on 
sewerage and water-supply systems, as mentioned above, but 
there were also attempts to remove insidious pollutants. For 
example, the Health of Towns Association was formed in 1844 to 
address the problem of factory smoke.25 Another, less obvious, 
pollutant derived from the decaying dead. As Cannon notes, in 
relation to Australia, some cemeteries had to be re-sited: 
"as late as the 1880s, Sydney people 
were still burying their dead in the 
Devonshire Street cemetery, 'in the 
midst of a bustling community', where 
in rainy weather 'slimy and offensive 
matter' oozed through the stone walls 
into Elizabeth Street.' 
By 1765, Manchester had inaugurated a system of Police 
Commissioners for "cleansing and improving the streets".27 In so 
" Michael Cannon, Life in the Cities, Melbourne, Thomas Nelson, 1975. p.164. 
25 Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1968, p.375. 
26 Cannon, p.145ff. 
27 P. J. Corfield, The Impact of English Towns 1700-1800, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1982, p.158. 
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doing, Manchester was continuing a mediaeval obsession with 
keeping streets 'clear of encumbrances' and 'clear of dirt'. In 
Paris, similar tactics involved "street widening, street 
straightening, demolition of balconies, projecting oriels, and even 
occasionally whole buildings."28 It should be clear, however, that 
these hygienic tactics also operate in relation to other, more 
politically dangerous aspects of the health of particular 
populations.' 
The second type of strategy used to combat this newly 
perceived dangerousness was in an area that should come as no 
surprise to us by now: the pedagogic. There was a subtle shift in 
what was seen as the rationale for the school, and some of the 
`virtues' of monitorialism, such as the ceaseless activity and the 
lack of a need for contact between teacher and pupil, began to be 
derogated. It was believed that a new relation between the 
children of the poor and their schools needed to be constructed, a 
relationship which would be much more successful at giving 
children a system of moral values. Jones and Williamson notice 
precisely the difference between the old style monitorial schools 
" M. Girouard, Cities and People: a Social and Architectural History, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1985, p.65, and see especially chs 12, 14. 
29 A whole series of these sorts of interventions and projects can be glimpsed in 
Viscount Ingestre (ed.), Meliora, or Better Times to Come. Being the Contributions 
of Many Men Touching the Present State and Prospects of Society, Two Vols, London, 
Parker, 1852. Ingestre was President of the Society for Improving the Dwellings of 
the Working Class, founded in 1851. 
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and what is required of the new schools: 
"with Stow's training system, as with 
Kay-Shuttleworth's pauper training 
school and Carpenter's ragged and 
reformatory schools, the quality of the 
teacher's relationship with every child 
within the school was crucial to the 
mechanism of the school, and the 
quality of that relationship was seen as 
conditional upon the quality of the 
teacher himself. In short, for the 
mechanism to work it required the 
teacher to have special skills and 
attributes."" 
The shift is, to all intents and purposes, a small one, but its 
significance is immense. I would argue that such a change 
signals the beginnings of modern teaching practice. Children 
were now accompanied by a plethora of theory as regards their 
nature, and the best and worst ways to educate them. They were 
no longer virtual automata who `undergo' teaching and come out 
on the other side inculcated with useful habits. Such a view of 
education was no longer possible, and could no longer sit 
alongside the individual now made visible in ways recognisable to 
us today. David Stow anticipated modern 'progressive' forms of 
education in his critique of systems like the Madras: "Education 
is abortive at present. Why? Because it is teaching the head, not 
" Jones and Williamson, p.87. 
Page 235 
training 'the child'."31  
Schooling and Literacy: Moralisation and Aestheticism 
The teacher and the pupil, then, were suddenly bathed in a new 
light, and stood in a different relation to one another. Partly this 
resulted from the perceived failure of older methods of 
education,32 and partly it was made possible by new ways of 
understanding how children may be 'brought up' in crime if 
interventions were not made. Yet the overriding transformation 
was one that we may call 'disciplinary'. The notion of how one 
may effectively discipline individuals has now shifted, such that 
the responsibility for the calculation of one's own interests and 
development came to lay with the self, rather than with an 
entirely external form of surveillance." All of this raised the 
individual to a new level of importance; in fact, in reversing the 
31  David Stow, National Education. Supplement to Moral Education and the 
Training System, with Plans for Erecting and Fitting Up Training Schools, Glasgow, 
W. R. M'Phun, 1839, p.20. 
32 This raises an interesting point: the critique of monitorialism was, in fact, 
virtually contemporaneous with it, and thus could only make rhetorical claims about 
its failure. Training systems like Stow's were not, then, a progressive step on from 
monitorial schools, as a standard history of education would suggest, but were much 
more about reorganising some of the principles of monitorialism to work in a 
different register - that is to say, in harmony with a 'reversed axis of 
individualisation'. 
" The shift was, of course, gradual, and the new Glasgow system makes use of 
many of the resources of the system of mutual instruction. 
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political axis of individualisation it made the individual visible 
in a completely new way. The focus fell particularly on the 
teacher, who now had to play a new 'facilitative' role in the 
child's 'development'. This new role demanded administrative 
support, and sure enough, there began to be projects for teacher 
training, or 'normal schools'.34 
Not only did the teacher's role change, but so did the main 
objective of the pedagogy. The monitorial system had insisted on 
literacy as a technique for the inculcation of useful habits, and an 
activity to fill time; whereas 
"the training systems advocated by 
Stow, Kay-Shuttleworth, Symons and 
Carpenter, had as their main aims the 
formation or reformation of a set of 
dispositions within children, and a 
development of their moral, intellectual 
and practical understanding, useful 
dispositions being, for example, a love 
of one's brother man, a love of 
knowledge, a love of cleanliness, a love 
of labour, and a love of order. And it 
was precisely through the relationship 
to the teacher that these aims were to 
be achieved. Mary Carpenter, for 
example, makes it clear that the 
fundamental role of the teacher's love 
for his pupils lies in its power to form 
or change their dispositions.' 
" Committee of Council on Education, Minutes in August and September 1846, 
Parliamentary Papers XLV.1, 1847. 
35 Jones and Williamson, p.88; see Carpenter, p.75. 
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The monitorial systems of Bell and Lancaster had no need of any 
notion of the child having a realm of 'personal experience'. This 
idea is a modern invention. What monitorialism required and 
delivered was a specialised disciplining or regularising of human 
behaviour. Looked at in this light, we can see that proposals of 
Bell and Lancaster were for a purpose-built environment to carry 
out this task. The monitorial schools were a habitus, an 
organized social space, in which specific skills were formed and 
became habitual. 
A technically organised achievement was required for the 
acquisition of the monitorial forms of literacy, involving 
techniques of the body and of specific notations (the formation of 
letters).' We have already noted how the formation of literate 
abilities in such a habitus were seen as regularising and 
structuring a student's life. Literacy was a tool to give one's life 
a shape, and the shape desired was one given by the kind of 
religious materials that were directly connected to the process 
of acquiring literacy skills. 
David Stow's reform of the monitorial system (his 'Glasgow 
System') is particularly important for our story. He agreed with 
the purpose but not the techniques of the monitorial system, 
objecting that they did not allow it to achieve its goal of the 
36 We may think of these as abilities; Mauss would call them 'assemblages of 
actions' - see Techniques of the Body, p.76. 
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`moral equipping' of the urban population. For Stow, the rigid 
disciplinary techniques of monitorialism and its immediate 
predecessors were too mechanical and too remote from the other 
formative environments of the urban young. Because of this 
remoteness from 'real life', children resisted the teaching they 
were given and failed to internalise the moral norms of the 
school 
Stow's two major reforms were aimed at the architecture 
of the school, and, as I have hinted above, at the role of the 
teacher. First of all, Stow claimed that all schools needed 
playgrounds, where pupils would display their real selves; 
similarly, they must have a gallery, a raised platform of banked 
seats from which all students could see and be seen by the 
teacher:" 
"every school ought to be furnished 
with a play-ground. Physical exercises 
and singing are used more as a means to 
an end than for their own sake - the end 
being to arrest and secure the attention 
of the children, and prepare them for 
receiving the intellectual and moral 
lessons to which they are called... 
Without a play-ground, therefore, there 
" See David Stow, The Training System, the Moral Training School, and the 
Normal Seminary, London, Longman, Brown, Green, 1850. 
38 From now on, the architecture of the school becomes a matter of the utmost 
importance. The precise nature of school architecture is discussed at length, for 
example in Extracts from Minutes of Committee of Council on Education of 4 January 
and 15 July 1840, p.13ff. Later on in this document, there is some concern with 
giving carpenters, smiths, plasterers, and so forth, a proper grounding in school 
construction - see p.22ff. 
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cannot be an approach to the 
development of the real character and 
disposition of the child... and, also, 
without the gallery principle, there 
cannot be the patient, full, and 
dispassionate review of their play-
ground conduct by the master- 
trainer."39 
Stow's second principle lay in the reorganisation of 
teaching and the teacher: the teacher should take on a new 
`personality', and be 'parent, priest and friend'. The monitorial 
school, with its quasi-military attention to drill, has been 
transformed into the caring administration of a set of 
educational experiences. The objectives of the new system were 
built into the structure of play and classroom interaction, around 
a new relation (of trust and love) between teacher and child. The 
origins of progressive schooling are writ large here. 
One of the things that we can learn from Stow is that the 
domain of personal experience, at least for the child (and perhaps 
for the teacher as well) is not an escape from the norms and 
disciplines of the school, but is a particular form of them. 
Disciplinarity is the source of even that most pure and chaste 
love, the love of teacher for pupil. In addition, it is clear from a 
comparison of the training texts of Stow with those of Bell or 
" Stow, p.47-8. For an account of the architectural changes as moral 
interventions, see M. Seaborne, The English School: its Architecture and 
Organisation 1370-1870, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971. 
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Lancaster, that the latter insist on a completely mechanical set 
of techniques for the acquisition of literacy, whereas the former 
do not. Yet we must remember how and why these things happen - 
how a new set of techniques aims at the elaboration of a new set 
of personal experiences; if we bear this in mind, we can realise 
that, contrary to common belief, personal experience was not, is 
not, and never will be, a foundation for the use of literate 
techniques. It seems much more helpful to suggest that that 
experience is something formed by and through the use of such 
techniques. This, I think, is one of the most important claims 
made in this thesis: the relation between forms of subjectivity 
and forms of literate techniques is the opposite of what one 
might intuitively assume - literate techniques are determinant of 
the possible forms of personal experience. 
In Stow's system, children were being gently forced to 
question and correct their own behaviour without any apparent 
external discipline. Stow and his like transformed the school, 
now complete with its playground, into a space of supervised 
spontaneity and regulated freedom. I would maintain that Stow 
began to introduce into schools some of the distinctive 
`aesthetic' techniques of modernity. In particular, we can notice 
in Stow the attempt to get the self to 'balance' the self and its 
drives: a kind of aesthetic self-perfectionism: 
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"The play-ground, or 'uncovered school', 
as we have already said, permits the 
superabundant animal spirits, or 
`steam', to escape, while at the same 
time it adds to the health of the pupils, 
affords relaxation, and secures 
contentment with their other lessons 
in-doors, without the usual coercion 
which is necessary when there is no 
play-gr0und"4° 
Ian Hunter makes the case that we see in Stow the working out of 
aestheticism as a techne (to use the Foucaultian term) achievable 
in the classroom.'" What seems to be happening, as Hunter 
convincingly puts the case, is that a fairly obscure late-
eighteenth century German cult was being inserted into the 
practices of the schoolroom; the functioning of literary 
techniques was, however, different for Stow than for us 
aesthetic moderns. Stow's system still regarded reading as a 
way of accessing religious and moral lessons;42 reading actually 
took a back seat to the play-ground, which had the function of 
opening up the pupil for inspection and correction - a function 
which has devolved back onto the book in the modern era, as I 
4° Stow, p.192. 
41  Hunter, Culture and Government. See especially p.70ff. See also Friedrich 
Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1968. 
42 So, for example, James Phillips Kay is the author of the following minutes: 
"Their lordships are, however, strongly of opinion, that no plan of education ought to 
be encouraged to which intellectual instruction is not subordinate to the regulation of 
the thoughts and habits of the children by the doctrines and precepts of revealed 
religion." Extracts from Minutes of Committee of Council on Education of 4 January 
and 15 July 1840, p.12. 
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suggest in Chapter 10. 
I am suggesting that this profound shift (what, if we take 
Hunter's argument seriously, we might regard as occasioning the 
invention of the 'aesthetic personality') needs to be understood at 
the level of 'discipline'. New forms of discipline actually produce 
new forms of human subjectivity: they do not obstruct or militate 
against them. A quite different view of this shift has been taken 
by other historians. For example, Mary Sturt suggests that 
Stow's regime is indicative of a belief in education for its own 
sake - a kind of triumph of humanitarianism, which leads to the 
imposition 'from above' of more fulfilling modes of teaching.43 On 
the other hand, scholars such as E. P. Thompson, Brian Simon and 
Richard Johnson try to understand the contemporaneous changes 
that mark the world of education at this time by stressing the 
continuation of religious norms and 'repressive' discipline; for 
these historians, the shift to a training system such as Stow's 
cannot mean anything in terms of cultural or subjective change - 
that must be achieved outside of the repressive school 
atmosphere in some idealistic space where the working classes 
" Mary Sturt, The Education of the People, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1967, esp. p.1-92. 
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realise their own educational desires." Ian Hunter puts the 
objection to accounts of this sort: 
"[they] assume that education is a 
manifestation of culture, pictured as 
the historical reconciliation of an 
exemplary opposition between the self-
realising and the utilitarian, the self-
expressive and the normative. They 
disagree only over whether this 
universal movement towards the 
complete development of human 
capacities has already occurred or has 
been blocked by a freezing of the 
dialectic on the side of 'class cultural 
control'. However, it seems to be the 
case that self-realisation and social 
norms, self-discovery and moral 
training, are by no means opposed to 
each other in Stow's modified version 
of the pedagogical disciplines. Quite 
the opposite: it was in the supervised 
freedom of the playground that moral 
norms would be realised through self-
expressive techniques; and it was in 
this space that the forms of self-
discovery organised around the 
individual would permit the realisation 
of new social norms at the level of the 
population 
We can actually think of schools like Stow's, then, as a habitus in 
which 'culture' is produced, alongside and through 'the individual': 
" Simon, Studies in the History of Education, p.126-276; E. P. Thompson, The 
Making of the English Working Class, London, Pelican, 1963, p.385-440; Richard 
Johnson, 'Notes on the Schooling of the English Working Class 1780-1850', in R. 
Dale, G. Esland and M. MacDonald (eds), Schooling and Capitalism, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1976. 
45 Hunter, p.38-9, italics in original. 
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neither of these entities, 'culture' or 'individual', exists outside a 
particular milieu, a particular set of technical organisations. 
Interestingly enough, the teaching of reading was something 
of a casualty in this move to intervene more completely into the 
child's educational life. Stow advised against concentrating over 
much on literacy, because he believed that otherwise parents 
would quickly remove their children from schools before the real 
work of moral training was accomplished; parents were likely 
foolishly to equate 'reading' with `education'. In addition, Stow 
worried about the way in which reading keeps children in their 
seats for such a long time.46 In concerns of this type we can see 
the birth of the valorisation of activity in education and in child 
development. The healthy child is no longer the child who sits 
still and rote learns. 
" David Stow, The Training System Adopted in the Model Schools of the Glasgow 
Educational Society; a Manual for Infant and Juvenile Schools, which Includes a 
System of Moral Training Suited to the Condition of Large Towns, Glasgow, W. R. 
McPhun, 1836, p.99-101. See also C. Baker, 'Infants' Schools', in Central Society 
of Education, Third Publication, London, Taylor and Walton, 1839. 
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`Principles' Replace 'Rote Learning' 
The derogation of the rote learning methods of monitorialism 
gathered pace;47 and by 1835 we see that the enquiries into the 
training of pauper children set up by the Poor Law Commissioners 
stressed the importance of explaining the principles of religion, 
rather than just learning the precepts by heart." There was a 
considerable concern with the possibilities of miseducating 
children; the Select Committee of 1835, for example, 
concentrated on two areas. First of all, they made digs at what a 
bad system of education could do for the child; this was an attack 
both at the 'pathological' homes that many children of the lower 
orders emerged from, and at existing systems of education, like 
monitorialism, that were presented, for rhetorical purposes, as 
their only escape at that time: 
"At present a great portion of the 
population can read and write; and is it 
not to be apprehended that many of the 
evils which are dreaded from the 
diffusion of education are infinitely 
more probable from the sort of false or 
mis-education to which the lower 
47 See, for example, Carpenter, Reformatory Schools, p.153. 
" James Phillips Kay-Shuttleworth and Edward Carleton Tuffnell, Reports on 
the Training of Pauper Children, London, 1841, p.123ff. See also Poor Law 
Commissioners, Seventh Annual Report, Parliamentary Papers XI.201, 1841, who 
are full of praise for Stow's 'elliptical method' because it makes the child an active 
learner rather than a passive recipient of knowledge - see especially App. VIII, 
p.361. Jones and Williamson, p.89, note that the publications of the Society for the 
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge show a similar set of concerns during this period. 
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classes of the people are exposed, than 
if an efficient and ameliorated system 
of education was put in action by the 
powers of the Government and the 
people combined? - I have no doubt of 
it; it has been in everyone's experience 
discovered that reading is perverted to 
the purposes of the perusal of the very 
worst species of publications, and that 
writing has also been used for 
extremely doubtful and even criminal 
purposes; and that a great deal more 
will be neecssary (sic) than these mere 
instruments, which are capable of that 
perversion, and which the immoral and 
the unenlightened are very apt so to 
pervert.' 
The second theme noticeable in this report is the doubt about the 
moral quality of the home, and the belief that such a moral 
quality could be better supplied by professionals.5° A vision of a 
very different sort of future is seen in the evidence of James 
Simpson to the Committee (we shall presently come upon Simpson 
as a supporter of Stow): 
"I think that the removal of an infant at 
two years old into the society of its 
fellows, into what was well called a 
regulated nursery, is the best disposal 
of infants, without distinction of 
" Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Education in 
England and Wales, 13 August 1835 (Kerry Report), London, H.M.S.O., p.205. 
50 The school was becoming a perfect, regulated space where a whole host of 
concerns - aside from education - could be dealt with. So, for example, we see in the 
Extracts from Minutes of Committee of Council on Education of 4 January and 15 
July 1840, p.13ff. a long excursus on how 'healthful' a proposed site for the 
building of a school should be. 
Page 247 
rank."51  
Simpson's evidence suggests that to view this as purely a class 
issue might be an oversimplification. I suggest that it is far 
more than that; the complexity of reading interests was forcing 
people to confront the possibility of new ways of organising 
society. In particular, new forms of intervention were making 
visible new forms of the social. New modes of perception were 
arising; but people like Simpson were still struggling with the 
forms of codification needed to complete the grid of 
specification. They did not have long to wait. 
Derogation of the existing system, is, of course, a common 
and popular discursive resource. One of the conditions of 
possibility for the establishment of a new way of organising 
education is to demonstrate the fallibility of other systems of 
schooling. Monitorial schools were mainly derogated for their 
inability to supply meaning along with the rote lessons; dame 
schools also got a hard time of it: 
"Did you see the books that were 
used?" 
"They use such books as Carpenter's 
spelling-book, and Mayor's spelling- 
books; and in many cases they just 
repeat the words after their mistress, 
which, I suppose, is considered teaching 
the art of reading... I am quite satisfied 
that in dame-schools they cannot teach 
'Select Committee, p.122. 
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reading."' 
This 're-rationalisation' of the activities of the classroom 
extended beyond the content of the teaching, however. As we 
have seen, the space of the school came to be considered in a new 
way, valorised as a place of development in its own right (if 
proper use was made of it)." Similarly, time became, as Jones 
and Williamson note, not a negative medium to be filled in any 
way possible, but a new dimension which needed to be filled and 
developed in a positive way.54 Education could now become 
something much more subtle, something which the mere filling of 
time could not measure: 
"It is common for children to have large 
tasks to prepare at home... In most 
cases, on the old and other systems, the 
schoolmaster simply hears the lessons 
which the children commit to memory 
at home: and parents deceive 
themselves by determining the amount 
of education their children are 
receiving, by the number of books and 
the length of the lessons which they 
have to pore over during a whole 
52 Report from the Select Committee on Education of the Poorer Classes in England 
and Wales, 16 August 1838, London, H.M.S.O., p.136. Similar derogations are 
evident throughout the Report from the Select Committee on Criminal and Destitute 
Children, 8 August 1853, London, H.M.S.O. 
53 Many texts apart from Stow share this obsession with the playground as a 
sphere of moral and intellectual transformation; see, for example, James Simpson, 
The Philosophy of Education, with its practical application to a system... of popular 
education as a national object, Edinburgh, 1836, p.98-9. 
54 Jones and Williamson, p.89-90. See also James Hole, "Light, more Light!" 
On the Present State of Education Amongst the Working Classes of Leeds, and How it 
Can Best Be Improved, London, Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1860. 
Page 249 
evening."" 
We see, in this discovery of new areas of life to valorise and into 
which it was possible to intercede, a new political rationality, 
which now began to aim at the maximisation of the abilities of 
the citizen: the elicitation of all that can be elicited. This change 
was a subtle and a gradual one, but it is very noticeable here. The 
continuity with monitorialism lay in wanting to push large 
numbers of children through the system and subject them to a 
single regime of care which could mould them into the sorts of 
individuals society desired - a tactic we can refer to as a 
governmental strategy of ethical individualisation. Ian Hunter 
spots the paradox: 
"The new organisation of the popular 
school, in which the abolition of 
coercion and the encouragement of self-
expression would permit a profusion of 
individual characters to show 
themselves, was at the same time a 
mechanism for subjecting these 
characters to new general norms of 
development. The playground, which 
provided the space in which children 
might manifest 'their true character 
and dispositions... free and 
unconstrained', was also the 
prophylactic space in which these 
characters and dispositions could be 
moulded according to new social norms 
embodied in the 'moral observation' of 
55 Stow, p.46-7, italics in original. 
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the teacher."55 
Education as Discipline: New Technologies of the Self 
At the level of an assertion, the above argument may well be 
cogent. But why does an explanation of the development of 
schooling and the role of literacy which privileges disciplinarity 
make more sense than one which describes events in terms of 
progress, humanity, or the needs of capital? The beginnings of an 
answer can be perhaps be given from a reading of an important 
book by Thomas Laqueur.57 Laqueur argues explicitly against an 
analysis of Sunday Schools (the turn of the century predecessors 
of the monitorial and the Glasgow system schools) as middle-
class institutions designed to make the working classes submit 
to the logic of new forms of workplace organisation.58 Laqueur 
does not deny that such schools attempted to inculcate in working 
class children new norms of orderliness, punctuality, cleanliness, 
conduct, literacy, and so forth, which equipped them for factory 
life (among other forms of life'). However, he claims that they 
56 Hunter, p.41. 
" Thomas W. Laqueur, Religion and Respectability: Sunday Schools and Working 
Class Culture 1780-1850, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976. 
" A view found in E. P. Thompson and Brian Simon inter alia. See the discussion 
above. 
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were neither a middle class 'plot' - the forms of philanthropy and 
evangelism they embodied were firmly rooted in working class 
culture - nor did their rise coincide geographically or temporally 
with the spread of factory production. It is worth quoting some 
of his argument at length: 
"Sunday schools began at a time when 
the factory system had scarcely gained 
a foothold and grew to contain millions 
of children before the factory became 
the dominant organisation of 
production. They were as much a rural 
as an urban phenomenon, as much part 
of an agrarian as of an industrial 
economy. Furthermore... Sunday school 
teachers were predominantly working 
class, funds often came from the 
working class community, and indeed 
the lower orders responded as eagerly 
to the philanthropic surge of the late 
eighteenth century as did other strata 
of society. The great majority of 
Sunday schools were neither the direct 
product of industrialism nor of the 
middle class."59 
Secondly, Laqueur maintains that the new norms of literacy, 
cleanliness, temperance, and so on, were not religious or moral 
ideologies forced onto the working classes by the middle classes; 
rather, a variety of social and religious practices, given new 
scope by the (disciplinary) organisation of the school, enabled the 
new norms to appear. Literacy, cleanliness, and so on, are not 
54 Laqueur, p.216. 
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simply imposed from above via the school, but actually arise out 
of it. 
Laqueur goes on to describe the precise ordering of time and 
space of the schools,' but insists that there is not a 
discontinuity between these new forms of social organisation and 
regulation, and the longstanding forms of care of the self, 
particularly the Christian pastoral. Laqueur, then, argues that the 
new practices of the schools have a double aspect: on the one 
hand, they satisfy new concerns about the moral and physical 
health of the individual, who is now available for a new kind of 
inspection of self; on the other, they satisfy something like a 
ritual of observance, linking care of the self to care of the soul. 
We notice a recurrent theme: religious mores are not an 
obstacle to the development of certain forms of sociality: in fact, 
they may often be an incitement to it. The more systematic 
forms of social organisation that were now available may well 
have been helped along by an ancient discursive resource. The 
transformation of Christian notions of care of the self into 
something like the modern artillery of disciplinary self-
regulation should not, by now, surprise us; and we can see 
something of a specific grid of transformations taking place in 
the domain of reading. 
60 Laqueur, p.220-5. 
Page 253 
Reading as a skill stood at the centre of this 
`transformation'; or perhaps it would be more accurate to speak 
of a 'transcendence'. We have already noted how within the 
Sunday school movement, certain spokespersons such as Hannah 
More and Sarah Trimmer maintained a distinction between reading 
(which they were prepared to have taught in Sunday schools) and 
writing and arithmetic (which were more jealously guarded 
skills). Simon and Thompson again portray this as a kind of 
religious obscurantism, an ideological decision with its roots in 
maintaining political hegemony.' However, Laqueur's point is 
that the majority of Sunday schools took little notice of the 
dispute and continued to teach all three; while even the 
conservatives were happy for this teaching to happen during 
restricted parts of the week.62 In fact, it seems clear from 
Laqueur, and also from Margaret Spufford, that what was at issue 
here was not cultural hegemony, but an attempt to maintain a 
long-standing distinction between reading as a 'devotional 
61 
 Simon, p.132-3; Thompson, p.389. 
62 Laqueur, p.124-6. 
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practice' and writing (and arithmetic) as a secular art.63 
In practice, however, such distinctions between devotional 
practice and secular arts became impossible to maintain. The 
insertion of reading into a transformed pedagogical set of 
discourses enabled it to become more than simply a devotional 
technology; new techniques of social regulation and 
transformation allowed it to link up to the child's attributes as 
future citizen, to his or her health and criminality (for these have 
become the obsessions of the age, as we have already seen). 
However, the old forms of regulation of the body did not go 
away; it is rather the case that a whole new set of technologies 
of discipline were overlaid onto a space that was already 
saturated with discipline. However, the precise detailings of 
achievement that were being constructed at this time are very 
much more recognisable to the modern analyst. For example, in 
reading, government regulations were such that children in 
schools were divided into three classes of achievement, first, 
second and third; each class was divided in turn into a series of 
63 Margaret Spufford, 'First Steps in Literacy: the Reading and Writing 
Experiences of the Humblest, Seventeenth Century Spiritual Autobiographies', 
Social History 4, 1979, 407-35. The distinction also holds up in France; see Furet 
and Ozouf, Reading and Writing, p.76ff. In mid-eighteenth-century Scotland, a 
proposal was made that Catholic children should not be taught these 'secular arts' 
unless they attended Church services conducted by a Presbyterian minister. There 
seems little doubt that writing and arithmetic, by virtue of being thought of as 
secular, were inherently more problematic than reading. See John Mason, 'Charity 
Schools in the Eighteenth Century', Scottish Historical Review xxxiii, 1954, 1-13, 
p.8. 
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sections, which were themselves split up into subdivisions." The 
child was now precisely located by these more and more exact 
forms of specification. The physical space of the child was also 
regulated more and more precisely. There was an attempt to set 
up a regulated amount of space per child, and a properly regulated 
construction of the desk; the Committee of Council on Education 
made extensive use of "General Observations on the Construction 
and Arrangement of School-Rooms, &c, &c", published by the 
National Society: 
"General Rules for fitting up School-
rooms - 
1st. The space or passage between a 
form and the next desk is one foot: 2d. 
The horizontal space between a desk 
and its form is three inches: 3d. The 
breadth of a desk is nine inches: 4th. 
The height of a desk is 28 inches; the 
height of a form is 16 inches: 5th Every 
child, being seated upon his form, 
occupies a space of 18 inches in length 
of the desk: 6th. The passage between 
the walls and the ends of the forms and 
desks is from five to six feet... The leg 
should rest easily on the ground, the 
fore-leg and thigh forming at the knee 
nearly a right angle."65 
In addition regulations were laid out for the dormitory 
"Minutes of the Committee of Council on Education, with Appendices and Plans of 
School Houses, Part II, 1839-40, p.20. The division was derived from the 
Classification System of the Rotterdam Poor School in the Lombard Straat. 
65 Minutes, pp.6, 8. 
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arrangements in the orphan house: 
"These wards contain accommodation 
for 80 boys in single beds; but among 
the youngest boys some would sleep 
two in a bed, and thus 100 boys would 
sleep in the four rooms."66 
The constant supervision of these dormitories was made possible 
by the teacher sleeping in an adjoining room which had a window 
on to the dormitory. A series of apparently petty disciplinary 
tactics; yet a series of tactics which, I have tried to maintain, 
we should take very seriously indeed as producing the conditions 
under which social life, in the forms we know it, can exist at all. 
I have spent some time in trying to dispose of a theory of 
change which is monocausal; I have argued that reorganisations in 
educational practice, with reading and literacy skills frequently 
acting as a vector of power in such reorganisations, were not 
simply a matter of calculating how the working classes can be 
fitted out to take part in capitalism. What I am trying to do 
instead is to trace out how popular education and literacy were 
transformed in relation to the family, to health and morality, and 
to crime, as part of the formation of a new domain of 'the 
66 Minutes, p.22. 
Page 257 
social'67 which allowed the possibility of a series of regulatory 
interventions into the lives of targeted populations. 
We have already examined some of David Stow's ideals for 
his Glasgow system. In particular, we noted how his insistence 
on the teacher as a sympathetic companion of the child can be 
read as a redirection of the pastoral ideal into a just-forming 
area of 'the social' - something Hunter describes as governed by a 
voluntaristic Christian philanthropy.68 The concerns of Kay-
Shuttleworth, although directed at exactly the same area of 'the 
social', approached it from the perspective of the state's 
responsibility for its subjects, both in terms of their `health' and 
in terms of their 'good order'. For Kay-Shuttleworth, education 
was like public order or the water supply - "too vast, or too 
complicated, or too important to be intrusted [sic] to voluntary 
associations."69 We see with a man like Kay-Shuttleworth the 
education of the working classes firmly emerging as a legitimate 
object of governmental knowledge, along with a whole host of 
other legitimate objects: health, literacy, criminality, 
67 The term 'the social' is used to designate those new areas of life which are 
becoming objects of new forms of regulatory practice. I also mean to distinguish this 
usage from the usual totalising designations such as 'society'. See Henriques et al, 
Changing the Subject, p.106-7 for a justification of such terminology. Gilles 
Deleuze makes some schematic remarks on this new territory in 'The Rise of the 
Social', foreword to Donzelot, The Policing of Families, while some of Donzelot's 
more recent work bears explicitly on this topic - see his L'lnvention du social. 
"Hunter, p.52. 
"Kay-Shuttleworth, Four Periods of Public Education, p.451. 
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temperance, and so forth. An expanding web of social statistics 
had begun to show the interrelation of these domains and create 
the possibility of a new area of intervention and regulation: an 
area we now think of as 'social welfare'. 
I have described above how the splitting up of the town into 
various areas, which were then the responsibility of police and 
health 'boards', created the possibility for understanding 
interrelations between these different areas of life to be 
constructed, especially in the form of the statistical correlation. 
Kay-Shuttleworth's biography shows him to have been a man well 
placed to construct for himself these sorts of ideas about 
relations and dependencies between different domains of the 
social. He was a founder-member of the Manchester Statistical 
Society, one-time Chief Public Health Officer of Manchester, an 
Assistant Poor Law Commissioner, and, from 1839, the Secretary 
of the Committee of Council on Education. In his dealings with 
the different sorts of agencies which began to 'map out' the city, 
he was part of the project of understanding health, literacy, and 
other concerns of the social, through 'moral statistics', which 
were beginning to exert a new kind of control by imposing forms 
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of normativity on social life.7° 
Whereas for Stow, the monitorial system had failed because 
its system of mutual instruction did not replace the (potentially 
dangerous) 'sympathy of companionship' to be found in the child's 
life outside the school, for Kay-Shuttleworth, the monitorial 
system did not make sense because it dealt with only the 
intellectual side of the child, and did not take into account the 
now-burgeoning knowledge about those other contiguous areas - 
the child's medical, social and moral circumstances.' Both, 
however, saw an answer in a kind of re-registering of the 
techniques of pastoral care onto those which objectified the 
population in a new way, in terms of their moral and physical 
health. 
Although David Stow sketched out a few ideas as to the 
training of the new personality that was required to run his 
system, the sympathetic teacher, it was Sir James Kay- 
" Kay-Shuttleworth is just one name among many in this headlong project to 
collect statistics and through them to come to know the population better, and thus to 
bring it within the orbit of government more fully. About the same time, for 
example, we see the first publications of the Statistical Societies of London and of 
Manchester, who both concerned themselves to a large extent with these 'moral 
statistics'. Hacking's The Taming of Chance is an invaluable aid to understanding this 
new domain of public and private life. 
7 ' Kay-Shuttleworth also concerned himself with the relations between the 
economic needs of the community - the pros and cons of free trade, the cost of labour, 
etc - and how these related to the moral and physical condition of the workforce. 
Paul Q. Hirst argues that the making of such calculations to maintain a certain 
standard of 'civilisation' inaugurates 'the social'. See his 'The Genesis of the Social', 
Politics and Power 3, 1981, 67-83. 
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Shuttleworth who put this training on a formal setting. The 
Minutes of the Committee of Council on Education (see above) set 
out the techniques for the production of these new teachers. 
Between the ages of 13 and 18, the best pupils were apprenticed 
to school masters, and received an honorarium. At 18, the pupil-
teachers would compete for Queen's Scholarships for two years 
training in the special training colleges. The whole system was 
brought under the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Inspectorate, who 
were to examine the trainees at the end of each year of 
apprenticeship and award the certificates, which determined the 
salary level of the newly qualified teacher. 
In addition to these general governmental strategies aimed 
at improving the lot of the master, Kay-Shuttleworth set up his 
own Normal School at Battersea, which was 
"intended to be an institution, in which 
every object was subservient to the 
formation of the character of the 
schoolmaster, as an intelligent 
Christian man entering on the 
instruction of the poor, with religious 
devotion to his work."72 
Kay-Shuttleworth derived much of the organisation of Battersea 
from De Fellenberg and Vehrli's school for training schoolmasters 
for the poor at Hofwyl in Switzerland, which he visited. He began 
"Kay-Shuttleworth, Four Periods, p.399, italics in original. 
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by 
"select[ing trainees] from the classes 
immediately in contact with the people, 
and generally from children of the 
manual-labour class... ensuring an 
identity of interest and harmonious 
sympathies."73 
The school itself sought to instil a love of good habits, such as 
industry and cleanliness, and adhered to a strict timetable which 
ran from 5.15 a.m. until 9.20 p.m. Most interestingly, however, it 
inserted into the training the figure of the Principal, as a kind of 
ethical exemplar of what the teacher was to become; thus the 
relationship between the trainee teacher and the Principal was 
also one of 'love': 
"The Principal should be wise as a 
serpent, while the gentleness of his 
discipline, and his affectionate 
solicitude for the well-being of his 
pupils, should encourage the most 
unreserved communications with him... 
He should be most accessible, and 
unwearied in the patience with which 
he listens to confessions and inquiries... 
there should be no such severity in his 
tone of rebuke as to check that 
confidence which seeks guidance from a 
superior intelligence. As far as its 
relation to the Principal only is 
concerned, every fault should be 
restrained and corrected by a conviction 
of the pain and anxiety which it causes 
Sir James Phillips Kay-Shuttleworth, Memorandum on Popular Education, 
London, Longmans, 1868, p.8. 
73 
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to an anxious friend, rather than by the 
fear of a too jealous authority. Thus 
conscience will gradually be roused by 
the example of a master, respected for 
his purity, and loved for his gentleness, 
and inferior sentiments will be 
replaced by motives derived from the 
highest source.' 
Literacy and reading instruction have become fundamentally 
transformed by these moves. Previously, reading instruction had 
existed as an instrument in the inculcation of useful habits. 
Learning to read had operated as a vector of power because 
reading had borne an almost transparent relation to salvation. 
There had always been the possibility of heresy, of course, 
although heretical discourses were not what the great school 
reformers were particularly interested in. With Stow and Kay-
Shuttleworth, the pedagogical space was recast as something 
more - a space of moral improvement (and soon, of course, 
physical improvement, now that the playground has given the 
teacher another area to inspect). The relationship between the 
teacher and the pupil was transformed also, into one of gentle 
correction, powered by something like moral emulation. A new 
pedagogical system was constructed in which "new social norms 
for the government of the population could surface inside the 
7° Kay-Shuttleworth, Four Periods, p.405, italics in original. 
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formation of the individual conscience."Th Teaching to read, 
learning to read, now had become vectors of a different sort of 
social power, now began to bring with them new possibilities for 
self-formation and self-transformation: literacy became the tool 
par excellence through which the child could learn about him- or 
herself, check him- or herself, make calculations about the self, 
and ultimately change the self. 
Universalising Moral Training 
I have suggested that a change of the utmost importance in terms 
of ushering school practice into a state of modernity has taken 
place. From now one, the discourse is relatively stable. However, 
it is worth stressing that Kay-Shuttleworth's development of the 
form of modern pedagogy did not take a grip immediately. He was 
himself perhaps aware of the lukewarm response his measures 
would generate, and how the Inspectorate he proposed would have 
humble beginnings, with only a few men serving a multitude of 
schools. In addition, as long as schooling was not compulsory, 
such a reorganisation of the morality of a class would 
necessarily be piecemeal. Indeed, we see the beginnings of a call 
75 Hunter, p.64. 
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for universal education, but at this point in time it was still 
politically and economically unthinkable; in particular, the 
element of compulsion involved in such schooling plans did not 
coincide with contemporaneous ideas about individual freedom 
characteristic of the liberal forms of government prevalent in the 
West. Another reversal was therefore required before mass 
education could become the responsibility of government: and I 
shall begin to deal with such a shift at this point. 
First of all, it seems fair to say that a new set of 
discursive concerns did arise to push schooling this extra step; it 
was not simply the case that concerns about the moral and 
physical health of the lower classes become more pressing. In 
fact, it seems that the discourse linking the necessity of 
education in the eradication of crime just disappeared. Moving 
centre stage seem to be a series of concerns with how well 
individuals were fitted out to take part in a variety of 
institutions, ranging from the macro (representative democracy) 
to the micro (friendly societies, mechanics' institutes and the 
like). Skills like reading were recast in a relation of 
instrumentality to such overarching social imperatives; yet once 
again, the concern seems to be less with the efficient functioning 
of capitalism (although it would be an exaggeration to say that 
such discourses were entirely absent) than with the fulfilment 
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and maximisation of the citizen. The equation became simply one 
of giving children (literacy and other) skills in the schools which 
they could then use in subsequent institutional groupings. 
The school was no longer part of a range of calculations 
which included the workhouse, the prison - a network of social 
problems. It was transformed by now being grouped with 
organisations like consumer cooperatives - a network of social 
facilitation. Literacy, the instrument of the schools, moved along 
with them to become enmeshed in discourses of facilitation and 
maximisation rather than of control and limitation. The school 
now became firmly established in a relay of maximising 
institutions, and demands for compulsory education often 
referred to the necessity of improving the entire system of which 
schooling now formed a part; so, for example, citizens needed a 
good education to enable them to take part fully in mechanics' 
institutes, which was both taking part in, and enabling them to 
take further part in, representative democracy.76 In addition, 
however, there was the recognition that something needed to be 
done above and beyond the mechanics' institutes and the other 
sites of literacy; it was coming to be recognised that the 
mechanics' institutes were serving merely as cheap reading 
76 Of course, there were still pockets of resistance to the extension of education to 
the masses. The situation was almost identical in France leading up to Guizot's 1833 
Act, and again leading up to the Jules Ferry law of 1882; see Furet and Ozouf, 
Reading and Writing, p.1 18ff. 
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rooms for the middle classes, and not intervening effectively 
enough on their real targets: 
"Mechanics' institutes and occasional 
lectures have little effect in prolonging 
the period of instruction of the working 
classes. They are chiefly of use to the 
middle classes.' 
"The institution [sc. the mechanics' 
institutes] has continued to exist as a 
cheap reading-room, where several 
newspapers are taken in; but the 
ordinary members are in general not 
working men, but small shopkeepers."" 
A second important shift also took place. As I mentioned 
above, there was a perceived problem in imposing education on 
the free citizen of a liberal state. Lawrence Stone, exemplifying 
this tendency, argues that the English tradition was one of 
laissez-faire, with a preference for strong local government but 
with a weak executive.' The English state was thus slow to move 
on compulsory mass education, and when it did, it merely grafted 
a state supported system onto the existing church system. By 
contrast, Italy and Russia embarked on massive programmes of 
" Royal Commission to inquire into State of Popular Education in England. 
Answers to Circular Questions. Parliamentary Papers 1861, (2794 - v), xxi, 
Pt.v.1, p.16, evidence of Edward Ackroyd. 
" Royal Commission, p.84. Evidence of Rev. J. W. Blakesley. 
" Stone, Literacy and Education, p.96. See also W. L. Sargant, 'On the Progress of 
Elementary Education', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society of London xxx, 1867, 
80-137, who maintains that "it is always unwillingly that the English submit to 
forcible interference" (p.123). 
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state intervention from the 1870s which saw the literacy levels 
in their countries raised from lower than that of England in 1660 
to levels comparable with those of the most advanced countries 
in the world in virtually no time at all." However, in England, we 
notice plenty of resistance to the idea of imposing any system on 
the people, although clearly this was on the political agenda as 
early as 1834: 
"I do not think the habits of our people 
would suit any compulsory system; the 
system of voluntary subscription is now 
generally established; it is working 
well, and every year working better."81  
"Suppose the people of England were 
taught to bear it [sc. compulsory 
education], and to be forced to educate 
their children by penalties, education 
would be made absolutely hateful in 
their eyes, and would speedily cease to 
be endured. They who have argued in 
favour of such a scheme from the 
example of a military government like 
that of Prussia, have betrayed, in my 
opinion, great ignorance of the nature of 
Englishmen. But even if measures far 
short of decided compulsion were taken 
to induce the poor to educate their 
children, such as holding out advantages 
of imposing disqualifications, my 
opinion is, that the same consequences 
would follow, namely, making education 
unpopular, and so retarding its progress 
80 Stone, p.97. 
" Select Committee on the State of Education, Parliamentary Papers 1834, ix, 
p.191. Evidence of the Bishop of London. 
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incalculably."82 
The difficulty was resolved in an astonishingly quick 
reversal: first of all, no doubt the new role of the schools as 
sites of maximisation enabled a reconsideration of what they 
were doing as less an imposition on the individual, and more a 
necessary prerequisite to give him or her the wherewithal to take 
part in modern life.83 It became possible to represent education 
and literacy skills as a right: the State was seen as having an 
obligation as regards its citizens in this respect. The following 
passage perhaps sums up some of these concerns: 
"No one now pretends that ability to 
read or write is any assurance of 
honesty or manual skill or sobriety. No 
one pretends that the provision of 
elementary education absolves the 
legislature from all further attention to 
evils which are within the reach of 
legislation, and are as hostile to the 
common weal as the prevailing 
ignorance. Skill in reading and counting 
will not protect its possessor against 
mischief that is wrought by 
overcrowding, by exhausting labour in 
childhood and youth, by unbounded 
temptations to get drunk, by inveterate 
traditions and class habits of self- 
82 Select Committee, p.221. Evidence of the Lord Chancellor. A typical defence of 
maintaining a kind of 'free market' in education is given by Edward Baines, 
Education Best Promoted by Perfect Freedom, Not By State Endowments. With An 
Appendix, Containing Official Returns of Education, In 1818, 1833, and 1851, 
London, John Snow, 1854. 
" A brief discussion of a similar discursive shift in France is given in Donzelot, 
The Policing of Families, p.73-7. 
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indulgence. But it will give the man a 
better chance. Reading furnishes him 
with the instrument by which he may 
know how the world fares outside his 
narrow penfold. Writing and counting 
enable him to manage his own small 
affairs with order and confidence. We 
make no transcendental claims for 
primary instruction and what it can do. 
The influence of its effective diffusion 
would always have to be expressed in 
very homely terms. But these homely 
terms cover large spaces in the art of 
more orderly living."84 
In addition, the concern with the international 
competitiveness of England in commercial endeavours became 
paramount. In fact, we also see this concern in John Morley's text; 
his worries about the number of children who fail in their reading 
examinations was couched in terms of how low the English 
standards are anyway by comparison with foreign standards: 
"We should never allow ourselves to 
forget what Mr. Mundella told the House 
of Commons in 1870, that the English 
sixth standard (in the Revised Code, not 
the New Code), our highest, is below the 
lowest Saxon, Prussian, or Swiss 
standard even for country schools."85 
Many of the arguments in favour of making mass education 
compulsory arose from ideas about how the education of the 
" John Morley, The Struggle for National Education, London, Chapman and Hall, 
1873, p.113, cited in Jones and Williamson, p.104. 
" Morley, p.25. 
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masses was the only way to guarantee the safety of the nation. 
Sargant, for example, pointed out how the better-educated side 
tended to win in wars: in the 1860s the North beat the South in 
the U. S. civil war, and Prussia beat Austria.86 Similar notions 
were current in France in the 1880s as they prepared to take a 
similar step. Once compulsory education in Britain was 
established, the governmental reviews of its progress, which 
were, of course. almost exclusively conducted around literacy 
skills, concerned themselves obsessively with international 
comparisons.' 
Joseph Kay, too, was very conscious of the international 
context of educating the young. We see him very worried indeed 
about the number of young people on the streets of Manchester 
and Salford who were doing nothing, and he claimed that they 
would inevitably be drawn into crime; he contrasted this 
situation with the excellent methods for keeping children off the 
streets in the rest of Europe (especially Germany), particularly 
those methods that educated children at the same time; and he 
continued: 
"To leave them thus neglected [sc. 
educationally] is to deteriorate the 
moral and physical condition of a great 
part of our people and our race; to 
" Sargant, Progress of Elementary Education, p.93. 
" See Royal Commission to inquire into Working of Elementary Education Acts 
(England and Wales), Final Report, Parliamentary Papers 1888, xxxv.1. 
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injure the physical condition of our 
town populations; to breed moral 
disease and political danger in England, 
the heart of our vast Anglo-Saxon 
empire; to fill our gaols and penal 
settlements; to prepare audiences for 
the demagogues in times of gluts and 
depression of trade; to render such 
times times of grave political danger, 
and to make our cities, instead of being 
the schools of Christian civilisation, 
the nurseries of disaffection and of 
crime."88 
As early as the 1830s, these sorts of comparative 
statements about the various education systems of Europe were 
made. The Central Society of Education's publications are a good 
source of information about this obsession, which seems always 
to tread a thin line between an admiring fascination with foreign 
systems of education and what they achieve, and a horror at the 
way in which foreigners run their countries. Prussia is 
particularly interesting in this regard, because it was regarded 
as having an excellent education system which achieved all those 
things we in Britain desired; yet many writers inveighed against 
the 'mechanical' nature of Prussian schools and society, where 
" Joseph Kay, 'On the Comparative Conditions of Children in English and Foreign 
Towns', in Alfred Hill (ed.), Essays upon Educational Subjects read at the 
Educational Conference of June 1857, London, Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, 
and Roberts, 1857. 
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"education is police... It is military muster and parade!"89 The 
production of disciplinary educational techniques, for British 
liberal democracy, was clearly problematic.99 
This chapter has been necessarily dense; I have maintained 
that the transformations occurring in the period from about 1830 
to about 1870 are of the utmost importance in understanding 
modern school practices. We see an abundance of significant 
innovations. First of all, the examination was fine-tuned: every 
individual has now become material for a dossier, an apparently 
boring bureaucratic technique, but one which completely altered 
the calculability of the individual. Next, schooling was 
transformed: the child became an object of a set of techniques 
aiming at the maximisation of every aspect of life, and at the 
`balancing of the drives'; the teacher became someone who could 
`love' the child. This love of teacher for child was extorted in the 
service of the amplification of capacities. To a casual observer, 
the movement to moralisation appears to be guided by an 
" Reverend Richard Winter Hamilton, The Institutions of Popular Education. An 
Essay: to which the Manchester Prize was Adjudged, London, Hamilton, Adams and 
Co., 1845, p.153. 
90 A good example of this is Thomas Wyse, On the Present State of Prussian 
Education, in Central Society of Education, Third Publication, London, Taylor and 
Walton, 1839. G. R. Porter is interested in comparing education systems, and also 
wheels in the other great obsession of the age, crime; see his Statistics of Crime and 
Education in France, in Central Society of Education, First Publication, London, 
Taylor and Walton, 1837. 
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inexorable logic, giving privilege to something like 
`humanitarianism': I would suggest that this movement is, rather, 
made possible by things as banal as the systems by which health 
boards and police boards decide to carve up the city. The ways in 
which they made classes visible enabled projects like Stow's and 
Kay-Shuttleworth's to be enunciated. Literacy and literacy skills 
took a back seat for a moment - they were subordinated to the 
establishment of these new forms of knowing the individual. The 
child was inextricably caught up in this web: even the playground 
became a place for supervision, amplification, maximisation - it 
was (and is) never a place for escape. 
Health and crime were the obsessions of this period, but 
they do not seem to be the motors that propelled these new 
educational forms to become compulsory. A series of discourses 
which privileged international comparisons seem to do this, but 
what was most crucial was the transformation of the provision 
of education from an imposition to a right of the individual and a 
duty of the state. Latour would call this transformation a 
`translation': it is clear that there was a dramatic reappraisal of 
what would best serve the health of the nation. 
Again, I would stress that the key to describing these 
changes can be found in the notion of governmentality: what we 
are witnessing here is a maximisation of the population. 
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However, it should be clear that governmentality is not the 
imposition of an idea, but a collection of disparate interests, 
brought together by chance or by a sudden convergence of 
interests. One of these areas of interest is in a newly invented 
area, an area I have called the social. Crime and health may have 
been of less importance in the final push towards compulsory 
education, but it is clear that never again will the child be 
understood in ways that do not link together knowledge from a 
complex of sites, educational, medical, criminological, economic, 
and, of course, psychological. 
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8: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GAZE 
"L'Angleterre victorienne commencait a 
doubter d'elle-meme. Un peuple 
d'amateurs etait oblige de reconnaitre 
qu'il etait mal equipe pour tenir tete a 
un peuple de professionels."' 
What was the means by which England was to render itself 
internationally competitive? How could the English 
`professionalise' themselves? Of course, educating people 
according to the position that they were to fill in later life was a 
start, but where were the bureaucrats who would put this system 
of education on a rational footing, who could make the art of 
amplifying capacities a science? 
At this point, we must begin to consider how reading was 
reorganised by the gradual intrusion of the human sciences. The 
new social interventions which took place in and through 
institutions like the school (as well as the workhouse, the prison, 
the juvenile court, and so forth), institutions like welfare, could 
now begin to surface through practices like reading; at the same 
time, these new interventions used institutions like schools as a 
lens through which to view children, and used the practice of 
' E. HalAvy. 
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reading as an instrument of assessment. Reading became 
something of a mixture between a 'surface of emergence' and a 
`grid of specification' for the discourses of social intervention, 
but it was also transformed in serving this purpose. How did this 
happen? 
The foundation of big institutions, like the school or the 
juvenile court, served as what we might think of as a scientific 
instrument for disciplines like psychology. These institutions 
formed a lens through which individuals could pass, perhaps for 
the first time, beyond a threshold of visibility: that is to say, 
such institutions established a regime, or field, of visibility. The 
job of the disciplines, of the human sciences, was to provide 
conditions under which the now visible behaviours could be 
codified. This dual technique of establishing a field of visibility 
and a means of codification of behaviour, together form a grid of 
perception.2 The codification of individuals, the task of the new 
sciences of man, could take place primarily at the level of the 
case history, the file, the dossier - those great nineteenth-
century inventions for rendering into a manageable form the life 
of the 'inmate'. The individual became 'inscribed' into the 
disciplines through a variety of apparently very dull bureaucratic 
methods of representation; dull methods which were able to 
'See Lynch, 'Discipline and the material form of images: an analysis of scientific 
visibility'. 
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transform individuals into diagrams, tables, measurements.3 
These twin processes are the processes by which a science 
can operate; science must first of all render phenomena visible, 
and then it must find some way of making these phenomena 
representable, so they can be analysed. The science of psychology 
performed the same act with reading, which had to be made 
comprehensible by being transferred to a different register: a 
register of numbers, graphs and statistics, a register where 
having been thus distilled, it could be the more quickly assessed. 
Reading ability could become a 'real' indicator of something 
within the child, an attribute which is a window onto the child's 
success or failure: is the child advanced or retarded? A series of 
questions of this type slowly became askable with the irruption 
of the human sciences. Such questions became the staple diet of 
academic publications. Specialist psychology reading journals 
were curiously delayed, however: the American publication 
Reading Teacher was perhaps the first to appear, in 1947. Up 
until that point, the psychology of reading was debated in more 
general psychology and education journals. When specialist 
journals did appear, they were typical of the discourse: they 
concerned themselves with failure. 
Failure is an important concern in the development of 
'On this process in psychology, see Rose, Governing the Soul, p.132-50. On the 
idea of inscription and inscription devices see Latour, 'Visualization and cognition'. 
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Western societies, and is a topic which perhaps deserves a more 
extended treatment. The construction of psychological 
discourses has regularly been achieved in relation to the problem 
of pathology and failure; the normal is, quite simply, that which 
does not need to be regulated, that which does not fail.' In 
psychology, the normal does not come first, because the normal is 
not the problem; the abnormal is what has pride of place, the 
normal being nothing other than the absence of abnormality. It is 
interesting that in the build up to compulsory mass education in 
1870, it was the statistics of failure that seemed to carry the 
most weight in terms of justifying a fundamental change in 
educational practice. Failure is, of course, anathema to the 
advocate of maximising every aspect of the body and the mind. 
Crime could fade into the background as the most important 
consideration of government; it can become just one failure 
among many once a whole constellation of pathologies began to be 
mapped out. 
The 'amplification of capacities' was and is accomplished 
against the backdrop of knowing one's weaknesses, whether as an 
individual or as a nation. In the late 1860s, it was the business 
of government to know the reading public as intensely as 
possible. Statistics were presented for England/Wales and 
See Nikolas Rose, The Psychological Complex. 
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Scotland, dividing up readers into the six standards of reading 
which formed the basic structure of the examinations in reading. 
The lowest standard was to be able to read a narrative in 
monosyllables, the highest a short ordinary paragraph in a 
newspaper, "or other modern narrative": Results were given for 
students attending day and night schools, for each standard; the 
results were presented in the form of the percentage who fail. 
Somehow, this has become self-evidently the way to assess how 
successful a system is; failure is a better guide to success than 
success is. (Actually, the situation for reading did not look too 
bad - only about ten per cent failed overall, whereas more than a 
quarter failed the equivalent examinations in arithmetic). We 
suddenly had access to a new way of panicking; so James Kay-
Shuttleworth became most concerned when he examined the 
patterns of failure, and saw that there were more failures in the 
reading examination for 1866 than there were for 1863-4.6 
Almost as soon as they were introduced, the statistics produced 
from the examinations connected with literacy took on an 
extraordinary truth value. The importance of these figures lay 
not least in that they were used to make decisions about whether 
schools should receive grants or not. 
'Return of Time during which Examinations of Revised Code, Parliamentary 
Papers 1867-8, (54), Iiii.165. 
6 Kay-Shuttleworth, Memorandum on Popular Education, p.18. 
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So reading simultaneously faced a number of ways. First, it 
formed one of the objects of burgeoning psychological 
assessment - reading performance was one of those areas of 
`behavioural adjustment' that psychologists could begin to 
investigate. Second, it actually formed the instrumental means 
by which assessment could take place - the child needs to be able 
to read many of the 'tests' to which he or she is subjected to 
engage in them at all. Third, it provided a simple 
representational means of getting the desired information across 
- the child could read up on the information which can later be 
tested. By learning to read, the child is constituting him- or 
herself as a legitimate object of further testing, and propels 
him- or herself into an intertextual world where examination, 
surveillance, assessment, all become unavoidable. Fourth, in so 
constituting him- or herself as literate, a number of less 
formally regulated arenas may be opened up for the child - s/he 
could learn to fulfil him or herself, perhaps by becoming an 
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aesthetic personality: a lover of good literature, for example.' 
In addition, the status of reading has changed subtly. 
Reading has moved from being virtually synonymous with 
education, to being not nearly enough to constitute a thorough 
education. A more comprehensive education was what the modern 
liberal state demanded. This move was evident in Stow's 
attempts to reform education; it had become common sense by the 
1880s, when the Royal Commission reported on the workings of 
the new elementary school system.' The appendices of this report 
devoted more time to reading than to any other subject, but the 
main body of the report was full of witnesses to the fact that 
education is more than just reading. I would maintain that we 
can see in this report the signs of some confusion over a change 
that is taking place. The change is in the nature of education and 
the kinds of intervention into an individual's life an education can 
reasonably make. At this point, there was some difficulty in 
' The topic of Hunter's Culture and Government. It is worth pointing out that in 
no way does this constitute an 'escape' from disciplinarity; in fact, such a form of 
personality can only be formed within such disciplinary projects. There is no 'wild' 
reader, potentially untouched by disciplinary literary skills - but there are 
unintended consequences of disciplinarity, fissures in the geological slice which it 
may or may not be worth occupying (depending on our ethical substance). The 
reader may remember some of the other unintended and bizarre consequences of 
literary/disciplinary technologies referred to above: the figure of Shakespeare 
emerging from a technical and anti-aesthetic environment; puritanism and the 
development of chocolate; the spread of pornography and its relation to the spread of 
religious books, for example. 
'Royal Commission to Inquire into Working of Elementary Education Acts 
(England and Wales), First Report, Parliamentary Papers 1886, [c.4863], xxv. 
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conceptualising what reading now is - it is no longer the master 
discourse which provides access simply and unequivocally to a 
range of `goods', as it did when it was considered primarily a 
devotional practice, giving one access to the divine, enabling one 
to make one's devotions at any time.9 It has now clearly become a 
psychological technique or skill; and as such, it will slowly 
become the object of scientific psychology, which promises to 
tell us the true facts about it. 
Indeed, psychology seems slow to take on the job of telling 
us what literacy is; but in the meantime the job of defining the 
child more closely continued apace. Literacy was caught up in a 
whole series of techniques which aimed at the `policing' of 
society;19 however, at the end of the nineteenth century, while 
some of the serious scientists of the age were transforming the 
9 A puritan devotional technique: open the Bible at random and read. So long as 
you always carry the Bible with you, you are always in a position to make your 
devotions. 
'° 'Policing' refers not to a negative and repressive ordering of the population, in 
the sense it is often understood today, but as a set of techniques for developing the 
quality of the population and the strength of the nation: "The purpose of policing is to 
ensure the good fortune of the state through the wisdom of its regulations, and to 
augment its forces and its power to the limits of its capability. The science of 
policing consists, therefore, in regulating everything that relates to the present 
condition of society, in strengthening it and improving it, in seeing that all things 
contribute to the welfare of the members that compose it. The aim of policing is to 
make everything that composes the state serve to strengthen and increase its power, 
and likewise serve the public welfare." Johann von Justi, Elements generaux de 
police, 1768, cited in Donzelot, The Policing of Families, p.7. On this notion of 
'police', see also Pasquino, 'Theatrum politicum'; J. Schumpeter, History of 
Economic Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1954. 
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schoolroom into a quasi-medical site," it was left to other, 
lower status interest groups to continue the work of refining 
what literacy meant. The period just after the 1870 act saw a 
rash of attempts by educationalists to understand gender 
differences in preferences for different sorts of literature. For 
example, William Sumner wrote an article on "What Our Boys are 
Reading", while Edward Salmon's equivalent was "What Girls 
Read".12 Salmon's text was explicit on the way in which literacy 
could function as an aid to the imperial race and the proper 
running of the family: 
"Boy's literature of a sound kind ought 
to help to build up men. Girls' 
literature ought to help to build up 
women. If in choosing the books that 
boys read it is necessary to remember 
that we are choosing mental food for 
the future chiefs of a great race, it is 
equally important not to forget in 
choosing books for girls that we are 
choosing mental food for the future 
wives and mothers of that race. When 
Mr. Ruskin says that man's work is 
public and woman's private, he seems 
" See Rose, The Psychological Complex, p.131ff. The Education Department 
Circulars at the end of the nineteenth century back up Rose's point, exhibiting a 
bizarre concern with health and how reading aloud might threaten it. For example, 
Circular 408 from the Education Department to Training Colleges and Pupil-Teacher 
Centres, 13/2/1897 deals with the care of the throat when reading, and details a 
series of preventative exercises and vocal gymnastics for children to perform. See 
the appendices to A. Burrell, ClearSpeakingandGoodReading, London, Longman 
Green and Co, 1899. 
12 William Graham Sumner, 'What Our Boys Are Reading', Scribner's Monthly 
15, 1878, 681-5; Edward G. Salmon, 'What Girls Read', Nineteenth Century 20, 
1886, 515-29. 
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for the moment insensible to the public 
work of women as exercised through 
their influence on their husbands, 
brothers, and fathers. Woman's work in 
the ordering, beautifying, and elevating 
of the commonweal is hardly second to 
man's; and it is this which ought to be 
borne in mind in rearing girls."" 
In addition to attempts to theorise differences between the 
sexes, we also see in this period a revival of an old discursive 
resource: meaningfulness became once again a crucial topic for 
educationalists. There had been a curious lacuna in the discourse 
of meaningfulness. It surfaced as a crucially important resource 
for understanding language around 1750, as part of the 
undermining of the universalist projects of the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. We have already seen a set of projects which 
raised the profile of meaning and attempted to make reading 
something that is fun. Of course, much of this was rhetorical: a 
common ploy seemed to be to find something to derogate in order 
to establish the modernity of your own practice - and slavish rote 
methods were perfect for the job." The alphabetic method was 
particularly prone to attacks of this sort, but no one really had 
any great alternatives (excepting Gedike and Jacotot, whom I 
discussed in Chapter 2). Most of the 'new' methods actually 
13 Salmon, p.526. 
14 They still are. Plus ca change... 
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relied on a basic knowledge of the letters, which have to be 
learned by rote (although this fact was often kept quiet). The 
proponents of the new methods could have their cake and eat it: 
they had a technique to hand which was an easy target for 
derogation, even though the technique quite often formed a 
condition of possibility for their own up-to-date method. 
Interestingly enough, once the experiment in monitorialism 
began, the concern with meaningfulness seems to disappear 
momentarily from the archive; it became what I term a 'passive 
discursive resource'.15 It was as if there were a momentary 
blockage in the theorisation of the reader in one particular 
direction. The monitorial experiment was about the production of 
the reader in a different direction, in terms of a different 
register; in the rush to inculcate useful habits, the concern with 
meaningfulness just did not seem relevant. 
However, this resource was reactivated soon enough. My 
research suggests that roughly when Stow's arguments about the 
moral training of the individual began to have a wide currency, 
then the individual's 'psychological' functioning returned to the 
stage.16 For example, in 1839, C. Baker, a supporter of Stow and a 
IS By this, I mean that it still is available within the discourse, and can be 
revived if need be; but it (temporarily) loses its effectivity. 
16 It strikes me that monitorialism in the history of education filled a similar 
role to behaviourism in the history of psychology. They both effected a radical 
simplification of the discourse and in so doing rendered a whole series of previously 
crucial concerns irrelevant. 
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practising schoolmaster, made a long derogation of rote learning 
and praised 'meaningfulness' - the Madras system (monitorialism) 
with its teaching of reading by rote came under particular 
attack." A few years later, the Reverend Hamilton made a similar 
point: "The child cannot be made to take any interest in what he 
does not understand. He will no longer delight to read than as he 
catches the meaning."" A whole host of texts aimed at teachers 
took the same line - in fact, they are monotonous in that they 
only had two concerns: first, an obsession with the health of the 
pupils (are they sitting correctly, do they get enough fresh air, 
etc); second, a derogation of rote methods of teaching reading and 
an insistence on making reading meaningful.19 Other texts 
continued some of the other concerns we have mentioned - 
particularly the concern with the running of the empire,29 and 
there were a third set of texts, still very few at this time, which 
'Baker, Infants' Schools. 
'Hamilton, Institutions, p.68. 
'See, for example, Joseph Payne, Why are the Results of our Primary 
Instruction So Unsatisfactory?, London, Head, Hole and Co., 1872; Henry Kiddle and 
A. J. Schem, The Dictionary of Education and Instruction: A Reference Book and 
Manual on the Theory and Practice of Teaching, New York, E. Steiger and Co., 1881; 
almost any issue of The Practical Teacher, especially 12, 11, May 1892; Board of 
Education, Suggestions for the Consideration of Teachers and Others Concerned in the 
Work of Public Elementary Schools, London, H.M.S.O., 1905; Henry Cecil Wyld, 
The Teaching of Reading in Training Colleges, London, John Murray, 1908. 
20 Most interestingly, the British concern with making their education system 
appropriate for the concerns of empire was noticed almost immediately by writers 
abroad. Thus E. Halevy wrote: "L'Angleterre victorienne commencait a doubter 
d'elle-merne. Un peuple d'amateurs etait oblige de recorinaltre qu'il etait mal equipe 
pour tenir tete a un peuple de professionels." Histoire du peuple anglais au XIXe 
siècle, Paris, Hachette, 1912-32, p.152. 
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began to express the importance of a new connaissance, 
psychology, as intervening into our understandings of the child 
reading. A very significant intervention would seem to be 
signalled by Jenkins's text from 1915 on reading.' Jenkins's was 
an almost completely 'modern' text: perhaps because it was 
produced in the United States, it is able to escape the obsession 
with empire which was to plague English educational thinking and 
policy through to the First World War and beyond.22 It gave voice 
to a whole series of (by then) common sense ideas about the 
nature of reading: reading is impossible unless the child is 
motivated, reading is part of a thought process, reading is a good 
basis for other activities which in turn strengthen reading, 
reading gives the individual the opportunity for self-fulfilment. 
All the signs are there in the text that reading has finally won 
through to become a technology of the self, a means of producing 
a particular sort of individual, and moreover, a means of 
furnishing that individual with the techniques to continue 
developing the self: "the redemption of reading from the dull 
status of a formal and mechanical drill... is already well under 
way."23 Of course, we have spotted the roots of this process that 
21  F. Jenkins, Reading in the Primary Grades, Cambridge, Mass., Riverside Press, 
1915 
22 Excellent on this obsession and the language experiments it gave rise to is 
Jacqueline Rose, The Case of Peter Pan; or, the Impossibility of Children's Fiction, 
Houndmills, Macmillan, 1984, especially p.115-36. 
23 Jenkins, p.x. 
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Jenkins claims is well underway, perhaps a little earlier than he 
would have suspected, in the moral training systems of the 
1830s. However, what is interesting is Jenkins's insistence on 
the importance of testing to assess reading properly, and his 
wholesale support for a new technique: the psychological reading 
test. In particular, Jenkins touted Edward Thorndike's brand new 
test of reading ability which had been given an airing in a recent 
edition of a teachers' magazine.' The story of the development of 
the psychological test of reading ability is in fact a very 
unsurprising one: it was developed very much along the lines of 
the kind of test Binet was reduced to employing - a test that gave 
up the idea of measuring the abstract mental ability and 
concentrated instead on a serial ranking of children.25 Thorndike 
had concerned himself with the psychology of reading from the 
first decade of the century;26 but in the development of the 
reading test, we see the true vocation of psychology as a new 
technique for intervening into the social.27 
24 Edward L. Thorndike, The Measurement of Ability in Reading', Teachers 
CollegeRecord, September 1914. 
" See the discussion in Rose, The Psychological Complex, p.112ff. The reading 
test was in fact originally a subcomponent of the first intelligence tests - perhaps 
first developed in the work of Blin and Damaye. 
26 Particularly important are his Principles of Teaching, New York, A. G. Seiler, 
1906, and 'Reading as Reasoning: A Study of Mistakes in Paragraph Reading', 
Journal of Educational Psychology 8, 1917, 323-32. 
27 A few years later, the standardised test was ready: the Thorndike-McCall Silent 
Reading Test. See Florence Goodenough, Mental Testing: Its History, Principles, and 
Applications, New York, Rinehart, 1949. 
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The early years of the psychology of reading accomplished 
very little; few psychologists took up the call to rationalise the 
classroom, and those who did were mainly working in the United 
States. A group of lower status researchers seem to be the most 
active on this front, those people who wrote teaching manuals or 
encyclopaedias of education. However, a couple of things of some 
significance have happened: first of all, state education has 
provided psychology with a place of visibility for the objects of 
its gaze; secondly, in the development of a test that purported to 
be 'psychological', and thus qualitatively different from the 
`ordinary' tests of reading that had existed during the nineteenth 
century, psychology had elaborated what its means of inscribing 
the objects of its gaze was to be. It was now time to colonise 
reading: to reinvent it. 
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9: THE REINVENTION OF READING 
"Conventional reading instruction may 
develop book worms, children who read 
omnivorously, but at the expense of the 
development of social and executive 
abilities and skills."' 
I have suggested that the series of interventions into the lives of 
individuals and populations that are characteristic of the modern 
age can be thought of as constituting the invention of 'the social'. 
Reading and the teaching of reading have been crucial techniques 
in this reorganisation of social lives, and in addition, they have 
themselves been transformed. The irruption of the human 
sciences, contemporaneously with the invention of the social, 
meant that it would not be long before reading was taken as an 
object of scientific, and more specifically psychological, concern. 
The early psychology of reading, ten years or so into our century, 
was predicated on notions that will be familiar to us from the 
concerns of the nineteenth century. For example, in the 
psychology of John Dewey, we see some old themes: first of all, a 
notion linking education to some conception of social evolution - 
schooling could provide the individual with the skills and 
' John Dewey. 
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knowledge necessary to serve him- or herself, as well as the 
nation. Second, education could also relate to an appropriate 
moral training for the new age. These are two themes that have 
been seen in the writings of, among others, David Stow and John 
Morley. As Dewey puts it: 
"The key to the present educational 
situation lies in the gradual 
reconstruction of school materials and 
methods so as to utilize various forms 
of occupation typifying social callings, 
and to bring out their intellectual and 
moral content. This reconstruction 
must relegate purely literary methods -
including textbooks - and dialectical 
methods to the position of necessary 
auxiliary tools in cumulative 
activities."2 
The call was for the classroom to become a kind of learning 
environment, enabling the child to develop naturally in accordance 
with his or her interests. This 'natural' development of the child 
is, of course, recognisable to us as the aim of modern liberal 
forms of education; yet this was no development for 
development's sake, but an attempt to fit out the individual for a 
role in society. Reading instruction needed to be made socially 
useful; the danger lay in conventional instruction, which "may 
develop book worms, children who read omnivorously, but at the 
expense of development of social and executive abilities and 
'John Dewey, Democracy and Education, New York: Macmillan, 1915, p.315. 
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skills."3 Dewey was aware of calls for a more scientific method 
of teaching reading, one which could accommodate these 
ambitions, as well as making reading more and more meaningful, 
more and more `natural'.' Thorndike's work, which attempted to 
understand reading as a type of reasoning, was in part an answer 
to these requests; and the challenge was also taken up by Edmund 
Huey and W. S. Gray, also working in the United States.' In 
particular, one notices that these scientists gave a scientific 
justification of silent reading. The disciplinary technology has 
now received psychological blessing: 
"In school practice it appears likely 
that exercises in silent reading to find 
answers to given questions, or to give a 
summary of the matter read, or to list 
the questions which it answers, should 
in large measure replace oral reading."' 
The same process seemed to be happening in England. 
Government circulars stress the necessity for reading instruction 
3 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, New York: Liveright, 1929. 
°It is, of course, characteristic of scientific discourses that they regard 
themselves as uncovering truths which are ultimately guaranteed by nature. The 
early psychology of reading in the United States at the beginning of this century 
concerned itself with reading as part of the 'natural' processes of reasoning. 
'See, for example, Edmund B. Huey, The Psychology and Pedagogy of Reading, New 
York, Macmillan, 1909; W. S. Gray, The Twenty-Fourth Yearbook of the National 
Society for the Study of Education, Bloomington, Public School Publishing Co., 1952. 
6 Thorndike, Reading as Reasoning, p.324. 
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to be made scientific, to be virtually overhauled.' As Jacqueline 
Rose tells the story, the invention of the `synthetic' method of 
teaching reading, which stressed the relation of words to the 
visual image they 'represented', was part of an imperialist 
education, with an emphasis on making the known world subject 
to interpretation and control, accomplished through the metaphor 
of the word 'controlling' the object in the world by being its 
perfect counterpart. However, one can also notice explicit 
attempts in this system to understand the reader as a 
psychological phenomenon, a 'reasoner'. At this point, 
psychological knowledge about the reader was articulated with a 
set of theorisations of the development of the nation through the 
development of the individual/child. 
In fact, the `crises' in the teaching of reading seemed to 
relate in a fairly systematic way to the crises of the nation. For 
example, the British showing in the Boer War gave her "a warning 
to reorganise her education, her system of Imperial Defence and 
' The most important are Board of Education, The Teaching of English in 
SecondarySchools, Circular 753, London: Board of Education, 22 December 1910; 
Suggestions for the Consideration of Teachers and Others Concerned in the Work of 
the Public Elementary Schools: Instalment no. 4: Suggestions for the Teaching of 
English, Circular 808, 15 July 1912; The Teaching of English in England: Report 
of the Departmental Committee, London: H.M.S.O., 1921. Partly, no doubt, in 
response to these demands, a new method of teaching reading, the synthetic method, is 
invented: see Rose, Peter Pan, p.121ff., and also R. Wilson, Macmillan's Sentence 
Building: a graduated course of lessons in synthetic English, 14 vols, London, 
Macmillan, 1914; The Progress to Literature, 5 vols, London, Macmillan, 1914. 
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the administration of her public affairs. "8 The First World War 
gave the nations of the West another set of procedures for 
amplifying the capacities of their citizens; the testing and 
examination of recruits was the primary means through which 
this amplification was able to emerge, although it seems as 
though it may well have emerged quite contingently. The 
situation in the United States bears some examination. 
The entry of America into the First World War required 
psychologists to prepare a series of intelligence tests for the 
deployment of the new recruits. A group led by Robert Yerkes, 
President of the American Psychological Association, developed 
two tests, Army Alpha for literate candidates, Army Beta for 
those who could not manage the Alpha test.9 The finding that 
nearly thirty per cent of the recruits were unable to read well 
enough to take the Alpha test was a major shock to the 
psychologists who had prepared the tests: many recruits were 
discharged or were found menial tasks within the military. 
Yerkes and his co-workers claimed that the utility of psychology 
in the war both established its scientific credentials through its 
production of this knowledge and made it clear that psychology 
8 Arnold White, Efficiency and Empire, London, Methuen, 1901, p.vii. 
See Clarence S. Yoakum and Robert M. Yerkes, Army Mental Tests, New York, 
Henry Holt, 1920; Lewis M. Terman, 'Methods of Examining: History, Development, 
and Preliminary Results', in Robert M. Yerkes (ed.), Psychological Examining in 
the United States Army, Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 15, part 
2, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1921. 
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had a leading role to play in personnel matters. Franz Samelson, 
however, has disputed Yerkes version and suggested that 
psychology was nothing like the success story it has claimed to 
be in this domain." Personnel was the domain where psychology 
was to have its effect, but it was at the level of providing a 
means of making the individual amenable to management through 
a card system. Walter D. Scott rerationalised the personnel 
system of the U.S. Army through a card index system which sought 
to link the known skills of individuals with the needs of 
particular units. Scott's achievement should not be 
underestimated: 
"One of the major contributions of the 
psychological sciences to our modernity 
has been the invention of techniques 
that make individual differences and 
capacities visible, through devising 
means whereby they can be inscribed or 
notated in legible forms. The routine 
inscription of personal capacities into 
documentation enables the individual to 
become simultaneously calculable -
individual capacities can be thought 
about and planned into the running of 
industrial life - and practicable -
individuals can be distributed and 
allocated in such a way as to make use 
of their capacities to minimize 
malfunctioning of the institutional 
machinery and to maximize its 
'° Franz Samelson, 'Putting Psychology on the Map: Ideology and Intelligence 
Testing', in A. R. Buss (ed.), Psychology in Social Context, New York, Irvington, 
1 979 . 
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efficiency or profitability."" 
After the war, Scott's achievement was seen as sufficient to 
merit a Distinguished Service Medal. Despite the claims of 
Yerkes, the Army decided they did not really need a set of trained 
psychologists, and the psychological service was abolished in 
1919. Samelson claims that the psychological tests were not 
extensively used in terms of decisions about personnel anyway: 
other military criteria were more important. In Britain, the use 
of psychological testing in the army was minimal in the First 
World War and in the period leading up to the Second, although 
Germany made extensive use of psychological knowledge in 
personnel matters until the techniques were suddenly dropped in 
1941.12 
Psychology may not have been taken seriously in the 
military domain where it was called in to make decisions about 
the placement of personnel, but this false start nonetheless 
established the visibility of psychology as a serious technique for 
the quantification of human abilities; and the development of 
tests such as the Army Alpha and Army Beta were pushing 
psychology in a particular direction. The take up of the tests was 
" Rose, Governing the Soul, p.19. 
12 See the discussion in Rose, p.19ff. See also Cyril Burt, 'Psychology in War: 
the Military Work of American and German Psychologists', Occupational Psychology 
16, 1942, 95-110; P. Vernon and J. Parry, Personnel Selection in the British 
Forces, London, London University Press, 1949. 
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unimportant; what we are witnessing is a developing science 
organising its inscription devices. Psychology was to have more 
luck in the school. 
In the years following the war, testing strengthened its 
position as a useful psychological technique in educational 
settings, the grading in these standardised tests giving the child, 
but more importantly the educator, evidence of how successfully 
the teaching and the learning was proceeding:3 Slowly, the 
psychology of reading emerged as a subject in its own right, 
worthy even of its own journals, with a relative autonomy from 
`the crises of the nation'. Certainly in England, the eugenicist 
concern with the state of the nation which had been an incitement 
to much of the discourse of testing was on the wane by the mid-
1920s. Psychology was able to develop its social vocation, 
primarily by acting as a measuring technique, inserting itself 
into the spaces of the school and the family; by now, the latter 
"This technique became enshrined in educational practice in England following 
the highly important government report on the uses of psychological testing. See 
Board of Education, Report of the Consultative Committee on Psychological Tests of 
Educable Capacity and their Possible Uses in the Public System of Education, London, 
H.M.S.O., 1924. Other important testing texts of the time included Philip B. Ballard, 
Mental Tests, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1920; William Brown and Godfrey H. 
Thomson, The Essentials of Mental Measurement, London, Cambridge University 
Press, 1921; Cyril A. Richardson, Methods and Experiments in Mental Tests, 
London, Harrap, 1922. For a discussion of the similar wave of testing in the United 
States, see Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1962; David B. Tyack, The One Best System: A History 
of American Education, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974, p.198- 
216 . 
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had become a crucial surface of emergence for a whole series of 
disciplinary techniques." The self-evidence of testing remained 
unchallenged for at least forty years, and remains a crucial axis 
of pedagogical organisation. The techniques used in the teaching 
of reading up until the end of the Second World War were very 
much a continuation of notions developed from the late nineteenth 
century onwards; the emphasis was constantly on 
meaningfulness, and, in the post-synthetic method of the post-
Montessori period, on making reading 'natural'. For example, A. F. 
MacKenzie derogates any method of teaching children to read 
which uses 'artificial' sentences, and suggests that nature, in the 
form of nature tables, nature walks, and so forth, be used to 
provide material for a reading method.15 The stress on nature 
extended to attributing a series of natural attributes in the child 
which the teacher needed to build upon: "Economy in education 
consists introducing to the child the right activities at the right 
moment." 16 Similar themes can be found in a host of other 
contemporary texts: E. G. Hume, for example, claims that, although 
reading is not innate, love of self-assertion, curiosity and 
"This is another story. See Donzelot, The Policing of Families; Rose, The 
Psychological Complex; Governing the Soul. 
'5 A. F. MacKenzie, Learning to Read, London, Evans Bros, 1925, p.101 and final 
chapter 'A Natural Childhood'. 
'MacKenzie, p.19, italics in original. 
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imitation are, and these are the spurs to begin reading." Enid 
Blyton's Teacher's Handbook pushes a similar line, in suggesting 
that "most children learn to read by themselves when they have 
something they like to read."18 All of these texts took for granted 
the idea that the child learning to read has a specific 
psychological form, and this form is coincident with the form of 
participation in modern Western democracies The child was 
constituted as an active member of the micro-communities19 that 
classrooms had now become. The content of reading had been 
transformed from one based on religion and its doctrines, to one 
based on nature, ordinary social life, occupations, and so on. 
Children were even given a stake in this production of themselves 
as useful citizens: testing, and the review of the test, 
particularly in areas like spelling, enabled them to keep track of 
"E. G. Hume, 'The Teaching of Reading', in Irene Serjeant (ed.), The Child 
Under Eight at School: A Comprehensive Guide to the Training of Infants, Vol. IV, 
London, Gresham, 1938. 
'Enid Blyton (ed.), Modern Teaching in the Junior School, London, George 
Newnes, ?1933, p.8. Cyril Burt is among the contributors to this directory. 
'The jargon at the time was 'learning environments'. 
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their own progress.' 
Psychology, then, emerged as a technique in the day-to-day 
running of the school, and helped provide rationales for the most 
up-to-date experiments in teaching reading. Yet the period 
between the wars was essentially a period of consolidation, 
rather than a period of innovation.21 After the initial excitement 
at the discovery that reading was amenable to scientific testing, 
the refinement and development of these tests was the goal and 
the limit of theorisation of many psychologists interested in 
reading. Literacy itself became imbricated in a particular notion 
of the social which we have seen developing from the late-
nineteenth century - a notion of the secular development and 
maximisation of the citizen of an advanced liberal democracy. 
Interventions into the social took the form of a developmental 
programme with surfaces of emergence in the school and the 
20 The notion of 'nature' had slowly but surely become a fundamental condition of 
possibility for the emergence of psychology, and the guarantor of its truths. See 
Couze Venn, 'The Subject of Psychology', in Henriques et al., for a convincing account 
of how 'natural reason' became psychology's professed object of inquiry. As Venn 
tells the story, the Cartesian privileging of reason was a crucial first step towards a 
scientific psychology; however, as this reason was a priori and guaranteed by God, 
there was no space for a scientific investigation into reason. However, after Darwin, 
the task was to explain how reason evolved from its form in the lower animals. 
Reason was still privileged by Darwin, as it had been by Descartes, but it was now 
guaranteed by Nature rather than by God. Venn argues that at this point, a task had 
emerged for scientific psychology: to explain and understand this 'natural reason'. 
Virtually all scientific psychology has since pursued knowledge about aspects of 
mind, consciousness or behaviour that are ultimately rooted in nature. 
21 At least this seems to be the case in reading; the gradual elaboration of the 
child-centred pedagogy, within which the instruction of reading was embedded, is 
dealt with by Walkerdine, Developmental Psychology and the Child-Centred 
Pedagogy. 
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family. A kind of progressivism provided the logic of instruction, 
privileging nature and the innate abilities of the child. 
However, this set of concerns was disturbed after the 
Second World War. War provided, once again, a shock to the 
nations of the West as regards the standard of literacy of their 
citizens. Recruits who could not read properly were not just a 
liability in wartime, however; they were also clearly unable to 
take part in democratic social life in times of peace. Out of the 
experiences of war came a new goal for society to achieve: 
`functional literacy', defined as "the capability to understand 
instructions necessary for conducting basic military functions 
and tasks".22 The notion of functional literacy spread beyond the 
confines of the military, of course, and came to reside in a 
judgement about the relation between the citizen and his or her 
social world: was s/he equipped to make the most of his/her life? 
Research into reading in the post-war period unsurprisingly began 
to make use of the dominant behaviourist paradigm to conceive of 
the reading process and to develop what de Castell and Luke call a 
`technocratic' model of education:23 a kind of refinement of the 
scientific strands of progressivism. Essentially, this seems to 
involve a restatement of the supremacy of science, and the 
" The term was actually invented by the U. S. Army. See Amiel T. Sharon, 'What 
Do Adults Read?', Reading Research Quarterly3, 1973, 148-69. 
23 de Castell and Luke, p.169. 
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necessity for education to be modernised to fit in with the 
demands of a 'scientific' age. Reading was reconceptualised as a 
set of subskills, each of which could be analysed in terms of 
stimulus and response: the manipulation of the text (as stimulus) 
evoked the desired skills (as response). A whole series of 
learning packages were developed, in the United States in 
particular, to enable literacy skills to be acquired (emitted?) by 
the child. The language of these courses is noticeably different 
from only a few years before: the emphasis was not so much on 
the teacher 'loving' the pupils and ensuring a sufficiently 
motivating learning environment for the natural abilities of the 
child.' The teacher was now described in the language of 
managerialism: 
"By using a management system the 
teacher can select specific objectives 
to be taught, monitor pupils' learning 
progress continuously, and diagnose the 
source of individual learning problems, 
prescribe additional instruction and 
meet pupils' needs and make sure the 
pupils have achieved proficiency in 
skills objectives."25 
The language of business and science are combined here to give a 
" The teacher's 'love' of her children becomes a passive discursive resource. It 
is certainly much in evidence in the 1930s, and resurfaces in the 1960s, but it 
seems to disappear in between. No doubt the hegemony of behaviourism in that 
period is at least partly responsible for this disappearance. 
25 Xerox Ginn 720 Reading Series, p.ii, cited in de CasteII and Luke. The series is 
from the 1950s. 
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new authority to the reading package and to the teacher running 
it. By now, the United States was the place to be for the 
amplification of capacities. By comparison, British attempts to 
understand the reading process are almost apologetic: the 
techniques one sees recommended are still couched in the 
language of progressivism.26 The maximisation of the British 
citizen was still being accomplished with the aid of old 
technologies of the self. 
Psycholinguistics: A New Technology of the Self? 
In the area of reading research, a psycholinguistic approach came 
to be seen as providing an explanation of a child's meaningful  
reading that the previously dominant approaches, such as the 
skills approach (which was an offshoot of behaviourist theories 
of the self) could not do.27 What was important about this work 
was its attempt to revive progressivism: it was intended to work 
at the level of a refutation of behaviourist ideas by then seen as 
26 The lack of new ideas in England can easily be judged from Ministry of 
Education, Reading Ability: Some Suggestions for Helping the Backward, Pamphlet no. 
18, London, H.M.S.O., 1950; Ministry of Education, Language: Some Suggestions for 
Teachers of English and Others in Primary and Secondary Schools and in Further 
Education, Pamphlet no. 26, London, H.M.S.O., 1954. 
27 Essentially, skills approaches broke down the reading process into a variety of 
subcomponents which the child could master separately. 
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problematic in the context of debates on human freedom. The 
work of Frank Smith28 provides an example par excellence of a 
psycholinguistic theory of reading; the keynotes of theories of 
this type are chronicled by Smith himself: 
a) a distinction is made between deep and surface levels of 
grammar, following Chomsky (which in turn, incidentally, allows 
a distinction to be made between performance and competence): 
"There is no simple correspondence 
between the sounds of language (at the 
surface structural level) and their 
meanings (deep or underlying 
structure). Extracting the meaning of 
an utterance - getting from surface 
structure to deep structure - involves 
complex syntactic and semantic 
decisions."28 
b) the reader is claimed to be an active organiser of the the 
sensory qualities of the world: 
"Rather than saying that he discovers 
order and regularities that are 
properties of the environment, it is 
more appropriate to say that the 
perceiver imposes his own organization 
upon the information that reaches his 
perceptor systems."3° 
" See particularly Frank Smith, Understanding Reading: A Psycholinguistic 
Analysis of Reading and Learning to Read, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1971; Psycholinguistics and Reading, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973; 
Reading, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
" Smith, Psycholinguistics and Reading, p.71. 
3° Smith, Understanding Reading, p.187. There is a veiled derogation of 
behaviourism in this statement. 
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c) a further claim is made that cognitive mechanisms (which are, 
incidentally, innate) guarantee this active construction: 
"The organization of his knowledge of 
the world lies in the structure of his 
cognitive categories and the manner in 
which they are related."31  
Such a conception of the nature of language and of reading 
means that Smith comes to emphasise not the passive decoding of 
events but the reader's active capacity to read for meaning: 
"A reader who concentrates on words is 
unlikely to get any sense from the 
passage that he reads. It is only by 
reading for meaning first that there is 
any possibility of reading individual 
words correctly."32 
Of course, there is a cost to making the child visible as one who 
is in possession of all these abilities; the teacher gets 
downgraded to a mere facilitator of the reading process: 
"The most critical aspect of the 
teacher's role [is] as a supplier of 
information, to provide feedback, to say 
`right' or 'wrong'."33 
It is interesting that once this paradigm is established, its claim 
to speak the truth about the individual reader is particularly 
strong, but with just a hint of defensiveness. Reading is 
31 ibid. 
" op. cit., p.7. 
33 op. cit., p.228. 
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redefined as natural and basic (in fact, it has a "basic nature"' ), 
and Smith's research has a monopoly on 'truth': 
"We have nothing but reason on our 
side... In such an approach, the 
adjective `psycholinguistic' would be 
synonymous with `objective', 
`analytical', or `scientific'."35 
This new `true' approach has once again provided for a revival of 
the notion of `meaningfulness' which had been snuffed out by 
behaviourist theories of reading. Behaviourist-informed methods, 
such as the `skills' approach or the 'phonics' approach, understood 
the process of reading to take the form of a hierarchy of 
separable skills; any problems in the process of learning to read 
could thus be remedied by attention to the particular subskill 
problem that blocked the way to progress. By contrast, the 
psycholinguistic method, in prioritising meaningfulness, stressed 
the provision of more meaningful material in the event of failure 
to read: apprehending some meaning was regarded as the priority 
in successful reading. 
I maintain that we see in theories like the psycholinguistic 
approach to reading the operation of two contradictory moves 
which coexist uneasily, but enable such strategies to be part of a 
34 op. cit., p.12. 
" Frank Smith and Kenneth Goodman, 'On the Psycholinguistic Method of Teaching 
Reading', in F. Smith, Psycholinguistics and Reading, New York, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1973. 
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domain of governmentality. On the one hand, they treat the child 
as an isolatable target of instructional technology; on the other, 
they use such strategies to maximise the possibility of the 
child's participation in social life - in other words, they aim at 
the amplification of individual capacities in and for social life. 
The Desert-lslanded Child 
Many writers have produced critiques of the way in which 
psychological theories of the child's cognitive functioning cut out 
the social context in which that functioning takes place; or, if 
these psychological theories are more sophisticated and do not 
exclude the social context, then this context is added on merely 
as a variable which merely has 'effects' on the more fundamental 
internal processes.36 If one understands this in terms of such 
theories being predicated on various epistemological dualisms 
(especially the individual-society dualism), then it becomes 
possible to enumerate ways in which many apparently quite 
different theories in child psychology are in fact very similar. 
36 See, for example, D. Hutchinson, Psycholinguistics for the Teacher', 
Unpublished MS, University of London; and, at a rather more sophisticated level, 
Valerie Walkerdine, 'From Context to Text: a Psychosemiotic Approach to Abstract 
Thought', in M. Beveridge (ed.), Children Thinking Through Language, London, 
Arnold, 1982. 
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For example, Venn and Walkerdine point out how the Piagetian 
insistence on a strict division between the child and the 
environment which the child needs to develop, necessitates 
recourse to something like a set of genetically-encoded a priori 
rule systems in the child, to enable him/her to structure the 
environment and proceed with the business of accommodating and 
assimilating.37 
 It thus becomes possible to see that the distance 
between epistemological systems like Piaget's, and those like 
Chomsky's (which latter system, of course, provided the 
intellectual conditions of possibility for psycholinguistics), is in 
fact very small: both sorts of theory depend on isolating the child 
as a meaningful target of intellectual analysis. 
In this way, we can see that the psycholinguistic model of 
reading, and its main competitor, the Piagetian model of 
reading,38 are, in fact, epistemologically very close.39 More 
modern psychological theories of reading do not significantly 
advance on these epistemological limits: for example, the current 
interest in children learning to read as being a form of 
'Venn and Walkerdine, Piaget's Theory Reconsidered. 
"See, for example, E. Ferreiro and A. Teberosky, Literacy Before Schooling, 
London, Heinemann, 1982. 
" Most psycholinguistic accounts of reading tend to borrow from Piagetian 
theory, perhaps unconsciously; a good example is Margaret Spencer, who grafts a 
notion of 'storying', a classic form of Piagetian symbolic play, onto her 
psycholinguistic approach. See 'Learning to Read and the Reading Process', in H. 
Rosen (ed.), Language and Literacy in Our Schools - Some Appraisals of the Bullock 
Report, London, University of London Institute of Education, 1975; 'Stories are for 
Telling', English in Education 10, 1, 1976, 16-23. 
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interaction and a distribution of labour between phonological 
processing and working memory would appear to have been 
prefigured in earlier psycholinguistic work." Similarly, the 'real 
books' approach, in its attempt to forge a rapprochement between 
the dominant developmental theories, stresses an active learner, 
a 'natural' social context within which reading can occur (to 
include 'natural' rather than 'synthetic' texts), and the benefits 
of regular testing and assessment.41 Such theories work with a 
mode of perception-enunciation which is fundamentally 
individualistic, perhaps in the main because the assessment of 
reading is so much easier at an individual level. That is to say, 
the techniques of inscription and calculation that modern 
psychological theories of the reader make use of set up the 
individual as the limit of intelligibility. Simply put, such 
theories could not begin to comprehend reading as a social 
process. The greater and greater recourse to cognitive 
" Smith, Psycholinguistics and Reading, deals at length with the problem of the 
trade-off between visual and non-visual information in reading, and on limitations 
on the capacity of working memory as crucial in this process. 
41 0n the 'real books' approach, see Martin Coles, 'The 'Real Books' approach: is 
apprenticeship a weak analogy?', Reading24, 2, 50-6, 1990. On the importance of 
testing, see Department of Education and Science, Reading Policy and Practice at 
Ages 5-14, London, H.M.S.O., 1989; Department of Education and Science, The 
Teaching and Learning of Reading in Primary Schools, London, H.M.S.O., 1990; Peter 
Pumfrey, Measuring Reading Abilities, Sevenoaks, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977; 
Peter Pumfrey, Reading: Tests and Assessment Techniques, Sevenoaks, Hodderand 
Stoughton, 1985; Denis Vincent, Reading Tests in the Classroom, Windsor, NFER-
Nelson, 1985. For examples of borrowing from a range of traditions, see Jane 
Oakhill and Alan Garnham, Becoming a Skilled Reader, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1988. 
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psychology to try to fill out the gaps in these theories is hard not 
to notice. In fact, many areas of developmental psychology are 
experiencing this movement towards cognitivism.42 
However, my concern is not to debate with these theories on 
an epistemological level: whether reading should be thought of as 
a more social process is not at issue here. I am merely concerned 
to establish that this is how the psychology of reading 
constitutes its objects. What is important about this 
individualising inscription is that it is part of the process 
whereby the norms of development are outlined. In particular, 
norms for the individual child are constructed here, and they can 
make their way into INSET courses, teacher training, and the 
apparatuses of testing and examination. However, we can also 
see the construction of another set of norms, for the teacher and 
for the family. 
42 Edward Sampson argues that cognitive psychology provides the perfect 
understanding of the individual for late capitalism - the individual as a completely 
isolated information processor. See his 'Cognitive Psychology as Ideology', 
American Psychologist 36, 730-43, 1981. If anything, his view is being borne out 
in recent valorisations of the entrepreneurial self; in Britain, at any rate, we are 
familiar with such political fostering of these ideas and with the idea that there is no 
such thing as society. If this is the case, the individual of cognitive psychology is 
both 'true' and that to which we should aspire. 
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Psycholinguistics, Reading and Social Life 
I have already argued that psycholinguistic theories of the reader 
have an effectivity at the level of the teacher. The teacher's 
central role in the process of reading instruction (and as a kind of 
moral guardian) had been unquestioned since the middle of the 
last century: with Stow's reforms, the teacher had been 
transformed from an overt disciplinary presence to something we 
would recognise as modern - the teacher who 'loves' the pupils 
enough to ensure their training proceeds as it should. With 
psycholinguistics, the teacher is demoted to a mere facilitator: 
the child has all the apparatus s/he needs to learn to read; the 
teacher's job is to help this 'natural' process along. No doubt this 
is the occasion of the insertion of a whole series of new 
anxieties into the life of the teacher; it becomes hard to see who 
else might be to blame for the failure of the child. In between 
the space of the actual performance of the child and the idealised 
version of the self-educating child can form a whole new set of 
occasions for self-doubt. Psycholinguists such as Spencer and 
Smith begin to insist on a rigid separation between reading, a 
kind of pure space of knowledge, and reading instruction, a space 
of potential confusion and failure. Spencer argues that the 
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teacher should concentrate on "helping children to read" rather 
than "teaching reading",43 while Frank Smith is more polemical: 
"An additional discouragement to many 
cognitive psycholinguists to involve 
themselves in reading has been the 
incredibly confused and inconclusive 
state of reading research, aggravated by 
the fact that research into reading fails 
to separate itself from matters of 
reading instruction, instructional 
theory, and social and educational 
bias."'" 
However, help for the teacher is at hand; or at least, an 
alternative place where blame can be laid. The psycholinguistic 
revolution in the theorisation of reading was part of an overall 
re-evaluation of education, and a series of consequent attempts 
to reconfigure family life. The discovery of the importance of 
`the early years' in the development of the child was a 
justification for a new set of interventions into the relationship 
between the mother and the child, which, as Nikolas Rose puts it, 
sought to govern this relationship "in the name of the intellect".45 
A series of longitudinal studies and government reports 
established beyond doubt the importance of the early years, and 
'Margaret Spencer, 'Understanding Children Reading', Times Educational 
Supplement, 18 June, 1976, p.3. 
" Smith, Psycholinguistics and Reading, p.5. 
45 See Rose, Governing the Soul, p.178-199. Also important on this 
reconfiguration is Valerie Walkerdine and Helen Lucey, Democracy in the Kitchen: 
Regulating Mothers and Socialising Daughters, London, Virago, 1989. 
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the differences between families of different social classes 
emerged as the standard problem. If the problem was one of the 
failure of some children to become the sort of citizens we all 
want them to be, then the solution was seen to lie in a cognitive 
maximisation of those children. The Plowden Report concentrated 
on the amplification of capacities through the medium of the 
primary school;46 the Bullock Report stressed the importance of 
language education occurring in the home, and justified early 
intervention as necessary to compensate for any 'social handicap' 
the child might be suffering.47 The form this 'social handicap' 
took had become clear: Plowden had pointed out some years 
earlier that the educational disadvantage of being born the child 
of an unskilled worker is both financial and psychological; with 
Bullock, this point is made again specifically with reference to 
reading achievement. In addition, the gap between the classes 
increases over age, which is where the necessity for intervention 
comes in. A set of relays becomes established between official 
policy, academic research, and the structure of home life: the 
result is that the home can, ideally, be transformed into a 
completely stimulating learning environment, while the good 
parent (or, perhaps more accurately, mother) is the individual 
" Central Advisory Council for Education, Children and Their Primary Schools 
(The Plowden Report), London, H.M.S.O., 1967. 
47 Department of Education and Science, A Language for Life (The Bullock 
Report), London, D.E.S./H.M.S.O., 1975, p.216. 
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who never misses a pedagogical opportunity (but so skillfully 
that it never seems unnatural or forced)." 
The teacher is removed still further from the spotlight; or 
perhaps her role is subtly redefined. Relegated to facilitator she 
may be, but she can still play an important part in picking up the 
pieces when the child is failed by his/her home environment. 
Bullock is also a sign to the academy of what they can usefully 
do; the importance of early experience and the child as a 'natural' 
reader" move reading research away from theory and towards a 
more down-to-earth, nuts-and-bolts approach: 
"the real data for attaining educational 
certainties lies in an understanding of 
what children actually do in the 
classroom."50 
Shortly we shall consider what children actually do in the 
classroom. 
We have seen in this chapter psychology's attempts to 
colonise reading. Reading, by being transformed into a 
scientifically analysable skill, becomes amenable to a whole 
series of normalising judgements. Reading maintains its link 
48 See Walkerdine and Lucey, op. cit. 
49 The paradox that the child has a set of natural abilities which nonetheless need 
to be (gently) coerced and extorted is not noticed. Curiously, the natural is that 
which has to be produced. 
5° Keith Gardner, 'After Bullock - Whither Reading Research?', Reading 
Intelligence: B.E.R.A. Bulletin 2, 1, 1976, 2-5, p.3. 
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with the production of the socially useful and fulfilled citizen, 
but the promise is now that this technique of fulfilment can be 
guaranteed by science. So a series of projects such as 
behaviourism and psycholinguistics claim that they are more 
scientific, that they can tell us the truth about reading, and can 
aid the production of this ideal child. However, in reorganising 
the child, in reinventing reading and telling us the truth that they 
claim was there all along, these projects necessarily disturb 
some of the supports of the old child, the one we had before 
psychologists gave us the true version. The teacher is now 
constituted as little more than an assistant to the child; perhaps 
the teacher still has to 'love' the child, but little else. The 
family is increasingly targeted as a site where educational 
opportunities ought to be provided: the home that cannot do this 
will require an intervention. 
I have argued, then, that the significance of the 
psycholinguistic revolution lies at a different level than one 
might expect, particularly if one reads psycholinguists' self-
publicity. Epistemologically, psycholinguistics offers us nothing 
revolutionary - 'universal' language schemes are an old discursive 
resource, while the active learner counterposed to the passive 
recipient of behaviourist-inspired theories was prefigured in the 
developmentalism of the 1920s. Psycholinguistics is important 
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on a different level, in that it represents perhaps the apotheosis 
of the isolated individual of cognitivism. This isolation is 
effected by continuing the theme, that we have already seen in 
Stow, of the teacher as the pastor of the developing child; by 
locating the processes of development more firmly within that 
child and naturalising them; and by the virtual removal of the 
teacher from the mechanics of this process. It should be clear 
from the orientation of this thesis that I am sceptical of the 
claim that psychology is the scientific investigation of objects 
which pre-exist it and have an independent existence outside of 
the attentions of science. I suggest, rather, that people, children 
learning to read, are 'made up' by discourses such as psychology. 
The psycholinguistic revolution is not so much the discovery of 
the reality that has been lurking beneath educational malpractice 
all these years; it is a profound reorganisation of life and of 
subjectivities. 
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10: OF THE PRESENT: THE 
CONTEMPORARY CLASSROOM 
"Language, with its four elements of 
speaking, listening, reading and writing, 
cannot and should not be regarded as a 
subject to be taught."' 
"I mean, to a certain extent, I suppose 
you're um... constantly urging the 
children to conform, but then in any 
institution you can only get by, in a 
sense, by, you know, by conforming. So 
I suppose that's a negative aspect to it. 
But on the other hand, you're training 
them to take their part in society, so in 
that sense perhaps it's not negative, 
it's positive. I suppose it depends on 
where you're standing and how you're 
looking at it."2 
The modern classroom does not have a simple, transparent 
relation to the academic, educational, and political discourses 
that attempt to shape it. That classroom has a regime of truth 
which has a certain independence, an autonomy given it by the 
fact that the teacher is constituted as the boss: a teacher 
remarks to me, "each teacher is a queen of a very tiny area. I 
I Motto on first page of 'Language Policy and Guidelines', a document produced for 
parents and teachers at one of the schools I studied. 
2 Interview with Ms Williamson, primary school teacher. 
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mean, I am in control here, I am the boss". Later on, I ask one of 
the children in her classroom if she is going to draw a face on the 
picture of a little girl she has done: "I don't know." "Why not?" 
"I'm not the boss, am I." "Who is the boss?" "Miss Williamson." 
If the teacher is in charge, this is not to say that her organisation 
of the classroom is predicated on a series of whims; teacher 
training, refresher courses, teachers' own self-help groups, 
INSET (in-service training) courses, all combine to ensure that 
the teacher is enmeshed in a series of discourses whose 
conditions of possibility I have described above. But 
contradictions in the methods they are taught, the teachers' own 
resistance to particular methods, and the acquisition of their own 
idiosyncratic tactics as a result of experience at the 'chalk-
face', produce a series of heterogeneous practices which exhibit a 
`relative autonomy'. Nonetheless, one can produce an analysis of 
the practices of the contemporary classroom that have some 
claims to generalisability. 
This chapter attempts to exemplify how a certain set of 
knowledges and truths are produced; for example, the notion of 
the teacher as a kind of relay point between psychological 
knowledges and the children who are in her charge. It attempts to 
outline an example of a set of pedagogic practices, in exactly the 
same way as the chapters which have preceded it set out to do. If 
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I may anticipate a possible reading of what this chapter is about, 
I would resist the idea that it represents the empirical work of 
the thesis: the thesis has a I l been empirical work. Here we see 
one of the crucial differences between a post-structural account 
and other sorts of accounts; the historical empirical work is a 
necessary analytical tool to lay bare the modes of functioning of 
our present practices, while the analysis of the present obeys the 
same methodological rules in aiming at a systematic account of 
what is said and how knowledge and truth are produced. Such an 
analysis should be a refusal of any simple separability between 
theory and practice, a necessary refusal I argued for in Chapter 1. 
In the Classroom in the 1990s: Some Additional 
Principles of Investigation 
My approach to this strand of my work was to engage in 
systematic analysis of the classroom discourses connected with 
reading in two first year infant classes at different schools in 
inner-city Manchester. This systematicity of analysis should be 
seen as a continuation of the methodological principles informing 
the historical work, but a set of additional principles were also 
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invoked; different tools were brought into use as the changing 
needs of the research demanded, in keeping with the bespoke 
nature of my research. 
A central tenet of this part of the research was that 
information derived from any participant in social life would be 
valid, since the account thus derived is a product of the social 
domain. An analysis of this domain in its specificity will produce 
an interpretation that is valid without the support of statistical 
samples. That is to say, I am rejecting an empiricist tenet that I 
must show that whole groups do the same thing (or, at least, are 
normally distributed in their behaviour). I am not involved in the 
production of anecdotes, but in analysing what is 'thinkable' 
within classroom practice, in exactly the same way as the rest of 
my thesis attempted to produce not a complete and universalistic 
account of the history of an object, but to point to crucial 
moments where new luminosities appear in discourse. My 
analysis of interviews with teachers, for example, are not meant 
to stand up by themselves, but are meant to enable the cracking 
open of discourse, to reveal what is thinkable as true. 
In addition, I am seeking here to problematise the relation 
between the researcher and the research, acknowledging the 
implication of subjective choice in the generation of the data. 
This problematisation is still quite rare in developmental 
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psychology, despite the fact that it has long been acknowledged in 
the natural sciences, from where hypothetico-deductivism is 
derived.3 A theoretical correlate of assuming researcher and 
research to be separable is the distinction between theory and 
method in the social sciences. David Silverman has pointed out 
how, on the principles of the hypothetico-deductive method, a 
hypothesis is formulated on the basis of theory, and data is 
collected quite independently to test the hypothesis.` In the 
strict empiricist terms of experimental psychology, a null 
hypothesis is formulated which the researcher attempts to 
falsify, a "rhetoric of verification [which] notably fails to 
specify how theory is to be generated - except by abstract 
contemplation."5 Statistical sampling reflects this separation 
of theory and method; the test itself, and what it purports to 
measure, is assumed to be in some way removed from the social 
world and thus from any 'contamination'. The social history of 
statistics, and the historical specificity of its procedures and 
rationale, are likewise regarded as irrelevant. 
Such principles of research are incompatible with my own 
understanding of the positioning of subjects in discourses 
constituted in cultural and historical specificity. I am not 
3 See F. Capra, The Tao of Physics, London, Fontana, 1975. 
David Silverman, 'Methodology and Meaning', in P. Filmer et al. (eds), New 
Directions in Sociological Theory, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1972. 
'Silverman, p.187. 
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interested in statistical sampling as a methodological principle, 
or at least as a principle which guarantees my account, but would 
accept instead a notion of something like 'theoretical sampling', 
as first expounded by Glaser and Strauss.6 They argue that the 
collection of data should be designed to generate as many 
categories and properties of categories as possible and to relate 
categories to one another; much of what they argue asserts the 
existence of universal truths, in contrast to my own insistence on 
discursively produced 'regimes of truth', yet there is still much 
to be learnt from their method. In thrusting the role of theory to 
the fore, it paradoxically leads to the possibility of a dissolution 
of a strict theory/method divide. Similarly, Glaser and Strauss's 
exposition of the 'comparative method' suggests ways of 
generating theory from the categories that have been isolated. 
Each segment of data is taken in turn, and once its relevance to 
one or more categories has been noted, it is compared to other 
segments of data similarly categorised. The range and variation 
of any given category can thus be mapped out in the data, and such 
patterns plotted in relation to other categories. Such a method 
contains an explicit acknowledgement of the role of the 
researcher in the generation of theory, and is a deconstruction of 
social science claims to neutrality. My approach to the classroom 
6 B. Glaser and A. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Chicago, Aldine, 
1967. 
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data was, perhaps, a hybrid of Glaser and Strauss's method, in 
that it attempted to relate what is said, and thus what is 
thinkable, to what is true. Knowledge and power, discourse and 
subject, must be treated as unities. 
But where does this leave the status of theories and 
categories thus generated? Roy Bhaskar is clear that it is only 
possible to produce explanatory accounts: because social sciences 
are open systems, "social scientists are denied, in principle, 
decisive test situations for their theories... [thus the theories] 
cannot be predictive... [but] must be exclusively explanatory."' 
However, this does not mean that such theories are not testable: 
"once a hypothesis of causal mechanism has been produced... it 
can then be tested quite empirically, though exclusively by 
reference to its explanatory power."' The research I have engaged 
in can be thought of as a kind of 'theory generating'; nonetheless 
it comes within the ambit of the empirically testable, and with 
its own (qualified) claims to generalisability. 
The question now arises of how participants are to be 
identified according to principles like those of theoretical 
sampling. Here, I introduce the importance of contradiction. 
Many researchers have pointed to the importance of studying 




sites of potential structural contradiction as a way of throwing 
into relief aspects of discourse which might otherwise remain 
hidden. I decided that it might be worthwhile studying schools in 
a working-class district; it was reasonably clear that the 
working class are frequently at the sharp end of structural 
changes in educational practice, and that their exposure to the 
predominantly middle class ethos of the school might illuminate 
some of these points of structural conflict and contradiction.9 I 
set out to collect a variety of 'texts' for analysis: semi-
structured interviews (with teachers and children), children's 
stories, tape recordings of reading sessions, field notes, and 
teacher training documentation available in the schools. 
The age range of the children at the two schools was wide; 
when I started my research they were aged from 4 years 3 months 
to 5 years 11 months. As far as the timescale of this empirical 
work was concerned, I was keen to work in the schools for as long 
as was practically possible, partly because of the way in which 
time is structured at primary schools. For example, a reading 
group I was keen to follow only took place once a week, and with 
the illnesses of teachers or children, the cancellation of sessions 
9 I have no wish to be dogmatic on this point, or to subscribe to any of the more 
simplistic readings of the relationship between classes, such as 'trickle down' 
theories of cultural hegemony, or theories of the working class as a 'living 
laboratory' for bourgeois experimentation, and all the rest. The problem was 
simply one of where to start research; pursuing an interest in possible sites of 
structural contradiction seemed as good a place as any. 
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for some 'special occasion', and a variety of other interruptions 
well known to anyone who has spent some time in a primary 
school, a lot of time was taken up in gathering small amounts of 
data. In the context of a limited period of research, I decided to 
spend two terms at each school on this strand of the work, a total 
of four terms in all. The rest of the chapter deals with the 
`categories' that I produced from the data. 
The Role of the Teacher: Facilitator or Instructor? 
The teacher is caught up in a complex situation as educator of the 
young citizen. Education is a matter of leading children through 
from one place to another, as its etymology makes clear, but to 
what extent can the teacher interfere in this 'leading through'? 
First of all, the teacher must 'love' her children; if she does not, 
it is quite possible that she will feel anxious. Ms. McCarthy talks 
to me about one of the children she does not particularly care for: 
"Really I should be trying to mother him 
a bit, but I can't stand it. it's awful, I 
hope I don't show it too much... It does 
irritate me that. 
Yeah, and you can't help it so you've got 
to make a special effort with the ones 
you don't care for. The only thing that 
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worries me, that relieves me I should 
say, is that I felt this way about him 
before I knew all that was going on. I 
think I'm going to have to work very 
hard and make a special effort." 
The teacher refers to the recent discover of a history of sexual 
abuse in the child's family; her anxiety and relief in relation to 
this child are what are most noticeable: the teacher is clearly 
constituted as someone much more than the person who teaches 
reading. Yet the teaching of reading is profoundly affected by the 
emotional dynamics of the classroom: 
"It... It is difficult. You just have to 
make sure you spend the same amount 
of time with them all, with their 
reading and everything. And I'm 
especially careful to spend the right 
amount of time with John, well 
because... well, you know." 
The teacher is responsible for the ambience of the 
classroom; it must be something like a 'learning environment', 
but it is more than that - it is a place for the constitution of 
young, autonomous citizens. The teacher's love for the children is 
one of those techniques for producing such citizens, especially in 
those instances where the home does not provide the right sort of 
love. Ms. McCarthy continues to talk about John: 
"It's just as I say, you don't get that 
much help from the parents. I've only 
ever seen his mother once; now there's 
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some man appeared called Malcolm, so I 
don't know what the mum's doing. She's 
supposed to be seeing the children but I 
don't know what she's doing." 
The teacher cannot just pursue the simple business of teaching 
John to read; the family dynamics press in on her, she has a role 
to play in compensating to a child who has now been placed in 
care. 
In one of the schools there are a set of teaching guidelines 
available in the staff room, typed up and culled from a variety of 
sources. The advice for helping the backward reader is 
instructive, because it concentrates on precisely these aspects of 
the teacher-child relationship as crucial. The most important 
things are not the method one uses, the books that are best; what 
counts is the teacher's attitude - the ability to display this 
`love': 
"Maintain the closest possible personal  
contact with the slow reader. Let him 
see from your attitude that you have a 
warm interest in him as a person, and 
that his happiness, welfare and 
progress are your constant concern. You 
will need to be consistent and not blow 
hot and cold in your relationships with 
him."" 
I° Emphasis in original. This school is very interesting in that many of the 
teachers are antagonistic to what they consider the 'trendy-lefty' philosophy of 
teaching, such as anti-racist and anti-sexist initiatives. All of their teaching guides 
are written up using the masculine form for the child. 
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The teacher has been placed in a curious position; by virtue 
of access to social work files, she becomes part of a network of 
possible interventions into family life - yet she also is required 
to substitute almost directly for mothers (and fathers) who take 
no interest in the child's progress at school. As Ms Williamson 
relates: 
"There definitely are some, like, you 
know, like Jocelyn, for example. I 
mean, I think it's a matter of supreme 
indifference to her mother how she does 
at school. Then all her encouragement 
etcetera has to come from me." 
Ms. McCarthy runs through the children on her register to tell me 
something about their reading: every one is commented upon in 
terms of how their school work is supported by or obstructed by 
what happens at home; a typical example is her comment on 
Andrea: 
"Andrea's doing very well. She's a 
little hard-working girl. Nice parents 
who help her. And she's a nice child 
anyway, she is quite keen, you know, to 
learn." 
The home is simultaneously the place that the teacher must 
somehow try to reconstruct in the school environment, with 
herself as a kind of substitute mother, and also the place that can 
be given ultimate responsibility for failures in the education 
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process. Ms Williamson tells me "home predetermines 
everything"; no doubt, such a discourse is possible as a result of 
all those scientific enterprises which have shown both the 
importance of innate abilities in the child and the importance of 
the 'early years' in child development. If the parents have let the 
child down by not providing enough stimulation in those years, 
then it makes the teacher's job almost impossible. On the other 
hand, it offers the teacher a kind of escape from what would 
otherwise be an overwhelming responsibility. Ms Williamson 
talks about Tracy, who is not quite a case for social welfare 
intervention, unlike John; but the parents' lack of interest mean 
that there is nothing much she can do: 
"Yeah, she's a pathetic little creature, 
she's in and out all the time. She's 
actually quite bright but because her 
attendance is so poor, she's never going 
to do much. She's sort of way... way 
down the list as far as progress in 
reading. It's a shame because she could 
do a lot better. Very little interest 
from home. You can tell to look at her, 
she looks pale and wan, uncared for." 
Me: "Why is her attendance so bad, do 
you know?" 
"Usually not very good reasons. 
Mother's waiting in for the electrician, 
they got up late, somebody was ill, 
somebody else was ill, this happened, 
that happened, you know, never 
especially good reasons, and often when 
she does come in her eyes are like that 
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because she's been up late watching 
television. It's... it's not uncommon... 
They'd know about any major problems, 
but I mean social work agencies are so 
understaffed and overworked that you 
can only deal with the really serious 
cases. Things like children going to bed 
after watching the midnight horror 
movie, I don't think they'll ever stop 
them, I mean, I've just known it 
throughout my teaching career." 
The transformation of reading, and education more generally, into 
an interaction between the home and the school means that the 
teacher does not have to bear the ultimate responsibility for the 
failure of the child. The teacher is finally confirmed as a mere 
facilitator of the process by the insertion of another piece into 
the theoretical jigsaw: the child as a natural learner: 
"You know, you can also see children 
who are so... bright and hardworking 
etcetera etcetera, and even a poor 
teacher isn't going to stop them... 
racing ahead." 
Not only does Ms Williamson espouse a belief in these natural 
gifts in childhood; it is also very visible in notes from a teachers' 
self-help group she attends. It is full of statements which 
sketch out the philosophy of teaching I have been trying to 
describe: "parents are crucial", "children learn to read by 
reading", "reading is a mixture of innate ability and 
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environmental influence", "teachers can help reading by providing 
motivation". The process of reading is constructed along this 
typical nature/nurture axis, and the delineation of the role of the 
parent and of the teacher is written into this grammar. Activity 
is a crucial way of eliciting these natural/environmental skills, 
and reference in Ms Williamson's notes is made to Cliff Moon's 
notion of reading as an 'active dialogue with the text'. 
In such ways are the teachers' practices in relation to 
teaching reading formed. Ideas about 'naturalness' or the 
importance of family life are inserted into the logic of the 
classroom almost at the level of common sense; of course, we 
know from an archaeo-genealogy of these practices that they are 
historical specificities. Teachers have access to a variety of 
academic psychological and educational literature which becomes 
part of their practice. One school has a (well-read) copy of Henry 
Pearson's account of psycholinguistics for the teacher:" the 
teachers in the staff room tell me they are familiar with 
psycholinguistics as a theory of reading and know something of 
the work of Frank Smith, for example. In the teachers' reading 
group, documents are circulated with titles like 'The Fallacy of 
Phonics', and 'Reading Readiness', which attempt to use Frank 
Smith to derogate these methods: meaningfulness should be the 
" Henry Pearson, Children Becoming Readers, London, Macmillan, 1987. 
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guide to everything - phonics is a bad idea because it does not put 
the stress on the overall meaning of the text, while the concept 
of reading readiness is a bad one because "there is no moment in 
early schooling before which nothing concerned with reading 
could be achieved". 
Unsurprisingly, an eclecticism informs most teachers' 
practice: so, elsewhere in Ms Williamson's notes is a section on 
the dangers of pushing children too hard; yet this discourse can 
coexist with an understanding of reading readiness as unhelpful. 
Ms Williamson herself has an insight into how her classroom 
practice has evolved: 
"Um, I mean, it's a long time ago since I 
trained, twelve years ago, and it would 
perhaps be wrong for me to work from a 
theoretical basis in the first place if 
that theory came from college because 
it's probably outdated anyway. Yes, and 
I learnt far more actually in the 
classroom than at college. That's... 
teaching is about individual children 
and you can't learn about individuals in 
college, it's only when you're in the 
field, so to speak, that you learn to 
identify their particular needs, how 
they respond, how they are likely to 
respond, etcetera etcetera." 
It is clear that teachers do not simply buy into a set of theories, 
psychological or otherwise; teachers' practices are formed from 
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a wider set of concerns. However, many of the theories that 
inform a teacher's practice become black boxed, even become 
common sense; attention to an individual's particular needs is one 
such 'common sense' aspect of 'good teaching practice' which is 
only gradually elaborated in modernity. 
Because the teacher is able to pick and choose from all 
these different resources, she is, I would suggest, always more 
than just a facilitator, as the current psychological theories urge 
her to be. Teachers themselves are aware that they 'teach skills' 
in certain situations (the two contradictory discourses of 
teaching skills and facilitating some natural path of development 
coexisting quite happily, since they are marshalled and put to use 
as the need arises). In addition, the teacher is constituted as 
part of the web that is 'the social'; she forms part of a relay 
which subordinates the inculcation of literacy to the master 
discourse: the production of citizens. 
Page 334 
The Classroom as Learning Environment 
John Dewey's call for the classroom to be reconstituted as a 
`learning environment' continues to be answered. With David 
Stow we saw a new valorisation of time and space, and the 
institution of the playground as a site of moral training. Valerie 
Walkerdine has outlined the shift in the 1960s from the 
`conventional' classroom, with its rows of desks facing the 
teacher, to the modern 'activity-centred' classroom, with a new 
arrangement of children and teacher in the thrall of active 
learning.12 We see in this new classroom evidence of a new mode 
of producing citizens; no doubt, some strands of the 
`technocratic' revolution of the 1950s instigated the substitution 
of 'science' for 'nature'. Yet, in allowing for a whole range of 
activities, play, silent reading, the "uncommitted area for the 
sudden unpredictable activity that requires space", the modern 
classroom is modern society in microcosm. One is perhaps most 
struck by the 'reading area' in the modern primary school; 
teachers have long since given up Lancaster's philosophy that 
quietness is the most important achievement of the school - in 
fact, there is seen to be a kind of healthiness in the bustle and 
12 Walkerdine, 'Developmental Psychology and the Child-Centred Pedagogy'. 
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the incessant noise of the primary classroom.13 However, the 
silence of the reading area is preserved at all costs, is a 
disciplinary priority. Silence is grafted onto reading in an 
effective disciplinary procedure; yet it is a silencing and a 
disciplining in the name of good education. This is precisely the 
theme of this thesis. Discipline produces: in this case, it 
produces that most useful of skills, literacy. 
The classroom is very much a training ground for our young 
citizens, and reading is a technique which is used to produce in 
them the attributes of a full citizen, all capacities amplified. 
Reading instruction is oriented around a notion of choice: the 
child is never compelled to do anything, but is won over, buys into 
the benefits that literacy can bring. This is done through a 
variety of simple techniques. First of all, we see the phenomenon 
of the library visit. When the child is at school, s/he can pick 
books freely from the school's own resources; however, the visit 
to the library is a much more explicit message to the child that 
the freedom to choose is part of learning to read. The children 
rush round the library, some too excited to remember the rule 
about silence - they pick it up after a few visits - and select 
13 If anything, silence has been recast as unhealthy, especially as it is regarded as 
indicating a kind of repression (of things like authenticity, creativity and activity); 
silence is also unhealthy because it can be opposed to a freedom from 
'authoritarianism'; 'healthy noise' is anti-fascist and anti-prussian. See the 
discussion of these issues in Denise Riley, War in the Nursery, London, Virago, 
1982.   
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whatever they like. Often, of course, they pick books that are 
inappropriate; much too hard or much too easy, and some have the 
curious habit of picking out books they have already read, as 
though they fail to understand what they have to do and settle on 
an old friend instead. These children are gently coerced into 
making different selections, shown that they are in error and how 
they can stretch themselves. David selects a pop-up book, much 
too easy for him considering how well his reading is going; Ms 
Williamson manages to convince him to put it back and get 
something else. She told me why afterwards: 
"Yeah, yeah, because he'd had that one, 
one of those that opened out into a big 
long [inaudible]. And that type of book I 
tend on the whole to discourage... David 
was just getting that big long book for, 
for no good r... because he liked the look 
of the book not... the actual..." 
Unfortunately for Ms Williamson, another child manages to get 
the pop-up book out of the library, so when I talk to David about 
his book choice, he insists that he has got the wrong book: 
Me: "What did you pick then David?" 
David: "I picked... I dunno... That's the 
one, no, that's the one Miss Williamson 
gave to me." 
Me: "Well, which one did you pick? Can 
you remember?" 
David: "This one." 
Me: "Why do you like that one?" 
David: "Cause it's got... I'll show you. 
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It does this [shows how book pops up]." 
David is still resistant to having his choice altered, but, of 
course, these are early days. In other areas, a similar tactic is 
engaged in, and the children seem to accept it. They are told to 
draw their own pictures, but the teacher will come round and 
suggest they do something else if their own choice is 
inappropriate. They are also constituted as authors of their own 
stories, although these too are rewritten by the teacher if they 
inappropriate:4 John wants to write a story about going to 
prison to see his dad, and this is redrafted into something less 
delicate; Collette has a story about going to Norweb (the 
electricity board), but the teacher redrafts something more 
aesthetic. By such techniques are children produced as authors of 
their own accounts, but accounts which have been sanctioned. 
Quickly enough, they learn to sanction their own accounts as they 
discover what is and is not appropriate. But this is another story. 
" In both schools, children were asked what they wanted their 'story' to be. This 
took the form of a sentence, such as 'I went to the shops on Saturday'. The teacher 
would write out the sentence, and the children would either write over the teacher's 
writing or copy underneath. They would also draw a picture to accompany the story. 
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Surveillance Through Examination 
It will not be a surprise to anyone that the examination of 
children is considered an educational priority; take this extract 
from some notes taken from an INSET course: 
The need for an objective test  
Teacher's opinions of children, no 
matter how expert, are liable to be 
highly subjective. What we want to 
know, regardless of other factors like 
running noses, poor dress and speech, 
naughtiness, good arithmatic [sic] 
ability etc, (all of which may cloud a 
teacher's Judgement) is how does a 
child compare in reading with average 
children of his age i.e. what is the 
average standard?15 
The teacher is given a procedure to obtain a score for the child, 
both in the form of a reading age and in the form of a reading 
quotient.16 The teacher has a simple and effective way of 
transforming the performance of the child (in this instance, the 
ability to read words) into an 'objective' score. The teacher is 
thus furnished with the means to know and to make calculations 
15 In this context, one can see that recent government moves in Britain to 
institute a National Curriculum with regular testing is only an attempt to make 
explicit a logic which is already well understood in the schools. 
16 Reading age: a child with a RA of 7.6 reads like a child of 7.6, regardless of 
his/her chronological age. Reading Quotient: calculated in a similar way to 10, i.e. 
reading age divided by chronological age times 100. 
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about the child in a new way, a more scientific way than by whim. 
What is this new knowledge about the child used for? 
We need to know a child's reading age 
so we can:- 
1. Put him on suitable reading matter 
2. Give him appropriate reading 
treatment. e.g. a 10 year old with a 
reading age of 7.2 is an obvious 
candidate for remedial treatment; a 6 
year old with a reading age of 10 will 
require to be stretched well beyond the 
average level of an infant class or acute 
boredom and under-achievement will 
result. 
3. Put him in the right group. 
What it is important to note here is that the examination and the 
mark, the production of a new sort of knowledge about the child 
through a specific means of inscription, is not the operation of a 
negative power. The examination is a technique of normalisation, 
but it is a normalising technique which has the amplification of 
capacities built into it as a raison d'être. The child who is behind 
must be given remedial treatment; the child who is ahead must be 
stretched. These tests in fact form a relatively minor part of the 
school timetable: they are regular but they are not seen as the be 
all and end all of the school." As a school's "Language Policy" 
document states, "Tests don't teach the child anything!" Such a 
notion of examination as instrumental to the real business of 
" Or at least they were not when I conducted this research. Recent moves by the 
current Conservative government seem to be privileging tests more and more. 
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`giving children a chance' is reflected in the way in which other 
attempts to maximise the child's potential are given far more 
time and attention. One school, for example, runs a system called 
`Work Samples', a kind of dossier of the child's progress, but a 
dossier where the child's work can speak for itself: 
"The most important indicator of the 
work a child is doing is the child's own 
work. Consequently, the work samples 
are essential to enable the school to 
monitor progress in terms of rate and 
level of achievement. Whilst work 
samples are taken once each term 
special pieces of work - both good or 
bad - may be relevant for inclusion in 
the files. In this way the files can 
become a true reflection of the child's 
work." 
These files are 'true reflections' precisely because they are a 
kind of democratisation of the process of evaluation. The child is 
the one producing the work, and the child, having taken on this 
prototypical authorial function, can actually present his or her 
own work in the name of his or her own processes of development. 
Of course, what is hidden in this story is the question of who 
does the selecting, how the child is lured into producing these 
pieces of work, 'good or bad'. Yet I would contend this issue has 
become invisible: if one understands education as a right rather 
than as an imposition, and if one understands teachers as 
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guardians who ensure that this right can be enjoyed, then this 
production of a young member of an advanced liberal democracy 
seems unproblematic. 
The test, then, is only one amongst many procedures the 
schools have in their battery for developing the child. Another 
crucial technique, certainly in the schools I studied, was the 
additional language teaching given to children of ethnic minority 
parentage under Section 11 of the 1966 Local Government Act. 
Under the terms of this act, Local Education Authorities can 
receive money for the employment of extra staff if they have to 
"make special provision in the exercise of any of their functions 
in consequence of the presence within their areas of substantial 
numbers of immigrants from the Commonwealth whose language 
or customs differ from those of the rest of the community."18 
Such interventions into the lives of children are, of course, easily 
critiqued as manifestations of 'racist ideology', manifesting an 
attempt to substitute white bourgeois language and values for 
those of another ethnic group. But to approach these 
interventions in such a way is to risk missing an important point: 
the influence of 'race' has been inscribed in a particular way - in 
the schools I studied, the child had to have both parents born in a 
foreign country (not just the Commonwealth) - and having been 
18 Home Office, Circular 72/1986, London, H.M.S.O., 1986. 
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inscribed, is put into play in a series of calculations about the 
child. The potential dangers of something like Section 11 are 
obvious to the teachers and the schools; as one school handbook 
states, just after a piece on Section 11 and Remedial Education 
(which are, incidentally, strongly distinguished): 
"This includes communication across 
the curriculum - the acquiring and 
passing on of knowledge, value [sic], 
beliefs and ideas. The children will 
learn as much from how we teach them 
as they do about what we teach them. 
We must ensure that opinions, beliefs 
and other value judgements are taught 
as such. We must avoid using methods 
or materials that may discriminate 
either openly or subconsciously and be 
able to justify everything we do." 
Ms Williamson, my epigrapher, makes it quite clear that she 
understands the costs and gains of teaching children to read: 
"I mean, to a certain extent, I suppose 
you're urn... constantly urging the 
children to conform, but then in any 
institution you can only get by, in a 
sense, by, you know, by conforming. So 
I suppose that's a negative aspect to it. 
But on the other hand, you're training 
them to take their part in society, so in 
that sense perhaps it's not negative, 
it's positive. I suppose it depends on 
where you're standing and how you're 
looking at it." 
Techniques like Section 11 education may well have a negative 
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effect on children's consciousness of their own racial identity: 
but that is not the point of such measures. As Ms Williamson 
eloquently put it, the point is "training them to take their part in 
society". No doubt, costs and gains are incurred in such 
strategies. 
I have dealt with some of the tactics of the modern 
classroom in relation to the teaching of reading which weave a 
web ever more tightly around the child. Probably there is no 
escape, no space outside these discourses where the child could 
refuse to be produced as a fulfilled citizen who is armed with 
literate techniques for living a particular sort of life. But I 
should not want to suggest that there is no resistance. Perhaps it 
would be appropriate to include in this chapter an anecdote about 
such forms of resistance. 
Late in the school afternoon, the children have a playtime. 
When they come back after play, they have a story, and then for 
the last fifteen minutes of the school day, finish off what they 
were doing before play. When they have finished their work, they 
can 'choose', that is, select an activity such as a game to fill the 
rest of the time. One child, Michael, in the period leading up to 
play, works laboriously slowly on his story. He does this day 
after day. In fact, it is clear that he has finished his story, but 
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spins out time with some extra colouring in, tracing over of 
letters, and so on. He finishes his work exactly at the moment 
when the teacher says it is time for play. One day, I go over to 
him and say that he has obviously finished his story; why does he 
not show it to the teacher. He tells me that he would not do that; 
if he does, she will make him start something else, and he will 
have to finish it off when he comes back from play. Michael 
would rather be able to 'choose' after play. At five years of age, 
after a term at school, Michael has begun to work out how 
institutions operate. 
In this chapter, I have argued that in the modern primary 
school classroom, one can see the uneasy coexistence of a variety 
of discursive forms connected with education, whose conditions 
of possibility I have traced out in the preceding chapters. Many of 
these forms can be made visible by an attention to the problem of 
literacy in the classroom. I have characterised the classroom as 
a learning environment which suits the demands of the modern 
liberal state; within its confines, children are produced as young 
citizens, authors of their own works, free and independent, who 
can choose the path of their learning. In addition, these 
characteristics of children are regarded as natural, and their 
naturalness is guaranteed by scientific psychology. Of course, 
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this is an idealised picture of what is going on - I have suggested 
that the notions as 'choice' and 'authorship' are not as 
straightforward as they might seem at first glance. A variety of 
disciplinary technologies operate as guarantors of this 
supervised freedom: the production of the silent, individualised 
reader is begun here; techniques of examination begin to operate 
upon the beginning reader; and the 'special relationship' between 
the teacher and the child, a technique which oversees the 
process, is forged in the carefree spaces of the classroom. A 
variety of malign influences, such as the disadvantages that 
might attach themselves to ethnic minority children, are guarded 
against. These practices have come to be regarded as self-
evident, in the main because they present themselves as 
necessarily humanitarian. Perhaps humanitarianism is nothing 
more than a sophisticated mode of enslavement. 
I suggested that such discursive forms have an uneasy 
coexistence; and there is certainly evidence of a variety of 
resistances to the 'amplification of capacities'. Children in the 
modern classroom may well be able to devise complex strategies 
of resistance, as do the their teachers. In particular, I argued 
that teachers are caught between the roles of facilitator 
instructor, between their own 'common-sense' conceptions of 
how to help children learn to read and that formulated for them 
Page 346 
by scientific psychology. Out of a confusing and confused set of 
discourses, however, arises a regular, daily pedagogical practice 
which seems to facilitate the production of the literate citizen. 
"A meticulous observation of detail, 
and at the same time a political 
awareness of these small things, for 
the control and use of men, emerge... 
bearing with them a whole set of 
techniques, a whole corpus of methods 
and knowledge, descriptions, plans and 
data. And from such trifles, no doubt, 
the man of modern humanism was 
born."19 
19 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.141. 
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CONCLUSION 
"I do not say things because I think 
them; I say them rather with the aim of 
self-destruction, so that I will not have 
to think any more, so I can be certain 
that from now on, they will lead a life 
outside me, or die the death, in which I 
will not have to recognise myself."' 
I have traced out a story over a long historical period: from Plato 
to the modern primary school. In the latter, there is evidence of 
discourses that have a very long genealogy. How have the modern 
practices of the school become thinkable? What are their 
conditions of possibility? These are two of the main questions I 
have addressed in this thesis. In this concluding chapter, I should 
like briefly to review some of the points I have made in the main 
body of the thesis in seeking to answer these questions. 
In Chapter 1, I introduced the theoretical framework that 
informed the conduct of the thesis, using certain problems in 
modern psychology as points of departure. I suggested that 
psychology and psychological explanations of the reading process 
are beset by a variety of problems - philosophical, 
' Michel Foucault. 
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methodological and political - which mean that a certain, perhaps 
rather strangulated, conception of the child beginning reader is 
inescapable. However, from the beginning, I claimed that what 
interested me most was an examination of what psychology 
produces as true in the course of its disciplinary activity. I took 
this to be the most useful step in a project of disputing and 
deconstructing the self-evident humanitarianism that is the 
frequent justification for the conduct of psychology and for the 
instilling of literacy skills in young children. 
In Chapter 2, I began, very schematically, to look at reading 
and the child in the period before governmentality began to map 
out a new political terrain. I argued that in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries one could see a world which, although very 
different from the present, is comparatively easy to understand. 
Power operated in a simple and unambiguous way over the child; 
the child became a reader because of the necessity so to do to 
engage in devotional practice. However, the child learning to read 
was quite untheorised: in the terminology I have adopted, s/he 
was invisible, unilluminated, uninscribed, incalculable. And yet 
it is important to note that a whole set of disciplinary 
techniques, like the multifaceted techniques of Zucht, forged to 
serve religious ends, made themselves available in the pre-
Classical period. Later on, the same techniques could be used in 
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connection with problems of secular life. The silencing of 
reading and the slow ascendancy of the examination are two such 
techniques which are born in a field of naked power, but which 
come to serve more cunning and insidious purposes. 
When I suggested that the child reader was as yet 
untheorised, I meant that, before the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, s/he did not have any 'psychological' dimension. S/he 
had become an object of anatomo-politics, but not yet an object 
of bio-politics. 
In Chapter 3, I indicated when and how a `psychologisation' 
of the reader (and of the young citizen) began to occur. I argued 
that this happened primarily because of a set of apparently 
contingent lexicographical problems. The enunciation of a series 
of linguistic problems connected with the double sign in the early 
eighteenth centuries was the key here; the 'discovery' of language 
as a temporally located, culturally specific phenomenon led to the 
`discovery' of the reader, and especially of the child beginning 
reader, as a potentially complex entity. In the books of this 
period, we can see a little light being shone on the child: the 
problem of the sign illuminated the problem of the reader. I went 
on to argue that the concept of the normal was invented at the 
same time, perhaps first in the world of lexicography and 
linguistics. 'Normality' swiftly became a concept which was 
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`black boxed', and which took on the aura of the natural and the 
obvious. Its deployment procured a certain docility, a certain 
civilisation, through the imposition of principles of hierarchy, 
enclosure, and partitioning, and of disciplinary time. In the 
social organisations of the time, one can see a prototype of the 
advanced liberal democracies of the modern West. 
This psychologisation of the child reader continued apace in 
the eighteenth century. As I argued in Chapter 4, the child reader 
was more and more finely defined and detailed: and the presence 
of detail provided new domains for discipline. Technical 
innovations, like the invention of the footnote, and the production 
of more and more texts targeted at specific readerships, brought 
in their wake, no doubt, new forms of subjectivity, new ways of 
being a reader. A comparison of texts from the middle of the 
eighteenth century, like those of John Hill or of James Nelson, 
with texts from only fifty years before, gives some weight to my 
claim: while the former place more and more 'psychological 
baggage' onto the figure of the child reader, the latter have 
nothing to say about this figure that is remotely psychological. I 
also suggested that this shift in sensibility could not be 
understood in relation to one simple cause, and argued that 
Puritanism was an important incitement to discourse, an almost 
ever-present backdrop. A whole series of literate habitus were 
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given their conditions of possibility by the intense activities of 
this particular group of religious devotees. What Puritanism did, 
more than anything, was to provide a motor for the spread of 
literacy; and once literacy had become a valued and valuable skill 
more widely distributed among the population, all kinds of 
unintended consequences could arise. 
If we are to understand the constitution and character of 
literacy in our age, the phenomena of silent reading and of 
`meaningfulness' deserve an extended treatment. In Chapter 5, I 
argued that silent reading spread throughout the educational 
world, especially in the period from about 1750, until by about 
1800 virtually all reading and writing was silent. This silencing 
served the function of 'individualising' the reader, of course; 
there was no need for reading to be a social activity; it became, 
perhaps, the private act par excellence. In addition, silent 
reading permitted that great disciplinary technique, the 
examination, to become the double process recognisable to us 
today: examination as a continuous apparatus of intervention and 
correction, and the examination, the testing of large groups. The 
latter eventually allows for new forms of inscribing and 
calculating the worth of the individual. 
Silent reading is, doubtless, a great help if the meaning of 
what one reads becomes paramount, but I contended that the 
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emphasis on meaningfulness in reading arose quite separately 
from the emphasis on silence. I suggested that the new 
importance of meaningfulness from about 1750 onwards was 
psychologically crucial. Reading became no longer about giving a 
good oral performance; it was about internalising the deep truths 
of literature.2 Indubitably, this shift initiated a new psychic 
realm; the Interiorisation of the word' must be formative of new 
forms of subjectivity and sociality - and I suggested that the 
emergence of the Weberian 'man of conscience' is compelling 
evidence of this point. 
The problems that are posed by governmentality, the 
problems of the rational arrangement of the art of government 
and of the procurement of the happiness and health of the masses, 
slowly marked out a domain of problematisation: and the child as 
a reader was constituted as part of that domain. If we skip ahead 
to the end of the eighteenth century, we see that the sorts of 
battles over language typified by the prosecution of Thomas Paine 
were conditions of possibility for the reappraisal of the 
operation of educative power: for the upper classes, the problem 
of the education of the lower orders was starting to be seen less 
2 I am not intending to argue that before this moment it was impossible to ponder 
literature deeply; clearly, there was a long tradition of Bible study and commentary 
which gives the lie to such a naive interpretation. However, I would guess that the 
old dominance of oral performance must have meant that a deep understanding of the 
text was arrived at in spite of the prevalent oral mode of reading. Silent reading 
must facilitate 'thinking' better than reading aloud. 
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in terms of a negation of opportunity - the power to say no - and 
more in terms of the possibility of transforming the ways in 
which social objectives could be achieved by the transformation 
of the desires of the lower orders. This was the main theme of 
Chapter 6. At last, it was beginning to be realised that education 
can accomplish many things, and that there is power to be had in 
giving people certain sorts of freedom. 
The first experiment which made use of this new way of 
understanding the world and of intervening into it, the monitorial 
school, was comparatively crude. Yet it empowered much of what 
was to follow, especially in its insistence on a new technique of 
personnel management, the government of the self by the self.3 
From an examination of what was said on the topic of 
monitorialism, I concluded that it would be a mistake to 
characterise it as an attempt to oppress the unwilling schoolboy; 
but it would be equally misleading to say that its practice was an 
exemplification of a pure humanitarianism. Rather, I suggested 
that we can see the operation of a new kind of logic, the 
privileging of the rational government of of the child and of the 
reader. Schooling was transformed into a hyper-rational 
discourse, and old-fashioned ideas about the 'joust' of learning 
3 It would be more accurate to say that this was a revived technique of the self. 
The Greeks and the Romans were, of course, renowned for their attention to the 
problem of the relation of self to self. 
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were forgotten.4 
In Chapter 7, I dwelt on a series of concerns which seem to 
enable us to link together monitorialism and its 'successors', the 
systems of reformers like Stow and Kay-Shuttleworth. A 
continuation of Christian notions of pastoral care, the discursive 
resources of the Greek interest in self-knowledge, self-care, and 
self-mastery, and a brand new German cult, a cult of the 
aesthetic personality, associated especially with the name of 
Schiller, enabled a transformation to occur in the turn to 
monitorialism; but these concerns almost immediately suggested 
that it was necessary to go beyond monitorialism, which was too 
crude to achieve its social objectives. David Stow doubted 
whether the monitorial atmosphere really enabled useful habits 
to be instilled in the pupils. Stow's answer was to reinvent the 
child and the teacher: the teacher must 'love' the child, while the 
To expand on this idea of the `joust'. My feeling is that in a variety of 
discourses, the operation of rational principles or rational inquiry came to replace a 
notion of something like the 'test', or the 'joust'. For example, in science in 
general, rational inquiry came to the forefront; to take the specific example of 
chemistry, an attempt to understand the 'reason' of the elements replaced the 
'testing' of substances (as exemplified in the practices of alchemy). In the area of 
medicine, a rational understanding of disease replaced the idea of disease as a 'test' of 
the individual; the doctor's job was once merely to accompany the patient through the 
course of a disease - if the patient died, s/he had `failed' the joust with death. 
Similarly, in legal discourse, rational inquiry into the facts of cases replaced the 
`testing' of witches, for example, by seeing whether they floated or sank. I would 
argue that something similar happened in literacy: the child no longer engaged with a 
text and succeeded or failed in conquering it, but was taught to read by the application 
of more and more rational principles. I understand Foucault's global notion of 
governmentality as being, in similar vein, an attempt to name the translation of the 
problems of government from the register of the 'joust' to the register of rational 
principles. 
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child can develop into a good citizen partly as a result of this 
new relationship with the teacher. 
At this point, reading almost disappeared. It had been the 
technique through which children had been inserted into 
discourse. Learning to read had been the technique through which 
the self was constituted: both the self and its relation to the 
self, and the self and its relation to the social. The message of 
reformers like Stow, however, was that reading is not nearly 
enough to constitute a full education. 
In addition, meaningfulness emerged still more strongly as 
a discursive resource with Stow. Rote methods of teaching 
reading were deemed inappropriate. With techniques of self-
government at stake, a certain flexibility was required in the 
person doing the governing - rote learning could never give the 
child the kind of mental flexibility required of a governor (of self 
or of others). With Stow, meaningfulness was reintroduced into 
the educational curriculum as a priority; and once reading was 
reasserted as a crucial skill by about 1870, it is easy to see how 
a link between the two became possible - reading had to be 
meaningful. 
I also dwelt in Chapter 7 on the invention of 'the social'; a 
moment at which a whole series of previously independent 
discourses could link up. With the invention of the social (and of 
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course, the statistics that did the job of linking concerns 
together `causally'), reading could be seen to have a relation to 
crime and health. And yet it was nothing more than a series of 
contingencies which enabled this new set of concerns to become 
visible. When the health and the police boards began to 
demonstrate class patterns of bad education, illiteracy, crime 
and ill-health that were historically and geographically stable, a 
series of new interventions became possible. Once again, the 
changing of the lives of the lower orders was not a matter of 
oppressing them; it was a matter of changing their lives for the 
better, to remove the possibility that there might be 'failed 
citizens' in our midst. Education and literacy increased 
dramatically. With the aid of discourses connected with 
comparisons between nations, a transformation was made which 
enabled mass education to become compulsory. This was not an 
easy moment in British educational history, but one which fitted 
with the logic we can clearly see developing: the necessity for 
the amplification of the capacities of the individual. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, it would be accurate to say 
that schools were part of a set of relays which included the 
prison, the asylum and the workhouse: schools were part of a set 
of social problems By the middle of the nineteenth century, they 
were much more closely connected with institutions like 
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Mechanics Institutes: they now formed part of a network of social 
facilitation. 
In Chapter 8, I discussed the moment at which the human 
sciences were able to come into existence. The institution of 
compulsory schooling was an important factor in this 
development. The human sciences, and particularly psychology, 
intervened on exactly the territory we have seen marked out by 
the problems of governmentality; but by using the school as an 
instrument, they came to inscribe the child reader in a new way. 
Psychology colonised reading over time: the development of 
psychological techniques of inscription like the reading test, 
reading age and reading quotient gave us a scientific truth about 
an object we could otherwise only know subjectively. I suggested 
that the reading test was one of the most crucial ways of 
inscribing reading, and of translating it to a new register. 
Psychology could now begin to fill its social vocation as a 
todifier'. As I discussed in Chapter 9, this process was begun by 
such pioneers as Thorndike and Huey, but was most crucially 
developed in the psycholinguistic revolution in reading in the 
1960s and 1970s. The psycholinguistic approach empowered 
what I have termed the reinvention of reading: reading tests were 
already pretty much standardised by the time the psycholinguists 
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came along5 - but in producing new positive knowledges of what 
reading and the child reader were, they profoundly changed 
teaching practice, and inserted yet another undercurrent into the 
discourse - that of 'teacher as mere facilitator'. Psycholinguists 
are among those who reshape the social domain because, through 
their attempts thoroughly to amplify capacities, they intervene in 
the relation between the teacher and the child, as well as the 
mother and the child, and more recently in the relation between 
the parent and the teacher, 'in the name of the intellect'. 
Finally, my examination of the operation of the modern 
classroom in Chapter 10, I attempted to show how practices with 
very old discursive roots are able to operate. I stressed how the 
classroom has become a micro-democracy, a place of supervised 
freedom and organised spontaneity, a place where, through the 
discourse of literacy, children are constructed as liberal 
citizens, with a stake in their own development, learning to 
become authors, aesthetes, lovers of good literature, as well as 
acquiring the levels of functional literacy required to make their 
way in the world. I suggested that techniques like examination 
are not, as we may suspect, repressive, and barriers to the 
development of subjective experience; rather, such techniques are 
s A very old test, Burt's Word Recognition Test, is still widely used in schools; 
most of the alternatives, like the Schonell Test or the Watts Sentence Reading Test, 
are no spring chickens either. 
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conditions of possibility for such experience. There is no 'ideal' 
child who pre-exists discourse, no 'wild' subjectivity which 
stands outside of the discursive. 
Implications of the Thesis: for Psychology, for Literacy, 
and for the Child 
There are, I believe, some important implications for political 
and for psychological practice that flow from this thesis. It 
should be obvious that the kinds of psychological knowledges I 
have been seeking to put under the spotlight are not politically or 
ethically neutral; however, this should not be taken as meaning 
that they are somehow oppressive. I am happy if this account to 
some extent debunks cherished ideas about the birth of 
intellectual disciplines, and outlines how they arise from a 
series of discrete, and ultimately very chancey, roots which are 
frequently less than glamorous and perhaps somewhat surprising. 
If, following on from these discoveries, this thesis is an aid to 
political action, it aims at enabling action which is piecemeal 
and local, with all due respect to the complexity of discourse. As 
for psychology, I hope that this thesis can be set alongside those 
Page 360 
texts which argue that to consider psychology as a purely 
intellectual endeavour is a nonsense. This thesis should be taken 
as an a refusal of the pure/applied distinction often made in 
psychology. The thesis is not pure research in that it suggests 
that knowledges like psychology are never abstractable from 
their effectivity - psychology is a productive discourse. 
Consequently, the relationship between methodology and data, 
which is usually rigidly enforced in psychology, is quite 
untenable. 'Knowledges' like psychology are necessarily both 
theoretical and engaging in specific fabrications: 'knowledge' and 
`power' are indissoluble. 
What are the implications of this research for children, and 
for reading? First of all, this thesis is an exemplification of the 
(by now well known) idea that persons are made up in discourse. I 
have argued that the child is not a raw datum awaiting scientific 
charting, but is made possible in its modern incarnation by 
psychology and by sets of literate practices. The child as a 
disciplined and maximised 'docile body' is a product of those 
power-knowledge realms I have outlined, as well as of many 
others, no doubt; I suggest that the ones I have chosen to examine 
are some of the most important for the formation of the modern 
child. As for the psychology of reading, this thesis would dispute 
the aims of that psychology as they are occasionally expressed or 
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as they are implicitly employed. Such a psychology cannot 
produce an absolutely true understanding of a set of problems 
outside of which it stands. When psychology began its 
colonisation of reading and reading instruction, it inherited a set 
of functions, in that literate techniques were already enmeshed 
in a set of habitus, imbricated in the production of technologies 
of the self. It added in a new set of devices for making objects 
visible and for making calculations about those objects. It is 
constantly making up the object of its study, fine-tuning its 
fictions and delivering them into regimes of truth. 
However, it is also important to note that discourses like 
the psychology of reading constantly blind themselves to what 
they are doing by their rather naive understanding of scientific 
and social scientific practice. For example, I have outlined how 
the `psycholinguistic revolution' of the late 1960s and early 
1970s is less innovative than its rather immodest claims would 
suggest. Modern reading research often claims to be a 
discontinuity, a break with a derogated past; yet I hope to have 
shown how the discourse became relatively stabilised in the 
nineteenth century. Many of the distinctions and innovations that 
such psychology claims for itself after this watershed are very 
minor indeed. This thesis would call for a reappraisal of the 
functions of such research, and would attack strongly the 
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triumphalist notions of the progressive accumulation of 
knowledge that is so frequently the rationale for its conduct. 
Psychologies of the child are doing many things, but they are not 
doing what psychologists think they are doing. 
Limitations of the Thesis 
My account of the conditions of possibility for a series of 
discourses connected with reading and the instruction of reading 
should not be read as intending to replace other sorts of accounts. 
I would rather it were read alongside them, in the hope that it 
sheds a different sort of light on some very old problems. An 
important difference, I think, is that I have not set out to write a 
history of the object itself, reading. I have rather attempted a 
study of a series of discourses in which reading is implicated, as 
way of giving some sense to our experience of modern practices. 
I should like to reclaim some of the playfulness with which I 
started, when I claimed my account would be more like a 
detective story. So it proved: the main 'object' of the study, 
reading, virtually disappeared from 1830-1870 from serious 
consideration; yet this was the period in which reading was made 
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modern, almost in its absence, we might say. 
I am aware that the story I have told about the child who is 
an object of literacy practices is a counter-intuitive one. I have 
suggested that individuals are made up by discourses, rather than 
pre-existing the discourses which take those individuals as their 
objects. My method has been to concentrate on what has been 
said, and if I wished to take a more defensive position, I could 
retreat and claim that I have given nothing more than an account 
of discourse. However, it seems to me unlikely that discourse is 
nothing more than a reflection of 'reality': it must also create it. 
It is impossible to prove this claim, although I regard it as a 
cogent one. If nothing else, I certainly hope to have generated 
some hypotheses about the history of literacy (even if they are 
untestable to a diehard empiricist) and to have enabled the 
possibility of thinking differently. 
The option I chose to follow in the conduct of this research, 
that of a laminary archaeo-genealogy, was a somewhat risky one. 
Indeed, as I was working on the thesis and a variety of books 
were coming out in the area, it was easy to become disheartened 
and to be unsure whether the work was proceeding in a helpful 
and sensible direction. Perhaps, in the face of these doubts, I 
clung on too closely to the periodisations and hypotheses of 
Michel Foucault; perhaps I have ended up writing little more than 
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a defence of Foucault's controversial 'generalisations'. Perhaps 
notions like governmentality became rather monolithic, 
explanatory categories in my account. Nonetheless, I still believe 
in the value of work of this type for the generation of ideas, and I 
still value the commitment of a history of the present to the 
disruption of present certainties. While researching this thesis 
has only increased my respect for the work of those professional 
historians who work with incredible care and hardly ever dare to 
guess, I still feel that a history of the present has much to offer 
- but it should not be confused with 'history'. 
Directions for Future Research 
In very general terms, there are many areas of psychology which 
need the disruption that a history of the present can supply. A 
`deconstruction' of the cognitivism that is invading 
developmental psychology and having effects on educational 
practice, for example, is an important venture. 
More specifically, there are research projects that could be 
taken up from this thesis. I am aware that I have talked about 
subjectivity very frequently, but have hardly begun to address 
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what one might term the 'nuts and bolts' of subjectivity. I have 
been happy to suggest that subjectivities are transformed by 
discourse, but how, exactly, does this happen? The notion of 
habitus I have made use of in this thesis provides a good place to 
start, but it is, to my mind, rather sketchy; it may well collapse 
into a kind of neo-behaviourism if pushed too hard. What I think 
is required is some research on the psychic constitution of the 
reader, research which would take seriously notions like desire. 
For example, some of the data I collected in primary schools and 
discussed in Chapter 10 cries out for a psychoanalytic or quasi-
psychoanalytic explanation of the 'transferences', the 'counter-
transferences' and the 'resistances' of the classroom. The French 
libidinal theorists (Lacan, Deleuze, Lyotard) would provide a good 
tool-kit here. While working on this thesis, I took a rather 
Pyrrhonian line, and was particularly dubious about anything 
which looked like it might be phenomenological or existential, so 
I ended up rather suspicious of 'experience'; yet I am slightly 
worried that a Foucaultian approach leaves subjectivity under-
theorised. 
It would also be possible to conduct more genealogical 
research on modern forms of government. In the course of 
researching this thesis, I became interested in the way in which 
the urban (as opposed to the rural) environment has become the 
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main governmental problem. I think it would be possible to 
extend the analysis I have begun to the ways in which the city has 
been 'read'. That is to say, how far has modern urbanisation 
required a reorganisation of the skills of the city-dweller. No 
doubt literacy is important here: at the very least people need to 
understand street signs, transport timetables, and the like. But 
there are doubtless a whole host of other 'skills' which the city-
dweller must have, or discourses into which s/he must be 
initiated - forms of hygienic behaviour, for example. Some of the 
`miscellany' of everyday life would be the topic of such research, 
and the labours of Mauss and of Norbert Elias would be 
inspirational in this regard. 
All this projected work would share, however, in a 
commitment to the undermining of the 'certainties' of the present 
which this thesis has tried to maintain. The laying bare of the 
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